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Movie mothers were neat, organized, energetic,
and seemed always ready to be a perfect spouse and parent.
Debbie Reynolds

With love to those who taught me I can design my own motherhood,
my mother Aida,
my children Yeram Zahir,
and
Íker Matías,
without them I would not be ME.
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ABSTRACT
Jessica M. Rodríguez Colón

DISPLACEMNET OF (M)OTHERS IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY U.S. FILMS: IMPACT
ON MATERNAL IDENTITIES OF ‘OTHER’ SUBJECTIVITIES
At the present two foremost studies, the Annenberg Report and CARD analyze the
inclusion or exclusion of underrepresented communities in film and television in US American
media. Both conclude there is an epidemic of representation, which includes the invisibility and
misrepresentation of characters and the narratives that surround them. As such the main
questions are: what is the current representation of maternal thinking in US American media?
How does the maternal representation and the gaze of mothers and (m)others influence and affect
the subjectivity of all mothers particularly, of those mothers who are positioned as others by
societal prescriptions? I argue that the representation and performance of fictional characters of
mothers in US American media impact maternal subjectivity, maternal otherness, and maternal
gaze. This argument is supported by presenting the current day of the Gaze Economy created by
the film industry, one that influences economic structures in the Unites States of America. Here
gaze economy is defined as the constant flux of exchange between the one who sees and the one
who is being seeing. In addition, this project introduces the concept of (m)other as the mothers
who are grouped outside of the dominant maternal discourse, but whom should be consider as
belonging within. Furthermore, this project presents a genealogy that explores how the
narratives, representations, misrepresentations and absent representations of some characters of
mothers, expand the culture of (m)others by furthering their conditions as an ostracized group.
The findings of this project will contribute to film, media theory, and film-philosophy critiques
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of representation and the epidemic of invisibility of underrepresented groups. Furthermore, the
project has deconstructed narratives, performances, and characterizations of mothers in a leading
role in the top 25 films from 2000 to 2019 in the United States of America to propose an
inclusion of other voices.

KEY WORDS: (m)others, gaze economy, maternal subjectivity, film, representation
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“In fact, none of you cared, because I'm pregnant. So, when you look at me, that's all you see, a
pregnant lady. And, look. Stop! Look! I get it. I know that “Mom” is the most important job in
the world, and not just because so many of you have told me that tonight. The thing is, I don't
want to be just a mom. I want a career. I want a life! I want to be seen as a person in my own…”
Jane Villanueva, Jane the Virgin, S1:E21 min. 23:52, 2015
Introduction
The above-mentioned quote from the television series Jane the Virgin displays one of the
concerns regarding the relationship between subjectivity and the gaze—to be seen. Furthermore,
her statement addresses one of the concerns of maternal subjectivity—to be seen as one’s own
person. Jane seeks recognition of her existence. When addressing the gaze, one generally refer to
the desires of the one who sees1, but as Jane presents it, the subject wants recognition and for it
“[wants] to be seen.” This concern of the gaze has been a part of the feminist critique of visual
representation for decades—“to be seen”, not as an object of desire or functionality but as “a
person” (Jane S1:E21). In the Feminist Film Theorists, Shohini Chaudhuri highlights the essay
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” by Laura Mulvey as one of the most significant essays
in the field of film theory due to its groundbreaking approach. In it, Mulvey takes a
psychoanalytic approach to expose the characterization of female roles in Hollywood as objects
of desire for the pleasure of the male gaze. Chaudhuri connects Mulvey with a more recent
research from 2005 by Martha M. Lauzen. This study examines the “celluloid ceiling”—a term
she coined—and in it, Lauzen’s “statistics reveal that not only are women significantly
underrepresented behind-the-scenes as directors, cinematographers, editors, producers, and
writers, but their chances of advancing through the industry are also far less than men’s”
(Chaudhuri 6). Research on the celluloid ceiling by Lauzen has continued as part of the Center
for the Study of Women in Television and Film, San Diego State University, that produces the
yearly report It’s a Man’s Celluloid World where portrayal of female characters is analyzed.
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Moreover, there is the Comprehensive Annenberg Report on Diversity in Entertainment2 (CARD)
which presents the most detailed study on matters of representation. CARD analyzed over 21,000
characters and crew members in over four hundred films and TV shows released between
September 2014 and August 2015 (CARD 2). They concluded that there is an epidemic of
invisibility and a problem with diversity in Hollywood.
Taking the contributions made by these media theorists and makers, in connection with
the work of feminist philosophers—including Judith Butler, Sara Ruddick, and bell hooks—as
the starting point, this project will examine the role media plays in the societal prescription of
motherhood in the United States of America particularly as it applies to mothers who are barely
represented—if at all—in fictional films and television series in the US American media. The
intention is to unveil and investigate the ideas about maternal identities, subjectivities, and
intersubjectivities carried through the fictional characters in US American films and television
shows in the twenty-first century. More specifically, this project focuses on the influence of the
maternal gaze on mothers who are placed as others within the maternal discourse and its current
impact on maternal subjectivity and/or the subjectivity of (m)others in US American films and
television shows.
The spelling of mother with the letter m in parenthesis highlights the status of otherness
placed onto those mothers within society. (M)others are those mothers who are grouped outside
of the dominant maternal discourse, but whom we should consider as belonging within.
However, then the question arises, who falls under the general definition of a mother? First, we
must consider that motherhood is an ideology constructed and confined within a paternalistic
structure and as such, the meaning of mother has two applications—one as a noun and one as a
verb. As a noun, the dictionary limits its definition to “a woman in relation to her child or
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children”, while the verb to mother is related to care, which Sara Ruddick redefined as
mothering. Feminist philosophers, such as Ruddick, significantly contribute to the expansion of
the meaning and understanding of these words by including the epistemological complexity they
carry. Nowadays, we can assert that such limited definitions of the mother are a common
misconception. For the purposes of this thesis, the word mother will refer to both the female
parent as well as the childbearing individual, for example surrogate mothers.
Other fundamental terms relevant to the understanding of (m)others and its gaze are the
coded concepts of the maternal. It is important to note that throughout this dissertation the word
maternal refers to that which belongs to the mother—which is geared by her thinking and
performances—while mothering is the historical and social qualifications ascribed to women to
perform a series of activities and work, related to childrearing. Maternity, motherhood, and the
maternal in general, has been omitted from or diminished by philosophical traditions or, at best,
defined through a male lens—not too far from its fictional representation in film and television.
As such, this male lens established the formulation of the primordial assessment of the maternal
to be a fundamentally biological condition to which women were thought to be predestined. For
instance, when speaking about the ethics of men versus women, Hegel talks about the role of
women and mothers as being predestined: “Woman, on the other hand, has her substantive
destiny in the family, and to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind” (§166).
On the other hand, and contrary to Hegel, Simone de Beauvoir asserts “One is not born a woman
but rather becomes one” (283), and this perception could encompass the maternal. Said statement
extends to the maternal precisely because it entails that nature never predestines the individual
who becomes a woman to mother another individual nor to act maternally.
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This study proposes that the societal prescription of motherhood—as well as the scholarly
analysis of mothers—has created a universal concept of the maternal that excludes many
mothers. These excluded mothers are the persons who will be referred to as (m)others—for
example refugee moms, surrogates, and IVF mothers. Furthermore, (m)other is defined as that
mother who is the other of an already societal other due to her maternal thinking, politics, and/or
practices. This project will examine the shortcomings of (m)others from the perspective of
theoretical analyses and visual representations. Specifically, the aesthetic representation of
maternal performances and the lack of (m)others in films and television shows particularly, the
influence of these on maternal subjectivity. As such, the central questions for the departure of
this investigation are: What is the current representation of maternal thinking in US American
film and television? How does the maternal representation and the gaze of mothers and (m)others
influence and affect the subjectivity of all mothers particularly, of those mothers who are
positioned as others by societal prescriptions? Does the current portrayal of characters of
mothers in US American films and television shows provide an array of maternal representation
that is close to reality or does it create a new form of displacement and invisibility turning
(m)others into an other?
This project suggests that to answer these questions, we need to revisit our understanding
of maternal subjectivity and the influences of maternal otherness and the maternal gaze on it.
Although Miri Rozmarin and Alison Stone have reevaluated maternal subjectivity by exploring
the relations between subjectivity and otherness in language and the mother-child gaze,
respectively, I will argue that we also need to include the influence that media has on maternal
subjectivity. I will further argue that the representations and performances of fictional characters
of mothers in US American media impact maternal subjectivity, maternal otherness, and
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maternal gaze. This inquiry is imperative in order to continue disrupting the patriarchal construct
of motherhood; by doing so, we can reshape parental roles and demystify gender roles attached
to parenting. To support this claim, this project will refer to a series of fictional characters
represented in different films and on television platforms—broadcasting, cable, and streaming.
To address these questions and support the argument, an intertextual approach will be applied,
using a psychoanalytical and deconstructive lens perspective where the philosophical and media
effects methodologies will remain in dialogue.
Scholars from multiple disciplines acknowledge that since the inclusion of television into
the US American household, both films and television shows have been at the core of the US
American household values, influencing its politics and societal gender perceptions. It is my
position that there is a dearth of diversity among the types of characters of mothers represented
in US American films and television shows. Majority of these characters of mothers are defined
by stereotypes and these stereotypes feed the patriarchal culture and a small percentage of the
feminist theory, thus creating an exclusion of mothers who do not fit into such prescription,
isolating and displacing them. Despite the recent changes in maternal representation, maternal
imaginary continues to be molded by the binary of good mothering and bad mothering while
simultaneously ignoring most mothers. Furthermore, even though we have seen a recent increase
in television series showcasing characters who represent mothers outside of the traditional
characterization—such as Jane the Virgin—those representations continue to feed the good or
bad binary of motherhood. I will contend that this practice of exclusion reflects the lack of
analyses of the diversity among mothers and (m)others who are a part of the societal maternal
discourse. I intend to demonstrate that such exclusion perpetuates the continuation of stereotypes
which creates an epidemic of invisibility of (m)others in films and television shows.
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Accordingly, this project will begin by analyzing the feminist critique of maternal thinking and
the way films mirror some of those proposals by creating gaps of exclusion which will be
examined to generate a new proposal of inclusivity of (m)others that could be included in both
maternal theory and film culture.
Maternal Theory
One can trace the genealogy of female philosophers who integrated philosophical and
psychoanalytical theory to shatter patriarchal opinions, including their contributions to the
history of ideas by presenting a female perspective. For instance, substantial contributions to the
development of thoughts with regard to the maternal issues are found in the works of Luce
Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and bell hooks. All of them advanced the concepts of maternal issues by
questioning how language is used to speak about women. In Body Against Body: In Relation to
the Mother, Irigaray refers to the medical language used by mental health professionals in the
context of the conference where she had presented the paper. Irigaray says “the absence of male
doctors [in the spaces where female voices are presenting their ideas] is, in and of itself, one
explanation of madness in women: their words are not heard” (10). In other words, the absence
of those doctors acted as a silencing device; not listening to women’s views is a way of
dismissing their voice and expertise. This course of action is not limited to psychoanalysis; it is
also present in many aspects of society which leads to the continued perpetuation of language
that advances privilege structures of power, including the dominant male perspective. Irigaray
argues that for the reconstruction of language into one that includes vocabulary that extends to
the phenomenological understanding of female realities and the body of the mother, a
reconstitution of language which incorporates the voice of women and is not limited by the male
viewpoint needs to be developed. These aspects of language will be explored in the chapters two
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and six, when some films and television shows are analyzed by deconstructing their verbal and
visual language. Chapter six, aims to show how the majority of productions essentially silence
(m)others through their continued use of male and middle-class language—which originates
from a privileged position.
Many feminist scholars concur with the idea that motherhood is socially constructed. It
follows from such agreement, then, that motherhood is a social construct and as a consequence,
variability in maternal performance might occur based on one’s cultural and socioeconomic
status. As such, these performances allow for the development of a series of politics and
philosophies based on the maternal. Therefore, one of the most questionable issues
encompassing the notion of the maternal is in its historical and social context, where the word
maternal carries in its meaning elements of parenting that are not exclusive of the female parent
but which are socially imposed upon her as instinctive of the female parent. In Gender Trouble,
Judith Butler presents a critical reading of the framework of ideas that Julia Kristeva uses to
define motherhood and the maternal body. Butler critiques the “reification of the paternal law”
presented by Kristeva since by doing so, “the varied meanings and possibilities of motherhood as
a cultural practice” (119) is denied. This critique raises—once again—the question: how do we
distinguish mother, motherhood, and the subjectivity of the mother? Motherhood is frequently
defined using patriarchal language based on the assumption that the female parent intuitively and
naturally should perform childrearing. On the other hand, the maternal—as described above—is
a set of behaviors and emotions surrounding the care of the other—the other usually being a
child. The maternal has also been defined using male language design to keep women in the role
of mothers and defined by performances of the labor of care.
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One of the pivotal moments in maternal thinking was when Sara Ruddick published
Maternal Thinking: toward a politics of peace in 1989. In it, she mainly argues that “maternal
voices have been drowned by professional theory, ideologies of motherhood, sexist arrogance,
and childhood fantasy” (Ruddick 40). Ruddick presents different aspects of motherhood—one no
longer concerned with motherhood as an institution but as a series of daily activities of
childrearing and caring that any parent could perform. However, some of the care labor which
Ruddick refers to as maternal can be performed by anyone because it is not inherently of the
female parent—neither of women nor their childbearing bodies. This historical context of the use
of language that surrounds the mother could be seen as problematic when, for example, Ruddick
refers to the care performed by some fathers as “being maternal.” In the essay “Revolutionary
Parenting”, bell hooks recall how Sara Ruddick romanticizes the maternal as something anyone
can perform; in some instances, Ruddick tells us that a man can be maternal—meaning that men
can care for the child. bell hooks that referring to the male parent as maternal is problematic
because it perpetuates the notion that childrearing and caring is a female instinct. As such, it
reinforces the social belief that female-bodied individuals can perform maternal care better
because it comes naturally to them. Whether one agrees or not with the way Ruddick defines the
maternal, one cannot deny that this has been the unspoken issue at the center of the maternal
discourse—as seen in the critique by hooks. After its initial publication, a significant number of
scholarly works surfaced, resulting in the emergence of the field of maternal studies.
As presented, maternal and motherhood are based on behavior and social structures,
respectively while on the contrary, we have the terms maternity and mother. Maternity is
biologically based, being those biological actions performed exclusively by the female body and
related to mothering, such as pregnancy, birthing, breastfeeding, and even surrogacies. On the
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other hand, the word mother signifies the female parent whose parental expectations carry as a
priority the care of another—limiting, at times, its subjectivity to that other, the child. This
distinction is necessary to reiterate that not all mothers go through maternity and vice versa, not
all females that go through maternity are mothers. When taking the word maternal into
consideration, one could question the extent to which the philosophical traditions dispossessed
mothers of their maternal individuality by producing maternal archetypes that are accepted as
universal symbols. When speaking about dispossession, Judith Butler says that “we are moved
by others in ways that disconnect, displace, and dispossesses us” (14). In direct conversation
with Butler, Athena Athanasiou states that “dispossession works as an authoritative and often
paternalistic apparatus of controlling and appropriating the spatiality, mobility, affectivity,
potentiality, and relationality of (neo-)colonized subjects” (19).
This project will extend its inquiry to how the dearth of representation of (m)others in US
American media is a form of colonization of the maternal, including its thinking. The ideas of
dispossession and colonization of the maternal gaze in Hollywood will be further explored in the
third section of this project. When speaking about the decolonization of the gaze, Audrey
Gwendolyn Foster says “decolonization of the ‘gaze;’ and the re/construction of sites of filmic
diasporic subjectivity is particularly difficult because of the persistence of white hegemonic
Hollywood constructions of spectatorship, ownership, and the creative and distribution aspects of
filmmaking” (1). Such aesthetics, as forms of colonization of the gaze, will be further explored
and will provide an outline to argue in favor of the politics of (m)others with the potential shift of
the gaze from an oppositional gaze toward a resistant gaze.
One of the ways in which mothers have challenged the gaze and provided mobility
toward decolonization of the maternal gaze is through artistic practices. Andrea Liss states that
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maternal aesthetics “gives stunning evidence of a multitude of maternal voices in visual art and
writing that contribute to the concept of ‘the surprise of the real’ in ways that open up the
possibilities for reflecting on maternal identities, subjectivities, and intersubjectivities” (6). To
this, Rachel Epp Buller adds that there is a bond between the assertion—or what she calls
reconciliation—of maternal subjectivity and the artist’s identity. These examples of maternal
aesthetics serve to illustrate the polyphony of maternal subjectivity, i.e. the subjectivity of the
mother characterized by her intersubjectivities. The disruption of the gaze is not enough nor is
the reconciliation of the intersubjectivities. As such, these voices are also inserted into the
philosophical discourse.
From all the qualities that relate to the maternal, perhaps the most difficult to define is
maternal philosophy first and foremost because of the traditional exclusion of the mother as a
thinking and independent being. It is important to note the two critical components of the
publication of “Maternal Thinking” by Ruddick. First, the original essay that later gave life to the
book, was published in Feminist Studies, even though today many consider it a philosophical
text. Secondly, it is directly attached to political economy, particularly the economy of the body
and politics of peace. Is important to highlight that in “A Conversation about Maternal
Thinking”, Ruddick shares with Andrea O’Reilly that when she initially wrote about maternal
thinking, she did not view it as a form of philosophy. Ruddick says “neither the thinking that
mothers engaged in or the thinking about maternal thinking that I was doing twenty years ago
were, in my view, philosophical” (18). Her statement corresponds with one of the themes to be
explored in the first part of this project, i.e. the theoretical and historical framework in which
feminist phenomenologies are bracketed, for example the label feminist studies, while ignoring
that feminist thinking as well as maternal thinking were and are philosophical inquiries.
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As such, this project defines maternal philosophies as a set of ideas that pave the actions
of mothers while not ignoring the discourse among maternal philosophies where any individual
can perform the maternal. Maternal philosophies are constructed within a pluralism that
incorporates many things among which are the aspects of the mother’s culture, geographical
location of childrearing, and socioeconomic status. In some instances, these considerations have
led to overgeneralized statements where one maternal reality is valued over another. This is
evident in media characterization of mothers but is not exclusive to it; we can also witness it in
maternal philosophy.
For example, in 2010, the French philosopher and historian Elisabeth Badinter published
The Conflict: how modern motherhood undermines the status of women where she argues that
the return of mothering tethered to nature undermines women today, and it is a setback from
what women achieved in prior decades. As a strategy to map her argument, she speaks about the
maternal divide of good versus bad while speaking about the diversity of women’s aspirations
and its connection to childbearing choices. Badinter creates a set of categories of women based
on their maternal work choices: “vocational motherhood, nullipara, saying no to children, the
postponers, and the Negotiators” (The Conflict). On the other hand, Simone de Beauvoir
dedicates a chapter of The Second Sex to the situation of the mother where she presents a series
of examples of the status of the mother as constructed by the patriarchal ideal of motherhood.
Beauvoir indicates that this situation “is highly variable.” These variables are evident in the
development of the genealogy and understanding of the analysis of maternal aesthetics presented
in the work of Liss and Buller. In general, these sets of maternal philosophies and aesthetics are
attached to maternal performativity which either lingers or rejects maternal subjectivity.
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Maternal Subjectivities and Otherness
If maternal subjectivity is the mother-self, it is essential to understand how the motherself came to be or was defined. Throughout this project and particularly in chapter one, I intent to
define maternal subjectivity with the voices of female philosophers. For both Plato and Hegel,
the mother was limited to a labor of care, thus neglecting the capacity of being to that which
cares for the other, that other being the child. Chapter one will explore how maternal
philosophies provide insight into maternal subjectivities; I will argue that maternal subjectivities
are a continuum influenced by time and culture. Furthermore, such continuum lies at the center
of maternal philosophy, politics, and aesthetics.
Generally, subjectivity can be described as the awareness of being a subject, or the
consciousness of existence. Subjectivity could also be understood as that which influences our
morals and actions. For the purpose of this project, we will focus mainly on subjectivity as being
in constant movement and development as well as not being fixed, perhaps as something that
will be better described as being inter or hyphenated—intersubjectivities. Deleuze and Guattari
define subjectivity as that which is created by its multiplicity and characterized by its polyphony.
When describing the constant move of becoming, Deleuze and Guattari state “the self is only a
threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities. Each multiplicity is defined by a
borderline functioning as Anomalous, but there is a string of borderlines, a continuous line of
borderlines (fiber) following which the multiplicity changes” (249).
Equally important, with regards to female subjectivity, Simone de Beauvoir states that
men have always placed female subjects as the other. She suggests that a woman “is determined
and differentiated in relation to man, while he is not in relation to her; she is inessential in front
of the essential. He is the Subject; he is the Absolute. She is the Other” (Beauvoir 6). Moreover,
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when speaking specifically about maternal subjectivity, she presents it as one being in an illusory
state during the pregnancy stage:
She is no longer an object subjugated to a subject; nor is she any longer a subject
anguished by her freedom, she is this ambivalent reality: life. Her body is finally her own
since it is the child’s that belong to her. Society recognizes this possession in her and
endows it with a sacred character…
Alienated in her body and her social dignity, the mother has the pacifying illusion of
feeling she is a being in itself, a ready-made value…
But this is only an illusion. Because she does not really make the child: it is made in her;
her flesh only engenders flesh: she is incapable of founding an existence that will have to
found itself; creations that spring from freedom posit the object as a value and endow it
with a necessity: in the maternal breast, the child is unjustified, it is still only a gratuitous
proliferation, a raw fact whose contingence is symmetrical with that of death. (Beauvoir
539).
Additionally, when exploring the relationship between the self and the other regarding the
subjectivity of the mother, Simone de Beauvoir discusses the pregnant woman and the mother
after the weaning process of her baby. Regarding the former, she states:
The transcendence of an artisan or a man of action is driven by a subjectivity, but for the
future mother the opposition between subject and object disappears; she and this child
who swells in her form an ambivalent couple that life submerges; snared by nature, she is
plant and animal, a collection of colloids, an incubator, an egg; she frightens children
who are concerned with their own bodies and provokes sniggers from young men
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because she is human being, consciousness and freedom, who has become a passive
instrument of life. (Beauvoir 538)
Regarding the latter, she states that the mother as a being of value is an illusion: “she is
incapable of finding an existence that will have to found itself” (Beauvoir 539). Moreover, she
speaks about the dualities and polyphony of the mother as both a being and an object of desire.
On the other hand, in the essay “Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity”, Alison Stone
presents mothers as those subjects who are trying to regain their subjectivity. Stone defines
maternal subjectivity as “a specific form of subjectivity that is continuous with the maternal
body” (297). She agrees with de Beauvoir in the sense that both identify the social
prescription/condition of the mother as being deprived of her subjectivity. Stone tells us that,
“the mother implicitly identifies herself as being constructive with the other” (301), for the
mother is a mother only to that other which is the child—whether absent or present. Once a
mother, always a mother.
Current scholarship pertaining to subjectivity and the mother understands it as that which
“depends on the mother's ability to be a subject in other areas of her life and to choose
motherhood freely as a mode of existence for others” (Rozmarin 6). Furthering these ideas, this
project defines maternal subjectivity as the mutation—not only the Deleuzian movement—of the
self into a new self that is related to a specific other and to the conditions imposed by the society.
I will define maternal subjectivity as a subjectivity that is not universal for all mothers, one that
is in constant transmutation, and one that is influenced by multiple circumstances, including
time, space, economics, and culture. This project will explore to what extent the subjectivity of
the mother should be defined solely based on that other is based on self-determination or whether
it is a patriarchal construction to confine a mother to their prescription of maternal subjectivity.
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Also, it will question whether the subjectivity of the mother is conditioned to her displacement.
Both Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray explore the displacement of female subjects
into a category of the other. In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir shows how women are viewed and
placed as other within the patriarchal social structure, facilitating that this condition is due to
how women are valued in the society. Further, she exhibits how women are positioned as an
other in relation to men. Later, Luce Irigaray develops this notion of women as other in
Speculum of the Other Woman. When speaking about the “particular economy of discourse”
(Irigaray 135) on the matter of otherness, Irigaray asserts that “others who will always have been
in service of the same, of the presuppositions of the same logos, without changing or prejudicing
its character as discourse. Therefore, not really others, even if the one, the greatest, while holding
back his reserves, perhaps contains the threat of otherness” (135). Within this discourse of
otherness, both Beauvoir and Irigaray explore a different debate, which is that of the woman who
is a mother, her condition, and the social expectations placed upon her based on biological
possibilities. Irigaray argues that women are always mothers because they are constantly giving
birth to more than just children. She saw the maternal as the giving of birth, including the birth of
desire in others, while de Beauvoir situated a conditionality to the labor of the mother—stating in
several of her writings and interviews that women are better off avoiding motherhood.
However, this project aims to reframe subjectivity of mothers in an attempt to liberate her
from patriarchal constraints which confine women to maternal care and fathers into free
selfhoods. The concept of otherness as developed by feminist writers within language can shine
some light on the definition of maternal subjectivities.
In her book, Around 1981, Jane Gallop develops the concept of (m)other, using the ideas
of difference as presented by Jacques Derrida as a point of departure. When parenthesizing a
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word, she reminds us that “the play of its parenthesis, using the material of language to reflect on
the language, resembles the stylistic devices of poststructuralist writers such as Jacques Derrida
and Luce Irigaray, as well as American feminists such as Mary Daly” (57). This bracketing will
be further discussed in the chapter two when discussing in detail the genealogy of the concept of
(m)other in the feminist tradition, moving from continental feminism to political feminism and
toward the opinions of contemporary feminist theorists in the United States of America. Such
chapter will conclude with an expanded definition of (m)other to the extent of including mothers
who are different from the societal prescription of motherhood. In it, the position of (m)others as
others will be examined to determine its effects on maternal subjectivity. (M)other will be
identified as the mother who is isolated and displaced by the societal prescription of motherhood.
The project will survey an array of (m)others with the intention of questioning the limitations of
the classifications of mothers as created by Badinter which is based on socioeconomic decisions
of labor. This project will look into the representation, misrepresentation, or absent
representation of some (m)others, including undocumented mothers, LGBTQ mothers,
infanticide mothers, imprisoned mothers, mothers of children with disabilities, refugee mothers,
diasporic mothers, grieving mothers, and mothers from different ethnic groups whose maternal
experiences are situated in the United States of America.
On Maternal Silence, Miri Rozmarin argues that, “the project of figuring maternal
subjectivity necessitates a reevaluation of the modalities of language that can bare the unique
relations between subjectivity and Otherness that underlie maternal subjectivity” (4). These
relations influence the politics of motherhood. Therefore, I propose we revisit this reevaluation
by looking into the maternal gaze in US American film and television productions in the
twentieth century. In order to do so, we must use performance studies as a medium to understand
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the visibility and invisibility of maternal subjectivities in US American media.
Maternal Politics
Maternal politics or the politics of motherhood refers to the actions or enactments
associated with maternal philosophies. Maternal politics is the enterprise that leads mothering
and by which maternal identity stands. Joined by maternal philosophies, maternal politics is at
the center of the maternal divide—Diana Taylor calls it the “uneasy relationship between
feminism and motherhood” (349). Taylor reminds us that one of the conflicts within secondwave feminism was that many women faced dilemmas regarding the social arrangements of
motherhood. In chapter four we will see how the conditions within the institution of motherhood
in conjunction with other ideologies, had led mothers into the political sphere as mother activists,
or political subjects who can either assist their communities or government by advocating for
peace, war, and anything in between or outside of these parameters. Leading us to think that
maternal politics are outside of binaries, and that they are driven by multiple philosophies and by
its differences.
Performance and Representation
In an interview for the Hemispheric Institute of Performance and Politics, when asked to
define performance studies, Diana Taylor says that it is about actions and the disruption of
structures, and that its importance resides on how it allows us to look at multiple areas as
mutually constituting. She states “we really can’t think about behavior and embodied practice
without thinking about disciplinary kind of performances—how we do gender, how we do race,
and the way that we get constructed as bodies” (Taylor HDVL). Moreover, she elaborates by
reminding us that performances have a contestatory aspect since each person can perform things
differently. According to Taylor, the study of performances invites us to think about knowledge
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in a different way by looking at history, economics, law, or medicine through a different lens. As
such, performance studies provide us with a different methodology.
Alternatively, but not contrary to Taylor, in the third edition of Performance Studies: An
Introduction, Richard Schechner identifies and outlines the following:
Seven areas where performance theory and the social sciences coincide:
1. Performance in everyday life, including gatherings of every kind.
2. The structure of sports, ritual, play, and public political behaviors.
3. Analysis of various modes of communication (other than the written word); semiotics.
4. Connections between human and animal behavior patterns with an emphasis on play
and ritualized behavior.
5. Aspects of psychotherapy that emphasize person-to-person interaction, acting out, and
body awareness.
6. Ethnography and prehistory—both of exotic and familiar cultures (from the Western
perspective)
7. Constitution of unified theories of performance, which are, in fact, theories of
behavior. (Schechner 17)
Further, the second section of this project will focus through all three chapters on how
philosophies of becoming—from de Beauvoir to Butler, including Deleuze and Guattari—and
female phenomenology influence the performance of the self, particularly of mothers and
(m)others. Concentrated attention will be paid on how power structures gear or limits these
performances. This study intends to engage in dialogue involving these seven areas that coincide
with the philosophical inquiry of this study while analyzing performativity of maternal
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subjectivities through the analysis of the fictional characters of mothers, their behavior, and their
influence and impact on the subjectivity of mothers.
One of the concerns of this project is how performativity is defined within the realm and
across the disciplines of the maternal, including its philosophies and not just within performance
studies. Schechner explains that performativity is a broad term “covering a whole panoply of
possibilities opened up by a world in which differences are collapsing, separating media from
live events, originals from digital or biological clones, and performing onstage from performing
in ordinary life” (123). Furthermore, similar to Taylor, he states that “performativity points to a
variety of topics, among them the construction of social reality including gender and race”
(Schechner 123). In order to understand performativity better, Judith Butler’s writings help by
stating that it “characterizes first and foremost the characteristics of linguistic utterances that in
the moment of making the utterance makes something happen or brings some phenomenon into
being” (28). Furthermore, when speaking specifically about theories of gender performativity,
Butler affirms “performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves
its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally
sustained temporal duration” (xv). Consequently, we can assert that the characterization of
mothers in media is not a singular act but framed acts of repetition and rituals based on the
maternal prescription of mothers in US American society. Taking these characteristics of
performance and performativity into account, the second and third section of this investigation
will study how women who are mothers perform their mother-self. Are these maternal
performances a reflection of their maternal subjectivity or a reflection of the maternal mirror
promoted and advertised to them through several media platforms? Furthermore, what is the
connection of maternal performances with reference to their politics and philosophies?
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Moreover, such inquiry will delineate the connections and influences of fictional characterization
on to daily societal performances.
From the performance of the self to the characterization of fictional performances of
mothers, the inquiry about representation and subjectivity is latent. When discussing maternal
representation, Eti Wade states:
Maternal representation within the arts is a practice that goes toward acknowledging
diverse and non-idealized maternal subjectivities to the benefit of both mother and child.
Currently, representation of maternal subjectivity remains mostly absent from the culture
with the possible implication of maternal misrecognition of what a ‘good enough mother'
is. Art works that articulates maternal subjectivity have the potential of opening up debate
and acknowledging the diverse range of maternal subjective experiences. (Wade 3)
Although Wade’s acknowledgment of maternal representation in the arts falls within maternal
aesthetics, and the focus of this projects falls within the Hollywood industry, a possible
underlying question is whether the Hollywood industry could benefit from maternal aesthetics in
the future while developing characters of mothers. As it could be observed through the
deconstruction of the films and television shows selected for this study, the characterization of
mothers in Hollywood remain narrowly divided into stereotypes, creating a limited spectrum
based on the good and bad binary of invisibility.
This project contends that contrary to maternal aesthetics, the current fictional
characterization of mothers in films and television shows in the United States of America
propagates the discourses between different mothers by limiting the maternal gaze to the binary
of a bad and good mother through the reproduction of stereotypes that create an epidemic of
invisibility. Although some may argue that we are witnessing more films and television shows
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focusing on the mother, this project will serve as a roadmap to delineate that the addition of such
maternal characters produces a small change in the narratives. This is mainly because those
stories continue to be presented primarily through the patriarchal lens, with a male language, and
within the US American white middle-class spectrum, furthering the invisibility and
misrepresentation of many (m)others while creating spectacles of their characters. Furthermore,
this seclusion influences the maternal gaze from the fictional screen to our daily interactions and
expectations. As a result, it affects maternal philosophies, maternal politics, and maternal
subjectivity.
Situating the Gaze and the de-reconstruction of the Gaze of the Mother
Since the project addresses the issues of visibility in films and television shows, chapter
five will be dedicated to delineating the details of the maternal gaze. But before we develop a
theory around the maternal gaze, its effects on maternal subjectivity, and the need to decolonize
it, we must look briefly at some of the key theories about the gaze. Before diving into the
analysis of the problems and possibilities of the maternal gaze, we will look into how the gaze
has been defined in general terms. Then, we will explore how it has been defined in relation to
female-bodied individuals, and finally, toward the mother. More specifically, we will trace its
discourse from its definition into a redefinition or reconstruction of the maternal gaze which can
empower the maternal experience toward liberation from the traditional constraints of the gazes.
This project will look at the maternal gaze as a polyphonic one that could be analyzed from a
psychoanalytical lens toward a political one.
It can be oversimplified as the act of seeing or the act of being seen. The discourse
around the gaze has been common in art criticism and film theory. From analysis of the gaze
within a painting, such as that of Las Meninas done by Michel Foucault, where he describes the
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viewer versus that which is viewed within the painting and in the spectacle created when
spectators view the work of art “no gaze is stable, or rather, in the neutral furrow of the gaze
piercing at a right angle through the canvas, subject and object, the spectator and the model,
reverse their roles to infinity” (5). Then, we have Jean-Paul Sartre who questions the role of the
gaze and one’s subjectivity in two ways. First, the gaze of the other as a form of recognition and
second, the gaze as a form of being enslaved. He states:
Thus being-seen constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which is not my
freedom. It is in this sense that we can consider ourselves as “slaves” insofar as we
appear to the Other. But this slavery is not a historical result-capable of being
surmounted-of a life, in the abstract form of consciousness. I am a slave to the degree that
my being is dependent at the center of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very
condition of my being. In so far as I am the object of values which come to qualify me
without my being able to act on this qualification or even. to know it, I am enslaved.
(Sartre 267)
On the other hand, for Jacques Lacan, the gaze has more than one instance. The role of
the gaze of an other, as part of the recognition of the self, is not one of enslavement but of
objecthood as the petit a and the mirror stage in child development. Lacan states “I see only from
one point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides” (72). This gaze is that which is lost,
that which substitutes the object, that which is caused or causes fascination geared by pleasure
and desire, and as such creates some sort of separation between the self and its fascination. Lacan
is more specific than Sartre in his theory where he specifies the split between the eye and the
gaze, he states that “in our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of
vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from
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stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it – that is what we call the gaze” (73).
The a in Lacan’s algebraic equation is the object of desire, the little (petit) other which becomes
the object that can never be attained. It is the “object-causes” of the desire. In other words, the
object petit a is any object that initiates one’s desire in motion. But all of this takes place due to
one’s initial moment of recognition of the self and others which is what occurs in a child during
the mirror stage.
The psychoanalytic concept of the mirror stage has created a discourse among
psychoanalysis but for the purpose of this project, we will refrain from entering that discussion
and limit our framework to Lacan’s definition of the mirror stage which is one of the most
significant for Laura Mulvey’s male gaze theory. Lacan suggests that the mirror stage has a
twofold value. The first being historical and the second one being related to the body image and
its drives. Later on, in chapter five we will see the role these ideas played in his theory of the
gaze and child development, particularly how such influenced Laura Mulvey’s male gaze theory.
In 1975, Mulvey published one of the most groundbreaking works within European
feminist theory and media theory, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema3” where she developed
the male gaze theory by reviewing the role of the male’s desire and the pleasure of looking and
its role in Hollywood cinema. In this essay, Mulvey analyzes the content of cinema through a
psychoanalytic lens, influenced by her reading and expansion of Lacan’s mirror stage theory.
Mulvey uses the psychoanalytical theory of Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage as a political weapon to
demonstrate how “the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form” (14). The
mirror stage has developed through the years and it has become a key framework of analysis in
film theory. For Mulvey—as for Lacan—the mirror phase “occurs at a time when the child’s
physical ambitions outstrip his motor capacity, with the result that his recognition of himself is
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joyous in that he imagines his mirror image to be more complete, more perfect than he
experiences his own body” (18). In this phase, one begins to find pleasure in seeing the other
which is the self.
In chapter five we will see how she continues that line of inquiry to develop the male
gaze theory which presents valuable points about the spectacle in media that ultimately caters to
an individual’s pleasure in looking and furthermore, into the Lacanian mirror stage of
recognition. We will also see how bell hooks retorts Mulvey’s arguments by reminding us the
privileges carried in such theory, that is not a universal theory and that black bodied individuals
have a different relationship with the gaze, on that is oppositional.
In the early 1990’s, hooks presented a counterargument to Mulvey’s claims by presenting
how active spectators use oppositional gaze as a form of resistance, framing her theory based on
the experiences of black female spectators. hooks did so by providing a lens that includes and
acknowledges not only the sexual differences—as in Mulvey’s theory—but also the racial
differences. When bell hooks discuss the gaze of the white women and the desire of her by men,
she addresses one of the main issues within feminist film theory—the way in which these
theorists claimed their work to be universal to all women. hooks questions: “Are we really to
imagine that feminist theorists writing only about images of white women, who subsume this
specific historical subject under the totalizing category “woman”, do not “see” the whiteness of
the image” (100)? As a contrast to the male gaze theory by Mulvey, hooks briefly describes the
historical context of the gaze as defiance for colonized people, particularly black women. hooks
reiterate that, “the ‘gaze’ has been and continues to be, at a site of resistance for colonized black
people globally” (255). Precisely, the gaze for those with colonized ancestry is oppositional—by
exercising the action of looking at the other who is an opposite, that is black women looking at
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white women in films and on television shows. This line of thought leads to the development of
her theory of the oppositional gaze. Black women are defying the role of the viewer by
becoming active critical spectators instead of accepting the social prescription of passive
spectators: “To stare at the television, or mainstream movies, to engage its image, was to engage
its negation of black representation. It was the oppositional gaze that responded to these looking
relations by developing independent black cinema” (255).
The maternal gaze comprises some elements from each of these prior analyses. I will
briefly look into the findings by neurologists and neuropsychologists which place the maternal
gaze as the gaze between mother and child. Then, will explore how the gaze of the mother is a
polyphonic gaze that is constantly shifting based on the individual that sees and the one who is
being seen as performing the maternal. Specifically, I will discuss the gaze of the mother versus
the maternal gaze and how both differ and where they converge.
Power Structures
This project argues that nowadays, the oppositional gaze extends from black spectators to
black cinema and into an array of media platforms which focus on showcasing the non-white
voices. For example, there are television networks dedicated solely to showcasing Black or
Latino voices, such as the BET Network and Univision. There is also an increase in streaming
shows on platforms, such as Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu, where many stories present what they
believe are reflections of the realities of non-white individuals and their communities. It is
important to note the low percentage of the stories representing women or mothers on these
platforms. Perhaps, as bell hooks says in “Radical Parenting”, this could be because “racism,
availability of jobs, lacks of skills or education and a number of other issues would have been at
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the top of the list—but not motherhood” (145). Which moves the focus of our concern towards
the role of the gaze within a power structures and sexist oppression.
In several works, Michel Foucault has shined some light on power structures—he has
gone to the extent of presenting how some structures vanish by the implementation of new ones.
Accordingly, in this project, we are concerned with both the structures of power related to
politics of representation which include its dearth of diversity, the power in looking for pleasure
versus looking as a form of resistance, and the role of the active spectator that hooks advocates
for.
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault defines power as “the multiplicity of force relations
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the
processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or
reverses them... thus forming a chain or system” (92). Then, the question at hand is what does
this chain or system have to do with the subjectivity of the mother? Power structures influence
and affect individuals’ subjectivities and it could either add value to their selfhood or devalue
them. In The Subject and Power, he goes on to say that “the subject is either divided inside
himself or divided by others” (Foucault 777–778). Through this multiplying process of
subjectification, the subject also creates divides within the self that influence not only its
portrayal by others but also its self-portrayal. In chapter four we will see how all of these
different relationships of power are discussed including relationships among the different
institutions in our society. But what about the power structures that are carried by aesthetic forms
in a patriarchal society where the legal and institutional power is presented as progress or for the
well-being of that other, the women?
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Furthermore, this project addresses the economy of the gaze in a patriarchal society
where these movies have been produced. If we define patriarchy in overly simplistic terms, we
can perhaps agree that it is a social structure where men have power over women. As such, the
power in this context does not equal force but the power-over or power-to, men over women by
asserting dominance and control and becoming the main authors and designers of other
structures in which women participate or under which women are subjected and objectified. In
this era, some of the power structures are questioned and transformed—this is a natural reflection
of the historical progressions. A patriarchal society creates some illusions of changes and
improvements on the condition of women. These illusions are evident on the evolution of
representation in film and television narratives in the United States of America where we see
more characters of women who balance motherhood and work or who are content with their stay
at home choice, for example, this illusion of balance or choice of mothers is present in the films
Motherhood (2009), I don’t know how she does it (2011), and Bad Moms (2016). Since “there is
power in looking” (hooks 94), this project investigates the intersection between the
representation, exclusion, and the gaze of (m)others in films and television shows.
The development of the maternal gaze within this project aims to expand the discussion
toward the aesthetic decolonization of the maternal gaze. In order to do so, more attention will be
provided to the voices of minorities and the understanding of their realities particularly, to
scholars whose body of work relates to these topics and who are placed in the margins by those
in power. As such, even though while speaking about the gaze and feminist film theory, many
will go to Laura Mulvey’s analyses and to Lacan to ground their work, this project intends to
detach from Mulvey’s male gaze theory in order to decolonize the gaze as proposed by
Gwendolyn Audrey Foster. Therefore, bell hooks’ oppositional gaze theory will be better suited
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for this project. Foster states that feminist theory not only erased black women as spectators but
also as cultural producers (3). Furthermore, she argues that the films created by filmmakers of
African and Asian diaspora work as a form of decolonization of the gaze. An example of this
decolonization in the main stream media has been recently observed with the spectacle created in
non-independent films, such as Black Panther (2018) and Crazy Rich Asians (2018). Both,
Foster and hooks had stated that feminist theory ignored women of on the margins as spectators
and as cultural and scholar producers. Therefore, this project will place Foster’s argument as a
theoretical basis to reclaim their space in the academic production and visibility of (m)others in
US American films and television shows.
Polyphony of the Maternal Gaze
Feminist theorists, such as Laura Mulvey and bell hooks, analyzed and disrupted film
theory by questioning the male gaze and presenting the oppositional gaze of African American
women, respectively4. Nevertheless, little has been said about the complexity of the gaze of the
mother in films and television shows and its influence on maternal subjectivity. For example, the
maternal gaze includes the gaze of one mother toward another mother, herself, and the gaze of
the mother by the father; it is not limited to the mother-child gaze. My position is not to offer my
argument as an opposition to the current work on maternal gaze but rather to expand it. It is my
intention to present that the maternal gaze is beyond the mother-child relationship. This
representation matters in the aesthetic portrayal of performativity of the characters of all mothers
in films and television shows.
Traditionally, female scholars and aestheticians, including Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva,
and more recently Alison Stone and Eti Wade, had problematized the maternal gaze and how it
relates to the mother-child gaze from a psychoanalytic lens to a sociological one. While some of
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them have further debated on how maternal subjectivity is influenced by the mother-daughter
relationship—before being a mother when the mother is a daughter—this project will define the
maternal gaze as a polyphonic gaze—one that includes but is not limited to the mother-child
relationship. Furthermore, throughout this project, maternal gaze will be defined as a way of
looking at the one who performs the maternal. It has the potential to be oppositional for mothers
who do not see themselves represented in media but actively engage as critical spectators. Also,
maternal gaze will be presented as that which influences our relationship with mothers—its
philosophies and politics. It is the way of looking at those who perform the maternal role. The
various characters of mothers portrayed in films and television shows serve as an illusion to
assemble an idealized image of mothering by creating universal ideals of the maternal. It silences
the voices of those who are not represented, leading us toward an epidemic of invisibility of
(m)others in Hollywood.
The film and television industry in the United States of America presents a limited
perspective of mother types. The current visual representation of maternal characters and its film
and television narrative in the main media outlets of the United States of America create an
aesthetics of displacement of (m)others. Through it, it misrepresents and fails to include the
narratives of many other mothers who are other within the already otherness of motherhood.
Such failure creates a tainted maternal gaze through media displacement and invisibility of
mothers, which influences and affects the maternal gaze and maternal subjectivity of mothers in
the United States of America.
Wade observes that “maternal subjectivity is largely absented from culture, obscured by
representational idealization” (29). She explores the possibilities of maternal subjectivity as
being related to the gaze of the mother. Her analysis explores the maternal gaze between mother
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and child in photographic works by artists who are mothers as that which exposes the maternal
gaze through “images that are often contradictory to conventional maternal ideals” (Wade 29).
According to Wade, this gaze “is understood to represent maternal subjectivity in unconventional
images of children and the family” (29). She elaborates on her analysis of the maternal gaze as
that which lies on intersubjectivities and states that it “requires that we recognize the mother as
subject, allowing to recognize and accept their subjectivity complete with needs and feelings that
do not conform to those of the child” (Wade 31). Her proposal is critical for understanding
whether maternal subjectivity should be recognized by its intersubjectivities or by a reclaiming
of the mother’s subjectivity before becoming a mother and to appreciate the importance of the
voice of the mother through this understanding.
It is common to see a scholar’s analysis of the maternal gaze based on the relationship
between mother and child, ranging from psychoanalysis to sociological analysis. These
descriptions are also carried toward the examination of maternal subjectivity, and it resides at the
center of other maternal disciplines, such as maternal aesthetics and the maternal gaze, which
Andrea Liss and Eti Wade examine, respectively.
Concerns with Representation: Why does it matter?
Maternal politics is considered to be a starting point for examining the function of the
maternal gaze in films and television shows. In the introduction to The Politics of Motherhood,
Annelise Orleck says “it would be a distortion to pretend that conceptions or meanings of
motherhood carry across national, cultural, political and religious boundaries, that they could be
the same for women of different races, ethnicities, classes, ages, or sexual preferences” (5). This
statement by Orleck also applies to mass media representation, including its relationality to the
gaze as presented through several platforms where the male gaze, the oppositional gaze, and the
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maternal gaze take place intersect and overlap. How we observe and perceive the other changes
based on the “national, cultural, political and religious boundaries, classes, ages, or sexual
preferences” (Orleck 5) of oneself and the other. These effects and practices lead to our inquiry
of how films and television shows impact the composition of maternal subjectivity.
Due to the increase in screening platforms for films and television shows, the study of
this project is bound to a specific period the twenty-first century for two main reasons—first, to
examine the increased impact media has on society due to globalization and exposure
opportunities and second, and most importantly, to fill in the gap in media research from the
twenty-first century. Martha M. Lauzen began yearly reports known as the celluloid ceiling
which focused on the representation of female characters in the top 100 domestic grossing films
in the United States of America. When comparing findings from 2011 to those from 2016, a
significant increase of 18% in female protagonist characters was noted with a 3% increase in
white female characters (fig. 1–2). On the other hand, the Comprehensive Annenberg Report on
Diversity in Entertainment (CARD) presented other details related to representation, including
the lack of racial diversity and concluded that Hollywood has an epidemic of invisibility.
Around 2016, media makers raised similar questions concerning representation and
inclusion of diverse individuals in the stories and behind the scenes, furthering their questions
regarding the technical aspects that these tasks involve. An example of this is the 2016
September Issue of the International Cinematographers Guild Magazine entitled “Television &
Diversity.” This issue showcased television shows that media makers considered to be the most
diverse at the time, discussing not just the characters but also the technical aspects of accurately
capturing multiple skin tones for the camera. In this issue’s President’s Letter, Steven Poster
concluded that while the industry is on the right track and changing for the better, things are not
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changing fast enough (4). Although the industry is far from working fast enough, there are a
number of significant projects aimed at filling the current gaps, including several publications
and web-based platforms that explore the dearth of representation of specific members of US
American society.

Fig. 1. Historical Comparison of Percentages of Females as Protagonists, Major Characters,
and All Speaking Characters. It’s a man’s celluloid world Report. 2016.

33

Fig. 2 Comparison of Race/Ethnicity for Female and Male Characters. It’s a man’s celluloid
world Report. 2016.
Some may ask why bother with a discourse about representation if it is changing? Or why
bother at all if these are simply entertainment platforms? Some may even argue that there is no
problem of representation because we have networks that cater certain stories of the
marginalized or that there is an evident increase in representation of the marginalized with films
like Black Panther and Crazy Rich Asians. The discourse of representation and its philosophies
is the key to abolish the perpetration of oppression by destroying its mirror effects.
Representation and visibility of others is a tool for liberation; Paulo Freire defines liberation as
something which can be achieved through embodiment and praxis via “reflection and action
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upon the world in order to transform it.” (51) First of all, representation is necessary to provide a
value of the self be witnessing our stories and identifying with the aesthetic fictional or real
mirrors—whether in media or any other aesthetic form—we recognize our existence through
others. Second, representation matters to tell our stories as we see them and experience them.
Finally, it is necessary to create imaginary narratives where justice prevails and our communities
could be free from oppression. This will be developed as the economy of the gaze in this project.
Moms in Films
In April 2014, Turner Classic Movies (TCM) published the book Mom in the Movies:
The Iconic Screen Mothers You Love (and a Few You Love to Hate) by Richard Corliss. This
book serves as an initial catalog of the most iconic maternal characters in Hollywood from the
classics to modern films. In one of the chapters entitled “A Mom by Any Other Name: Because
it’s the right thing to do”, the otherness of mothers is presented within the scope of what Sara
Ruddick terms maternal. It outlines the characters who perform the maternal but do not fit within
the categorization of the biological mother, including characters of mothers who lost their
children, stepmothers, surrogate mothers, and those who collide with their kids.
Notwithstanding, the cataloging and categorization of mothers in the movies presented in
Mom in the Movies, one of the major challenges of this study is to find a comprehensive and
detailed index of maternal characters. Given the lack of this kind of an index, this project has
embarked on the challenge to catalog the characters of mothers in films from the twenty-first
century. Currently, the index evaluated both leading characters and supporting characters of the
top 25 highest-grossing films in the United States of America from each year from 2000 to 2019.
It has been noted that this condition of mothers comes from a long tradition of
displacement from philosophical tradition to visual representations, and the scholars who analyze
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both. From the constructed institution to the creation of myth, the societal prescription of
motherhood limits her choices of becoming. These affect the gaze of the mother, resulting in a
polyphonic maternal gaze characterized by the judgment others place upon her. The failure to
include the diverse voices and images of women and mothers from marginalized groups as well
as the failure to include them in the production of images and knowledge has created a
displacement of (m)others. These (m)others are women who are placed as an other in relation to
men and as an other in relation to mothers with privileged statuses; these (m)others are the other
of an other of an other. They experience continuous displacement and dispossession, alienating
them from their free becoming, and affecting their subjectivity. As a result, many (m)others have
felt the need to become political in order to protect themselves and their children.
In conclusion, I have shown that this project is needed to support the importance and
value of expanding the inclusion of the voices of underrepresented members of society in the
media platforms of the United States of America. The concept of (m)other as those who continue
to be ignored and forced to the sidelines of society persist through the perpetuation of stereotypes
and exclusion of representation. Throughout the chapters I will illustrate the complexity of the
polyphony of maternal identity and its gaze to pave the understanding of what influences
maternal subjectivity. Yet, we could conclude that there is a need to include the effects of media
globalization and accessibility in the maternal discourse. Moreover, a concurrent need to assert
one’s existence, to further question, deconstruct, and reconstruct the language we use to define
parental roles. It is only through this process that we can achieve a more equitable parental labor
distribution. Nevertheless, before we reach that stage, we need to include all maternal labor and
all mothering under the umbrella term mother. To do so, it is necessary to recognize the
existence of other mothers and the great diversity in motherhood. It is imperative to give them
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their spaces back and not prevent their voices from being heard. One needs to accept the
diversity beyond the ideology of motherhood, one that includes multiple ideologies, beliefs,
realities, and mistreatments, one that considers the history of the exclusion of subjects and
permanence of the objectification of the labor of care by the female parent, one that is
hyphenated by the intersubjectivities a mother carries, and one that is not distorted nor erased
from visual representation.
In conclusion, the maternal gaze is a polyphonic one which needs to be evaluated from
this stand point. This is necessary to justly analyze the effects it has on maternal subjectivity and
its intersubjectivity which are carried through its performances as individuals and as a collective.
Maternal performances are geared by the politics of each mothering self and by their
philosophies of care. To show the displacement of (m)others in the U.S. media and its impact on
maternal identities of other subjectivities, this project is divided into three parts: maternal theory,
maternal recognition/the gaze, and maternal representations. Lastly, representation matters
because it affects the subjectivity of the current mothers, (m)others, and future parents.
Therefore, we must change the oppressive economy of the gaze of (m)others in order to achieve
a just gaze for all mother.
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“The history of philosophy does not begin with Aristotle, but the historiography of philosophy
does. Aristotle was the first one to systematically studied, recorded, and criticized the work of
previous philosophers.” (Kenny 8)
CHAPTER ONE
Maternal Thinking a Philosophical Practice
Although it may seem contradictory to start this chapter with a quote about Aristotle and
the history of philosophy, it’s more than necessary to begin from that place of ambivalence and
common agreement. It is precisely this dichotomy what allows us to raise questions among
philosophers that eventually lead to productive discourse. One may argue that since philosophy
is the study of knowledge there is no specific place where we can state as an ultimate fact “this is
the beginning of philosophy.” But, as stated in the above quote by Anthony Kenny in A New
History of Western Philosophy, we can trace the origin of the historiography of philosophy to
Aristotle due to his methodology. On the other hand, in the introduction to A Short History of
Philosophy, the authors Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, defined philosophers as
the ones who love wisdom, and those who move from the question “How should we live?”. They
extend their inquiry towards, “…to the realm of mere prudential concern and obedience to laws
and customs within a particular society to the very general question, ‘What is the right way to
live as a human being?’ ”(2). Solomon & Higgins state that the short answer to such question
was wisdom, the need for it, and as a result, the search for it, and moreover the love for it, “and
those who search for it, those who love it, were accordingly called philosophers (from philein =
love, Sophia = wisdom)” (2). Based on these requirements they place Socrates at the forefront of
philosophy. While in the introduction of Women Philosophers, Mary Warnock presented that in
the present philosophers are identified as those who studied philosophy and acquire a degree in
philosophy. She reminds us that “before the end of the nineteenth century there were no women
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academics” (XIX). Therefore, she does not limit the criteria of philosopher to those with a degree
or academic positions. She utilized other criteria to select the women she framed as philosophers,
women who did not held an academic post, whose writings were carried as arguments and not
just opinions. These points presented by Warnock are important, particularly because through the
progression of this chapter we will notice a parallel with the exclusion of women from thinking
spaces including religious ones. Spaces that limited women to motherhood and the expectations
others, men, deemed as expected or dutiful.
Nevertheless, the definition, understanding and generally the field of philosophy—
parallel to changes in the world, the human mind and the concerns of its subjects—has changed
through time. Consequently, resulting in transitions within a field with five major divisions,
commonly known as the branches of philosophy. Each branch characterizes by a particular
question regarding the human mind and by a main question: metaphysics, epistemology, logic,
ethics and aesthetics. Metaphysics is concern with reality, epistemology with matters of
knowledge and how we know what we know, logic is mainly concern with rules and
argumentation, ethics studies individual’s values, morals and how one should act toward each
other, while aesthetics focuses on notions of beauty and art.
Catapulting from this framework, we ask, what is maternal philosophy? Who are the
foremost philosophers, thinkers, and theorists who speak about the maternal and motherhood?
What is the position of feminist thought and theory among such discourse? What is their
positionality? How do ideas of becoming, converge or diverge from that of becoming a mother?
How becoming a mother changes and/or influences woman’s subjectivity? In this chapter I will
argue that philosophical traditions attempted to keep women confined to the role of childrearing
by limiting the definition of mother to actions of care by females. I will argue that maternal
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thinking and issues regarding the subjectivity of that who identifies as a mother, is maternal
philosophy. I will further argue that there is little to no recognition for maternal philosophy, as
such I will discuss a series of pivotal moments within philosophy that provide the road map
towards maternal thought and maternal philosophy. These pivotal moments are carried by female
thinkers, like Mary Warnock and Simone de Beauvoir, who made room for the discourse among
gender and its differences toward becoming, none the less, arriving at a moment of recognition
of the self, as such one’s subjectivity. Such genealogy is not limited to one philosophical
tradition, we will see how it has moved through a variety of branches of philosophy.
As this chapter progresses it will draw mainly from the continental philosophical tradition
and on the position of the female voice as a philosopher, as a being and as a member of society.
It will draw our attention to the exclusion of females into innate motherhood—female parent,
traditionally known as mother, although this will be further explored throughout the following
chapters once we look in detail at other types of female parents. This chapter will highlight key
passages from continental and analytical tradition where the role of women in society has been
initially placed and limited to motherhood, including Plato and Hegel’s take on childrearing.
Later on, we will introduce what female philosophers had said about the matter, from Lady
Damaris Masham, who is recognized by those who encounter her work, as the first female
philosopher to address motherhood, Simone de Beauvior who details the multiple expectations of
motherhood and its marginalization as a second sex, Luce Irrigaray’s re-valuation and perhaps
even romanticizing of the mother, and bell hooks call for an equal labor of parenting. Lastly, we
will briefly introduce the contemporary role of Judith Butler’s gender performativity theory and
its role into re-imagining parental genderized roles. The intention is to map the genealogy of
popular thoughts and politics that lead to a more recent recognition and reframing of maternal

40
thinking, from Sara Ruddick to the more recent work by Andrea O’Reilly to Alison Stone. I will
argue that these past and recent discourse by female philosopher compose what we will referred
to as maternal philosophy or philosophy of mothers. This chapter will focus on those hegemonic
voices that lead the discussion; in subsequent chapters we will introduce other voices, and some
films that will provide some rupture to those hegemonies, by pointing toward all the (m)others
who had been excluded from the popular maternal thought and representations leading to
ignoring them from mass aesthetic representation and politics.
Male Philosophers on THE MOTHER
Let us then begin by mapping what earlier philosophers said about motherhood. It is
necessary to establish, first and foremost, that both Plato and Hegel, envision women to be the
most suitable for the childrearing labor, although in different ways and for different reasons. As
such we will look at how the place for women in The Republic, by Plato, and in the description
of being as described in Philosophy of Right by Hegel, created restraints for women within
philosophy. By devaluating women or by excusing their placement under men, based on their
biological capabilities and as such confining them to childrearing and in other instances to the
institution of motherhood. We will look briefly at what Plato said about childrearing and its care
in The Republic, because Plato’s ideas had greatly influenced not just Western Philosophy and
metaphysics, but also ideas of governance in public and private spheres from the government to
the household and outside of a faith base belief system.
Although most of us will agree that Plato was quite revolutionary for his time when he
envision women as guardians of the city in his Republic, it is also true that such role was limited
to what they understood was female physiology and female biology, and what is commonly
referred to as the biological female clock5. On the one hand stating that, “A woman should bear
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children for the city from the age of twenty to that of forty; whereas a man should beget them for
the city from the time that he passes his peak as a runner until he reaches fifty-five” (Plato 150151). While on the other hand saying women are weaker than men. In Book V of The Republic
Plato focuses on “guardian women and children”, while earlier in the book he places men and
women to what many will call an equal level. He states:
Then my friend, there is no pursuit relevant to the management of the city that belongs to
a woman because she is a woman, or to a man because he is a man; but the various
natural capacities are distributed in a similar way between both creatures, and women can
share by nature in every pursuit, and men in every one, though for the purposes of all of
them women are weaker than men. (Plato 144)
Furthering his argument, he continues and states that women can be guardians of the city, but not
all of them, just some, as for do men by stating that “there is also a woman who is suited to be a
guardian, and one who is not” (144). This example presents two key components, first the
capability of women to hold a position of leadership, like being a guardian of the city according
to Plato. Secondly the physical limitations of women. For Plato some women can be guardians of
the city, but women as a group, as a category, would always be below men due to their weakness
(according to Plato). He states, “A woman and a man can have the same nature, the, relevant to
guarding the city—except to the extent that she is weaker and he is stronger” (144). Later on, in
this chapter I will present how some feminist philosophers contended Plato’s ideas to present a
clearer understanding of his patriarchal notion of the female body. But the hanging question may
be, what does this has to do with our central topic for this chapter about maternal philosophy?
The short answer to the above question would be that Plato dismisses parenting and
moves toward a childrearing model that is an all for all model. To be more precise, Plato is
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advocating for the abolition of the family of those, that according to him, have greater
capabilities. Although the proposal for co-parenting and the abolition of the family as an
institution may not be far from other feminist proposals6, the problem is that Plato utilizes a
merely theoretical political principle in benefit of the state and to continue the perpetuation of
power. Plato retorts: “That all these women should be shared among all the men, that no
individual woman and man should live together, and that the children, too, should be shared,
with no parent knowing its own offspring, and no child its parent” (147). Furthermore, he states:
Now, you are their lawgiver, and in just the way you selected these men, you will select
as the women to hand over to them those who have natures as similar to theirs as
possible. And because they have shared dwellings and meals, and none of them has any
private property of that sort, they will live together; and through mixing together in the
gymnasia and in the rest of their daily life, they will be driven by inborn compulsion, I
take it, to have sex with one another. (Plato 148)
As seen such principles have two key aspects: first, the sense of ownership—as in
proprietary—of children and second, that it will guarantee temporary sexual liaisons between
male and female guardians to breed future guardians, promoting a homogenous class of
guardianships. Later on, the mating process if presented as another problematization on the
kinship of the guardians. At no given point does Plato speaks about love for the guardians’ class.
Such class is one that has everything, while having nothing—no property—while at the same
time it has the job of keeping all citizens safe, and promoting the purity of their clan, while
having no control over their mates, and by having all children be their own while not knowing
which one they conceived. He states:
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It follows from our previous agreement that the best men should mate with the best
women in as many cases as possible, while the opposite should hold of the worst men and
women; and that the offspring of the former should be reared, but not that of the latter, if
our flock is going to be an eminent one. And all this must occur without anyone knowing
except the rulers – if, again, our herd of guardians is to remain as free from faction as
possible. (Plato 149)
So far, we have seen the power of the state on mating guardians to assure the homogeneity and
hegemony of such class, “the race of guardian is going to remain pure” (Plato 150), hence the
abolition of the family institution is for those who belong to this guardian class, which holds a
place of higher importance to the state. Now, when speaking about childrearing of the guardian
children, he does not place it onto the mother or the father, instead to a systemized support
carried by nurses.
At first it seems as if Plato was advocating for an equal division of the childrearing labor,
but as we dive more into his plan, we noticed that certain aspects are left to the nurses. He
specifies: “I supposed they will take the offspring of good parents to the rearing pen and hand
the, over to special nurses who live in a separate part of the city. But those of inferior parents, or
any deformed offspring of the others, they will hide in secret and unknown place, as if fitting”
(150). He continues with the responsibilities of such job, “these nurses also take care of the
children’s feeding by bringing the mothers to the rearing pen when their breasts are full”, (150)
he also states that when needed they will also use a wet nurse7 to either supplement the child’s
feeding or to ensure the mothers’ rest. Although there is a lack of specificity on the sex or gender
of the nurses, we can infer they are female or at least the wet nurses must be since their labor is
based on the biological production of breastmilk. These proposals lead us to question to what

44
extent he really saw guardian women to have equal partnership in the state, or whether he saw
that they must have certain benefits in order to continue the breeding of this “pure race.”
Let us turn our attention now to what Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel says about the
family, particularly the mother. Although some may see his proposal as one leaning to the
dissolution of the family due to his focus toward the unity of husband/father and wife/mother
into the new entity of the family; I focus on how he places these gender roles as “natural”, he
says that “the primary reality of ethical observance is in its turn natural, taking the form of love
and feeling. This is the family” (Hegel 51). The ideas he presents about the family are still
prevalent and to some extent are present on some feminist maternal theories8. More specifically
in regards to the family, in Philosophy of Right, Hegel discusses its relation to power,
subjectivity, and spirit by dividing its discussion into the following sub-topics which he describes
as structures: love and marriage, property and capital, and dissolution of the family. Hegel
divides the self—what we will call later on subjectivity—into the existence-for-self and
existence-in-self, assigning a sex/gender9 to each. Being this one of the key objections—in this
manuscript—to his analysis and how he allocates certain social and family roles to women and
men respectively, he states:
§ 166 Hence the husband has his real essential life in the state, the sciences, and the like,
in battle and in struggle with the outer world and with him. self. Only by effort does he,
out of this disruption of himself, reach self-sufficing concord. A peaceful sense of this
concord, and an ethical existence, which is intuitive and subjective, he finds in the family.
In the family the wife has her full substantive place, and in the feeling of family piety
realizes her ethical disposition. (Hegel 144)
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Hegel is presenting the spaces where the husband and the wife will find their “real place” within
society as a way of delineating what dutiful is their right. For Hegel, this idea presents an answer
to the ethical questions regarding the role of men and women as parents, placing the men in the
public social life and the women in the privacy of the household. Stating that, the wife does not
question such placement, “in the feeling of family piety realizes her ethical disposition” (144);
instead she understands her nature, her purpose within society, her existence-in-self.
Contrary to Plato, for Hegel no women have the capacity for higher understandings like
the sciences, or what he calls the universal faculties, furthermore for him women are insufficient
of generating meaningful ideas:
Women can, of course, be educated, but their minds are not adapted to the higher
sciences, philosophy, or certain of the arts. These demand a universal faculty. Women
may have happy inspirations, taste, elegance, but they have not the ideal. The difference
between man and woman is the same as that between animal and plant. The animal
corresponds more closely to the character of the man, the plant to that of the woman. In
woman there is a more peaceful unfolding of nature, a process, whose principle is the less
clearly determined unity of feeling. If women were to control the government, the state
would be in danger, for they do not act according to the dictates of universality, but are
influenced by accidental inclinations and opinions. The education of woman goes on one
hardly knows how, in the atmosphere of picture- thinking, as it were, more through life
than through the acquisition of knowledge. Man attains his position only through stress of
thought and much specialized effort. (Hegel 145)
We see that for Plato some women can govern, as long as they belong to a certain caste and as
long as they mother10 as the mother of all those with equal capabilities as those within their race
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and not as mothers of their blood related children. On the other hand, we see that for Hegel no
women can govern neither the state nor the family, for him, the women’s rightful place was to
mother. Hegel limits the mother to the actions of childrearing, care, and education; he states that
“at the outset the education given by the mother is of greater importance, since social character
must be planted in the child as feeling” (149). Such a statement is significant for our argument
as we move through this manuscript for two main reasons; first it denies the mother’s
individuality and as such its subjectivity and capacity for thinking and creating ideas. Second,
because such limited definition of mother as a verb, is carried both within patriarchal and
matriarchal societies, which will lead our discussion about the dominant discourses about THE
MOTHER.
As briefly noted, we can agree that traditionally many male philosophers argue for a
patriarchal family structure, where the mother cares for the children but has no political economy
in the household, as such is socially determined to be carried by the father. As seen above some
consider Plato to be the first one to break the thick division of labor among parents, while others
identify, The Second Treatise on Government by John Locke as an essential moment of inclusion
of the mother within the household economy. Our concern here will not be with who was the
first male philosopher to include the mother or to argue in favor of the unity of both parents in
the childrearing labor. Our concern here is with how these ideas influence the trajectory of the
(dis)placement of the mother within society into the household, and her power or dispossession
of such onto the present in order to provide a solid genealogy of ideas to be discussed on chapter
four as ideas of displacement of many other mothers from the predominant discourse who had
been either excluded or limited from aesthetic representation and the economy of the gaze.
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In The Second Treatise, John Locke speaks about the power structure of the family, his
aim on Chapter VI and Chapter XV is to present the power structure of parenting and its
relationship to political power and despotism. Locke defines parental power as follows:
First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their
children, to govern them for their children’s good, till they come to the use of reason or a
state of knowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule,
whether it be the law of nature or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern
themselves by—capable, I say, to know it as well as several others who live as freemen
under that law. (Locke 132)
He states that traditionally society places such power on the father while arguing that such
parental power should be placed upon both mother and father by stating:
It may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism in a discourse of this nature to find
fault with words and names that have obtained in the world, and yet possibly it may not
be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of
paternal power probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents over
their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it; whereas, if we
consult reason or revelation, we shall find she hath an equal title. (Locke 48)
As noted in his statement, Locke is focusing on the structure of the family by identifying where
power and dominion fall onto. Who carries the authority of the children? The labor of parents is
seen as those who guide a child towards a future self-governance, since children are considered
citizens who are not ready to be at full liberty. In the meantime, it is the parental power to govern
the child, he states that such has been determined for the father, he states that “however it might
without any great harshness bear the name of absolute dominion and regal authority when, under
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the title of paternal power, it seemed appropriated to the father” (Locke 48). Furthermore, stating
that it is absurd, and that it should include the mother as well, instead of it being an absolute
power of the father, he says, “in the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed absolute
power over children had been called parental, and thereby have discovered that it belonged to the
mother too” (Locke 49). He concludes that parental power is not “the fundamental authority
from whence they would derive their government of a single person only, was not placed in one,
but two persons jointly” (Locke 49). His analysis goes deeper and continues toward the moral
aspects within the family structure, the idea of respect, drawing from the Christian basis upon
which his overall argument is based on. As such, we can state that his questioning and proposal
were based on Christian morality turning this and further critiques of this text regarding parental
roles as one of ethical concern.
When he speaks about the respect a child must have for its parents—both mother and
father—and how the tradition of seeing the father as the only parent with parental power, cannot
and should not prevent the child from honoring and respecting the mother, he says “it is so
inseparable from them both that the father’s authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right,
nor can any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him” (Locke 59). Here we can
notice how Locke limits what he considers to be a moral responsibility of children to their
parents, in its statement we noticed his limited understanding of parents based on biology. These
values of respect and honor present two crucial elements about the political economy of the
family; first the unbreakable bond between mother and child—which Locke defines within this
context by biology as that who gives birth– and second the question regarding the mother’s
rights and the lack of power the father has to dispossess the mother of such rights. Locke
challenges the predominant idea of his time, which provided full power within the family
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governance to the father, by stating that both mother and father must share the governance, based
on moral values. Since a child may respect and honor that whom “bore him”, no one—not even
the father—can disposes the mother from her right to govern her children as a partner with the
father.
For Locke—as for Lady Damaris Masham, as we shall soon see— parental power is
granted by nature, more specifically by God, since both of their arguments are based on moral
ideas drawn from Christian theology:
Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents for the benefit of their
children during their minority, to supply their want of ability, and understanding how to
manage their property. (By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to
mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary
agreement gives the second, viz. political power to governors for the benefit of their
subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their properties. And forfeiture gives
the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped of
all property. (Locke 135)
These ideas of what “nature gives” to justify what each parent has or can perform are one of the
pivoting points upon which Lady Damaris Masham expands on to build and justify her
argument, for a matriarchal power structure for the household economy. Furthermore, these
topics on that which is natural of each sex to justify its placement or rights are prevalent within
the discourse of maternal philosophy. As this chapter continues to develop, we will notice how
such arguments lead to what we will refer to as the performance of the maternal.
Another critical aspect that Locke presents is the connection between parental power, the
freedom of the child, and property. When speaking about the father Locke says:
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His command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not their life or property; it
is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to
their education; and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases
when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not to
the lives or goods, which either their own industry or another’s bounty has made theirs;
nor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the enfranchisement of the years
of discretion. (Locke 56)
This idea will lead our discussion on Part III—mainly in chapters five and six—when I present
the development of the theory of the economy of the gaze as it relates to parenting and media.
Hence the connection between parenting, property, and inheritance to the social power structures
and the political economy of parenting which leads the prominent and limited representation of
mother types in US American media.
Before we go any further tracing the philosophical tendencies of placing women into the
private sphere, the household, and more specifically into motherhood, it is important to note, that
the placement into motherhood and household care is accompanied by her displacement from
government leadership. This displacement has its own history and genealogy as well, and
although that is not the focus of this manuscript it is important to mention how such
historiography influences maternal thinking and the tradition of displacement of mothers from
government and from philosophy. It is necessary to note that there was a latent frequency of the
same ideas which revolved around the mother as an object in service of something or someone,
rather than being recognized as a subject. One of the vertices of maternal thinking is grounded on
Marxist ideals, as such let us look into some key developments by Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engles on this matter. Also, it is important to state that Marx and Engels mostly work separately
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on the topic of the family, one seminal work on this topic, Origin of the Family, by Engels, was
written based on some notes he had by Marx, but Marx never collaborated on that manuscript.
First of all, they rarely mention the mother, and contrary to those mentioned previously in
this chapter, they do not prescribe parental roles. Although when speaking about dialectics, Marx
and Engels draw from Hegel, one of the most relevant ideas for our genealogy of maternal
philosophy is their analysis of the family structure. They focus on the effects of capitalism and
property acquisition has on the movement of different family structures including Marx’s notes
and Engels’ extensive analysis of matrilineal and patriarchal family structures.
Contrary to Plato, Hegel, or Locke; Marx and Engels do not place parents within specific
roles in the household. Instead their analysis focuses mainly on the economy of the household
and the labor of its members—including father, mother, and children—within capitalist societies.
They do not address specifically the mother, except for the instance when Marx discuses suicide
among bourgeois mothers in his essay, “Peuchet on Suicide.” Both Marx and Engels use
ethnographical examples of family structures including matrilineal societies and its move toward
the still prevalent patriarchal one. More specifically, they speak about the role of the family
within political economy. As such, some of their ideas will be further explored on chapter three,
about (m)others, and chapter five, when discussing the effects of the gaze economy.
Although they collaborated through their careers, the only work completely dedicated to
the family, was Origin of the Family, a manuscript and analysis authored by Engles, postmortem of Marx, but based on some of his notes on some leading—and to many—pioneer
evolutionary anthropologists. In it, Engels takes an ethnographic approach rather than Marx’s
economic one; as such he provides examples of different family structures from different
cultures, while continuing his discussion attached to how these household structures influence,
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affect, and/or maintain property retention within certain families – from the mother’s right to the
patrilineal.11
On Marx on Gender and the Family a Critical Study, Heather Brown argues that even
though Marx wrote little about women and the family, that his work, “gave important indications
towards a theory of gender and society” (4). Marx takes a more nuanced approached than his
predecessors, while criticizing Lewis Henry Morgan and Henry Sumner Maine in his notes, he
does so by directing his critique to the lack of historical context provided by them. As Brown
reminds us, “Marx again differentiates between the family in a society that already has a state
and the family before the state emerged” (180). It was not merely to point out the changes on
property acquisition and retention, but such in relation to the changes in societies prior to state
emergence.
In Capital Volume I, Marx states that, “Within a family and, after further development,
within the tribe, there springs up naturally a division of labour caused by differences of sex and
age, and therefore based on purely physiological foundation” (471). If we take such words within
the context of its time, one can argue that Marx—like Plato and Hegel—continue to see some
physiological/natural differences; what is unclear is whether he took such as a weakness or a
predeterminism into a particular role within the family. Also, in his essay “Private Property and
Communism” he argues that in general terms the development of societies can be measure by
looking at the dynamics within the relationship between men and women. He states:
In the approach to woman as the spoil and handmaid of communal lust is expressed the
infinite degradation in which man exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its
unambiguous, decisive, plain and undisguised expression in the relation of man to woman
and in the manner in which the direct and natural species-relationship is conceived. The
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direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation of man to
woman. In this natural species-relationship man’s relation to nature is immediately his
relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature – his own
natural destination. In this relationship, therefore, is sensuously manifested, reduced to an
observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man, or to
which nature to him has become the human essence of man. From this relationship one
can therefore judge man’s whole level of development. From the character of this
relationship follows how much man as a species-being, as man, has come to be himself
and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of
human being to human being. (Marx 43)
In addition to his brief mention of natural predeterminism, Marx notes the effects such
differences have on the work value of the members of the family, based on age and gender.
Furthermore, he notes the oppressive results it has on the most vulnerable, or on those without
autonomy.
When discussing children and their relationship to their parents he states, first, that “the
rights of children had to be proclaim” (Marx 620), secondly, that “parents must not possess the
absolute power of making their children mere machines to earn so much weekly wage” (620).
This leads Marx towards his proposition for the dissolution of the family as it was known during
the early years of the industrial-capitalist productions. More specifically he stated:
However terrible and disgusting the dissolution of the old family ties within the capitalist
system may appear, large-scale industry, by assigning an important part in socially
organized processes of production, outside the sphere of the domestic economy, to
women, young persons and children of both sexes, does nevertheless create a new
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economic foundation for a higher form of the family and of relations between the sexes.
(Marx 620-21)
On the other hand, he also argues for the dissolution of the bourgeois family, particularly in his
essay “Peuchet on Suicide”, where he looks into the case of four suicides by bourgeois women.
Contrary to Marx and Engels, their predecessor John Locke, spoke about the full
governance of the family, instead of limiting its function to property; this is why the exchange
between Locke and his disciple Lady Damaris Masham, is a pivoting point within maternal
philosophy. Moreover, since our main focus is the female voices I will limit to conclude that
neither Marx nor Engels provided a prescription of motherhood. This project is mainly concern
with what women had contributed to the history of ideas regarding the mother, from biological
predestination to actions of care, by asking ourselves what maternal philosophy is? Moreover,
what is maternal subjectivity?—this will be unpacked in chapter two. The possible answers to
these questions will be addressed later on in this chapter. As such, let us now shift our attention
to the female voices.
Early Female Voices on The Mother
So far, we have seen what key male thinkers said about the role of women based on their
biological capabilities and mothering12. Although such ideas lead us to many questions, the next
section will mainly focus on the discourse about motherhood, the female role, and a mother’s
duty among female voices. It was inevitable, but to take as a starting point the question of
whether gender influences one’s expectations concerning parental roles? While at the same time
wondering what has been women’s positionality in regards to the role of women and parenting,
particularly motherhood? If as individuals one advocate for equality one can see how aspiring for
such within the family structure should not be limited to gender, the question remains as to how
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the parental labor will be divided/distributed? How had societies calculated the value of women?
How such valuations lead toward maternal prescriptions? Furthermore, how such prescription as
a justification of one’s value (for women) perhaps geared some women towards avoiding
motherhood as a whole? Such line of inquiry guides our discussion to questioning who was the
first female philosopher to discuss motherhood? So far, Lady Damaris Cudworth Masham is
identified as the first female philosopher to speak on the matter, based on her argument in
regards to parental roles and childrearing. But, before we dive into Masham’s arguments and to
better understand her importance for the canon of maternal philosophy, it is important to explore
two female thinkers that preceded her, Christine Pizan, and Marie de Gournay, whom argued for
the acknowledgement of female contribution to political thinking and for the equality of men and
women respectively.
As we had seen, there is plenty of proof to show the value of female thinkers, as well as
the vast legacy of advocacy for the recognition of women as thinkers and as necessary for
political development. Also, it has been evident the dismissal or neglect for such
acknowledgement and the advocacy that has developed through centuries. For this reason, we
will transition now into those who not only speak about the thinking women, but about the
thinking mother, her capacity and the value of it.
It is necessary to begin this part of the discussion by looking at two understudied texts
that challenge the major ideas mentioned above about women. These are, The Book of the City of
Ladies, and The Treasure of the City of Ladies by Italian-French author, and political thinker,
Christine Pizan, who defended women’s rights during medieval times in France through some of
her writings. Although these books barely mention mothers, or their role in society—whether
prescribed or epistemologically—it is essential to look at its context, and the few mothers she
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does mention and the inner discourse it creates. Mainly because her ideas were influential at the
time, after the death of their husband and her dad, she became the sole economic support for her
mom and her children, such need, lead her to a writing career. At first, she built a prolific career
by writing love ballads, which got the attention and support of wealthy patrons. Her strategies to
support herself and her family from her writing, place her as the first professional female writer
in Europe. In addition to those early ballads, she wrote several books exploring topics related to
France’s political climate. In 1405 she published Le Livre de la cite des dames (The Book of the
City of Ladies), and Le Livre des trois vertus (Book of Three Virtues, better known as The
Treasure of the City of Ladies).
The Book of the City of Ladies serves as a response to Romance of the Rose by Jean de
Meun, where he mainly reduced women’s depiction to mere seducers. In it, Pizan uses
allegorical prose to combat the statements made by Meun, and she creates a fictional city of
ladies, which is the book, in it, she houses an array of prominent women from decades and
centuries before her existence, as well as some aristocrat women from her time. The city of
ladies is set forward upon the foundation of these female voices, as these layers developed, she
includes their concerns and contributions. Most of the city is built by including the contributions
of many influential female thinkers, female warriors, and females in politics. As she introduces
each female into the foundation of the city, she uses each one as a building block, or as a
building of the city, each of those contributions adds to her argument. Furthermore, it supports
and moves forward her advocacy for the education of women, which ultimately is the topic and
goal of The Treasure of the City of Ladies, a book that aims to educate all women, where she
claimed to include lessons for nuns, prostitutes, married and unmarried women; the three virtues
represented in her book, also gear the path towards the education of all women.
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Although Pizzan barely addresses motherhood or prominent mothers in her books, these
critical texts based on the city of ladies, the book and the treatise, are of great importance since
both are within the earliest writings, where a female thinker actively defends and advocates for
women’s rights. Also, we can infer her ideas upon motherhood, by the few mothers she does
mention, as well as her tendency to value more the non-mother as the model for strong and ideal
woman.
The Book starts with her question: “why is it that so many men—clerics as well as
others—have always been so ready to say and write such abominable and hateful things about
women and their nature?” (Pizan 21). In the introduction, she presents details about how she
explored the question, including her initial conclusion that women must be vile creatures, which
lead her to despise her sex. However, then she says how she shifted her question toward her
faith, wondering how God could create such vile creatures? She proceeds to share her
invocation/prayer to God which concludes with “But since You, in Your benevolence, created
me this way, forgive me if I don’t serve You well enough, dear Lord, and do not be displeased,
for a servant who receives fewer rewards from his master has fewer obligations to serve him
well” (Pizan 23). It is important to point out that this shows us how, Pizan—like Locke and
Masham—framed her moral understanding within a Christian framework.
As she continues to navigate such question, she dives into an argument revolving over the
value and worth of women in society. She presents her arguments through allegorical prose by
creating a city which is built upon the ideas of significant women who even up until her time had
contributed greatly to the world of ideas and politics. She has three main ladies who provide
answers to each of her foundational questions, upon which the city will be built. Through her
prose, the ladies and their functions to build the city are revealed. The city is built upon their
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knowledge, Lady Reason “instructed and helped [Christine] excavate the ground to build the
foundations” of the city13 (Pizan 31). It is interesting to see that one of the few mothers included
by Pizan is “Zenobia, queen of Palmyra”, whom she described as “a lady of noble blood”, whose
parents obligate to marry the king of Palmyra. The moment that shifts—and perhaps what makes
her worth including by Pizan—is the notion of being obligated, or a duty, since Zenobia only
slept with her husband for the sole purpose of bearing children. Pizan portrays such action as a
symbol of her devotion to the military service, and it showed her power and strength.
While Pizan argues for the education of women and their capability to acquire
knowledge, it is noticeable that her moral standards are based on—and limited by—her Christian
faith; for example, when she states that God gave women the ability to learn, and when she
presents the role of daughters. She states that:
He [God] doesn’t disdain either the female sex or their own, since it has pleased Him to
endow women’s brains with the ability not only to learn and assimilate the sciences but
also to discover new ones themselves—sciences, in fact, that are so useful and profitable
to the world that they have been more necessary than anything else. (Pizan 80)
The role of daughters is presented through a conversation between Christine and Lady Reason14:
Christine asks, “Are daughters a greater burden to their parents than sons or less
affectionate and more indifferent toward them than boys?”
Lady Reason replied “Also, daughters should be kept from bad company, raised by strict
rules, and taught to fear God, because discipline prepares children and adolescents to lead
exemplary lives.” (Pizan 106)
The second part is filled with examples of daughters who are “faithful” and “courageous wives”,
who exemplified virtuosity. While on the other hand, she mentions only a few virtuous mothers
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in the totality of the text, including Virgin Mary15, the stories of Queen Blanche, and stories of
Lilia, mother of Theodoric. While in the third part, most of those virtuous women were female
saints, who basically “renounce [to their] maternal love” (Bourgault and Rebecca Kingston
xxxiii). As such, we can see an example of how early on, even within the female voices, there
was a stigma against a mother, an idealization of mothers through the Virgin Mary, late on via
the multiple iterations. Of the iconography of the Madonna, and a tendency to favor non-mothers
as a strong female force within politics and in general within the society, while sanctifying
mothers. This is particularly interesting, giving that Pizan was a widowed mother who became
the first professional female writer in Europe after the death of her husband and dad, out of
necessity to support her three children and her mother. Later on, we will notice how such
discourse could be seen as similar to the discourse identified by feminist artists in the 1970s;
female independence and strength as something that does not belong to motherhood in the public
sphere.
In addition to Pizan’s allegorical analysis where she questions the prevalent exclusion of
female contributions, and the reduction of women as seducers—as per her critique of Meun—
during late 14th Century and into early 15th Century, we will add three significant, and also
understudied female philosophers from the 17th Century, Marie de Gournay, Sor Juana Inés de la
Cruz, and Lady Damaris Masham, two of these belonging to the forgotten women of the
enlightenment period. We will see their development and influence in Europe and the Americas.
Mainly, we will notice how each of their arguments pertain to the advocacy for equal rights for
women, mainly for their education. Each of their work moves from within different sectors of
society, government, the church, and the household. We will culminate this section with the
significance of the role of the mother in the governance of the household, as per Masham’s
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argument. The discourse these three female thinkers—in conjunction with their predecessor,
Pizan—comprise the first wave of female thinkers that lead toward maternal thinking, being
Masham, perhaps the first maternal philosopher.
During the 1620’s Marie de Jars de Gournay authored The Equality of Men and Women16,
and Apology for the Woman Writing. Although she has an extensive philosophical work of great
importance which has been neglected of extensive analysis, for this manuscript, the brief
discussion will continue to fall on two of her most prominent works, by narrowing down what
she says about our key subject matter, the mother. In both texts, she argues in favor of equal
education form both sexes, by delineating and defending the equality between both, extending
her argument in favor of equal access to both sexes to occupy public offices. She states:
If, therefore, women attain less often than men to the heights of excellence, it is a marvel
that the lack of good education—indeed, the abundance of outright and blatantly bad
education—does not do worse and prevent them from doing so entirely. If proof is
needed, is there more difference between them and men than among themselves—
according to the training they receive, according to whether they are brought up in a city
or a village, or according to nationality? Therefore, why should not their training in
public matters and in letters, of a kind equal to men’s, fill up the gap that commonly
appears between their minds and those of men, when we see, likewise, that such training
is of such importance that, because just one of its branches—namely, dealing with the
world—is common among French and English women and lacking among the Italian, the
latter are in general so far exceeded by the former? I say in general because in particular
the ladies of Italy sometimes excel; and we have drawn from them queens and princesses
who did not lack intellectual ability. (Gournay 81)
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Gournay highlights the misconceptions of differences among sexes, and among women, as an
aftermath of the access to education, by posing the question of whether one needs proof or not, to
which she responds by posing another question which highlights the difference among women
from different countries. One can see this as her awareness of differences expanding from the
acknowledgment of other privileges as something that is socially constructed, rather than
biologically deterministic.
Later on, in 1626, she published a collection of some of her prior writings, in the
introduction she starts situating the male versus female discourse within philosophy by
forwarding a critique of the dualities presented by Aristotle as a way to prove that, such
misconceived dualities had limited women to the labor of household care and childrearing. She
states, “Greek biology assumed that women were inferior to men and defined them merely as
child-bearers and housekeepers” (Gournay viii). This is perhaps one of the earliest
literary/philosophical critiques to Aristotle’s gender dualism, mainly due to her specificity about
his biological reductionism of women as child-bearers, and the assumption of biological
predeterminism as housekeepers.
In Equality Between Men and Women, Gournay argues that women are seen as
subordinates due to the prejudices by men, and that the apparent difference between men and
women is really based on the dearth of educational opportunities for women, the access or denial
to education is the reason to explain the intellectual and cultural differences between the sexes.
In this text, she successfully demonstrates the equality among genders by incorporating into her
arguments from different areas, including classical, biblical, and ecclesiastical elements. She
states, “man and woman are so thoroughly one that if man is more than woman, woman is more
than man” (Gournay 86); while earlier stating, “the human animal, taken rightly, is neither man
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nor woman, the sexes having been made double, not so as to constitute a difference in species,
but for the sake of propagation alone” (86). This reiterates and places forward one of our central
questions regarding the performances of the self, versus biological predeterminism. However,
her statement is even more complicated; at some point, she also states that the only thing which
defines differences among the human species is the “rational soul” (Gournay 87). The
complicated thing about this statement is who determines who is a “rational soul”, which is also
part of her critique in here and in some of her other writings when she addresses the attempt of
men to overpower women. According to Gournay—and based on her Christian morals—even
when speaking about procreation, men, and women are the same:
Man was created man and female—so says scripture, not reckoning the two except as
one; and Jesus Christ is called Son of Man, although he is that only of woman—the
whole and consummate perfection of the proof of this unity of the two sexes. I speak thus
according to the great Saint Basil in his first homily on the Hexameron: the virtue of man
and of woman are the same thing, since God bestowed on them the same creation and the
same honor: masculum et feminam fecit eos. Now in those whose nature is one and the
same, it must be concluded that their actions are so as well, and that the esteem and
recompense belonging to these are equal, where the works are equal. (Gournay 87)
Then, we have our hanging question, if she argues for equality of men and women, even when it
pertains to procreation, then what does she says about the mother? Before she makes remarks
regarding the institution of motherhood, she speaks about God and the female body. Gournay
states that God is neither masculine nor feminine to the extent of asserting that those who state it
is masculine are at fault, followed by her statement about the female body as a perfect one. In
other words, Gournay is presenting that men are erroneous to believe that they are superior to
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women under the presumption that they are closer to the image of God because God is a male.
She continues by arguing that God made the female body perfect:
What is more, it may perhaps be said of her humanity that she exceeds that of Jesus
Christ in this prerogative—that sex was by no means necessary in him for the Passion
and for the Resurrection and the redemption of human beings, his very functions, while it
was so in her for motherhood, which was likewise her function. (Gournay 94-95)
Although showcasing a series of arguments that support her argument regarding the equality of
men and women, she seems to be unable to escape the apparently inevitable idea regarding the
functionality of bodies within it, by stating “which was likewise her function” (95). Gournay
attempts to debunk the male centered idea of men as the image of God, by replacing it with
women as the image of God and supporting such argument by motherhood as if it was a given
function of the female bodied individual, falling onto the same binary that she is criticizing only
by switching who is made as the image of God, rather than removing the assumed predisposition
of a body based on their sex.
On the other hand, while still following some of these arguments, in Complaints of
Ladies, Gournay presents a direct criticism of the misogynistic tendencies of the era. This text
presents a stronger and more direct critique of the predominant ideas. Here she acknowledges the
privilege of men in a perhaps satiric tone, without losing her Christian tone17:
Blessed art thou, Reader, if you are not of that sex to which one forbids everything of
value, thereby depriving it of liberty; indeed, to which one also forbids almost all the
virtues, removing from it public duties, responsibilities, and functions—in a word, cutting
it off from power, by the moderate exercise of which most of the virtues are formed—
with the object of setting up as its only happiness, its crowning and exclusive virtues,
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ignorance, servitude, and a capacity to play the fool if a woman likes that game. Blessed
again are you, since you can be wise without offense, your masculinity allowing you—as
much as one forbids these to women—every action of lofty purpose, every preeminent
judgment, and every expression of subtle speculation. (Gournay 101)
This text is commonly recognized as one that incorporates sections from others to justify gender
equality, including Plato, and Aristotle, along with the historical achievements of Hypatia of
Alexandria, and Catherine of Sienna, among many others. Like Pizan’s city of ladies, through
her prose, Gournay directs the audience toward the many intellectual achievements of women, as
a proof of their intellectual capacity in order to argue in favor of their formal education. Both
Pizan and Gournay achieve this without discarding the examples of powerful women in the
scripture and the church’s history.
Another prominent female author who advocates for the education of women is Sor Juana
Inés de la Cruz, an autodidact Mexican nun, and a martyr, from late Seventeenth Century, who
challenge the Catholic Church at many levels, including her access to the literature banned by the
church during her time. While contrary to Pizan, and Gournay, Sora Juana did not use examples
of women’s deeds to justify the value of women, neither did she mentions mothers, her
contribution is needed within our project to link the parallels of women writers in the
Americas—since our analysis will move into this continent, particularly in the United States of
America. Also, in chapter two her work will be revisited to expand prominent female thoughts
regarding ideas of being and becoming. Throughout her prose in a satirical tone, Sor Juana,
responded to the attacks by men to all women, including attacks by clerical men. In Sátira
Filosófica18 she begins by saying:
Hombres necios que acusáis
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a la mujer sin razón, sin ver que sois la ocasión
de lo mismo que culpaís:
si con ansias sin igual
solicitáis su desdén,
¿por qué queréis que obren bien
si las insitáis al mal?
(Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz 148)
We can interpret her redondilla, in the literal sense as telling men how they complain about
every action performed by women without noticing that they are the ones who caused many of
those actions to which they complain. We can also interpret this redondilla, in similar ways as
Gournay, men see women inferior only because women cannot perform at their capacity due to
the lack of access to education. Moreover, in one of her letters Respuesta a la Ilustre Sor
Filotea19, Sor Juana states some of her reasons to choose the path of nunnery:
Entréme a religiosa, porque aunque conocía que tenia el estado cosas (de las accesorias
hablo, no de las formales) muchas repugnantes a mi genio, con todo, para la total
negación que tenia al matrimonio, era lo menos desproporcionado y lo más decente que
podría elegir en materia de la seguridad que deseaba de mi salvación; a cuyo primer
respeto (como al fin más importante) cedieron y sujetaron la cerviz todas las
impertinencillas de mi genio, que eran de querer vivir sola; de no querer tener ocupación
obligatoria que embarazase la libertad de mi studio, ni rumor de comunidad que
impidiese el sosegado silencio de mis libros. (Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz 14,16)
Now let us unpack her reasons. First and foremost, at no given point on this letter, nor in her
other writings does she states religious reasons for her decision, and this is perhaps one of the

66
elements that has always strike people about her trajectory. She joined the religious order to gain
access to books, to be able to dive into reading and writing as part of her being. As we can recall,
from Pizan and Gournay, formal education was a right forbidden to women, only a few women
will gain the knowledge of reading and writing, and even less the actual access to books. To this
we can add, that Sor Juana20, lived in Mexico all her life, where the percentage of educated
women remain within the colonial aristocrats that came from Spain. She taught herself how to
read and write, but that wasn’t enough, she wanted to access a variety of literature to further her
acquisition of knowledge, once she realized there was no formal way in which she could
continue to educate herself, she decided to join the religious order. She figured out only by
joining the church, could she gain access to the library. Through her years, she gained access to
books banned by the church during her time, for this she was sentenced to isolation and punished
by the church. Her writings were highly criticized by the Catholic Church, both formally and
informally. A letter was published by Manuel Fernández de la Cruz, the Bishop of Puebla,
México, with critiques based on Catholic moralism. Sor Juana responds in a public letter
published in the same paper as Sor Filotea’s critique, in it, she responds to some of the
predominant oppressive ideas of the catholic theologians of her time.
Although it is clear that Sor Juana joined the order to continue and further enter el mundo
de las letras, she also hints at the social prescriptions of her time, “wishing to have no obligatory
occupation that would inhibit the freedom of my studies”, this point toward the obligation
women felt into motherhood, something that seemed as “an obligation” at the time, like
previously noted, it seemed as a duty for women. At no given point she indicates that she wishes
to become a mother, nor does she rejects it directly; instead she constantly directs us toward the
social expectations for women, and the mandates of the church. This serves as a way to contrast
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the ideas of their time. From Pizan, to Gournay, and now Sor Juana, motherhood seems as a
social obstacle to the education of women. On one hand, we see how each of them find the same
culprit “hombres necios” (misguided men), while we can also notice the progression towards
ideas of what in present days we identify as gender versus that which we identify as sex. They
find different escape routes, and various plausible solutions, while Pizan and Gournay attempted
to enter the conversation, and attempted to prove to their counterparts that they were right, Sor
Juana focus on showcasing the error of her opponents. At the same time, they all highlight what
we mentioned at the beginning Mary Warnock identifies as an obstacle, education, and the
classification of a philosopher based on their academic achievements. How can we use formal
education and academic achievements as a parameter to define what a philosopher is, if history is
full of examples of how different systems have kept groups of people—in this case women—
from getting educated? Now, let’s proceed to analyze the work of another female philosophers of
the time, who many consider the first maternal philosopher, it is she who uses motherhood to
justify the education of women, perhaps as a rhetoric strategy.
Lady Damaris Masham
Now let us explore the work of Lady Damaris Cudworth Masham whose arguments are
in direct conversation with John Locke, particularly in response to his treatise evaluated earlier in
this chapter. Therefore, it initiates our discussion to one of the main issues at large through the
whole manuscript—not just this chapter—what are the discourses within maternal philosophy
that arise from female voices which allow us to delineate the problem at large, female versus
male voice, empirical texts and the complexity of patriarchal traditions and expectations?
Although not that many scholars have studied Masham’s work, within those who have,
there seems to be a general agreement that Lady Damaris Cudworth Masham was John Locke’s
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disciple. Such agreement surges from three key facts, one the correspondence between the two,
second, the fact that Locke lived at the Masham’s residency and third, Masham’s treatises where
she cites Locke’s work and expands on his ideas. Dr. Regan Penaluna states that:
[Lady Damaris Masham] is an empiricist much in the way of Locke, and expresses
similar ideas on toleration. Additionally, in her work she refers both to Locke’s An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding and to his Some Thoughts on Education. But there is
an important way in which her philosophy is a clear departure from Locke’s, yet which
has gone overlooked in the literature: namely, her theory of mothers’ authority, which she
elaborates in her second treatise. (Penaluna 3)
From the beginning of the treatise Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian
Life, Masham argues in favor of the education of women for two main reasons; one as a way to
educate themselves in the Christian tradition and understanding of God’s word, secondly to
instruct correct Christian values to their children. To support her argument, she presents that
women should be well educated in order to improve their reasoning; therefore, women should
not be fool in service of the family, she retorts:
The improvements of Reason, however requisite to Ladies for their Accomplishment, as
rational Creatures; and however needful to them for the well Educating of their Children,
and to their being useful in their Families, yet are rarely any recommendation of them to
Men; who foolishly thinking, that Money will answer to all things, do, for the most part,
regard nothing else in the Woman they would Mary: And not often finding what they do
not look for, it would be no wonder if their Off-spring should inherit no more Sense than
themselves. But Nature ever so kind to them in this respect, yet through want of
cultivating the Tallents she bestows upon those of the Female Sex, her Bounty is usually
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lost upon them; and Girls, betwixt silly Fathers and ignorant Mothers, are generally so
brought up, that traditionary Opinions are to them, all their lives long, instead of Reason.
They are, perhaps, sometimes told in regards od what Religion exacts, That they must
Believe and Do such and such things, because the Word of God requires it, but they are
not upon searching the Scriptures for themselves, to see whether, or no, these things are
so; and they so little know why they should look upon the Scriptures to be the Word of
God, that but too often they are easily perswaded out of the Reverence due to them being
so: And (if they happen to meet with such bad examples) are not seldom brought from
thence, even to scoff at the Documents of their Education; and, in consequence thereof, to
have no Religion at all. (Masham 45-46)
She believes the role of the mother is to educate her child properly and such standards include
teaching them good Christian values. She presents that—during her time—the social reality was
for the mother to offer the care and initial instruction of children until they attended school
instruction, therefore the mother is the one who provided the foundation of knowledge for her
children:
That is capable of instructing her Children in the reasonableness of the Christian
Religion; and of laying in them the Foundations of a solid Vertue; that a Lady (I say) no
more knowing than this does demand, can hardly escape being call’d Learned by the Men
of our days; and in consequence thereof, becoming a Subject of Ridicule to one part of
them, and of Aversion to the other; with but a few exceptions of some vertous and
rational Persons. (Masham 48-49)
As such, her argument is contrary to that of Sor Juan Inés de la Cruz who during the same
period advocated within the Catholic Church for the education of all women, and contrary to
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Gournay who a few centuries prior had advocated for the education of women in society.
Instead, Masham’s argument was not to advocate for the education of women for the sake of
acquiring knowledge and achieving an even professional plain field with men, her argument is
not driven by gender equality. Alternatively, she argues that mothers are those who form all
minds by educating their children; therefore, they must be educated. As such, she is presenting
the mother as an object or vessel for the development of others who will be part of other
structures in society. Furthermore, she sees the education bestowed on the mother as part of her
maternal duty or responsibility, since it is her duty to form the mind of her child:
If the assistance of Mothers be, as I have already affirm’d it is, necessary to the right
forming of the Minds, and regulating of the Manners of their Children; I am not in the
wrong in reckoning (as I do) that this care is indispensable a Mothers Duty. Now it
cannot, I think, be doubted, but that a Mothers Concurrence and Care is thus necessary, if
we consider that this is a work which can never be too soon begun, it being rarely at all
well performed, if not betimes undertaken; nothing being so effectual to the making Men
vertuous, as to have good Habits and Principles of Vertue establish’d in them before the
Mind is tainted with any thing opposite or prejudicial hereunto. (Masham 49)
She continues her argument by stating that one should be worried of those who will become
mothers and have no education. On the one hand she says that women are better equipped than
men for childrearing and children’s education, while on the other hand she states that not every
mother is prepared for their duties due to their lack of education. Hence, all women—as potential
mothers—should be educated into becoming rational beings:
For tho’ it is to be fear that few Ladies (from the disadvantage of their own Education)
are so well fitted as they ought to be, to take the care of their Children, yet not to be
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willing to do what they can herein, either as thinking this a matter of too much pains for
them, or below their Condition, expressed so senseless a Pride, and so much want of the
affectionate and compassionate Tenderness natural to that Sex and Relation, that one
would almost be tempered to question whether such Women were any more capable of,
than worthy to be the Mothers of Rational Creatures. (Masham 49)
Furthermore, she asserts herself by using John Locke’s Treatise of Education to present her
concerns about those mothers without education (Masham 51). She concludes that maternal care
influences both temporal and eternal happiness, that nature provided women with such
capabilities by design, as such are innately better—than men—on the “Cares of Humane Life”,
stating that:
… surely these distinguishing Qualities of the Sex were not given barely to delight, when
they may, so manifestly, be profitable also, if joyn’d with a well informed Understanding:
From whence, viz. from Womans being naturally thus fitted to take this care if their little
Ones, it follows, that besides the injustice done to themselves thereby, it is neglecting the
Direction of Nature for the well breeding up of Children, when Ladies are render’d
uncapable hereof, through the want of such due improvements of their Reason as are
requisite hereunto. (Masham 52)
Dr. Penaluna’s analysis concludes that Lady Damaris Masham “tells us that a mother’s capacity
for nurturing is a necessary component in the construction and maintenance of political society,
and so understanding the role of the mother is indispensable when doing political philosophy”
(4). This analysis on Masham’s work is one that will be recurrent within the discourse of the
maternal, particularly on that which I am identifying as maternal philosophy. We saw how Plato
and Locke proposal for the dissolution or the conjunction of the parental roles, while Hegel
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limits females to nurturing and Damaris Masham expands their role towards that of the educator.
In doing so, she argues that it is the mother the one who places the political seed on her children
since a young age through nurturing. Later on, it is she who continues to maintain the growth of
the child’s politics, turning the mother into a necessary tool for both “construction and
maintenance of political society”, as such she becomes indispensable for political philosophy.
While all of the abovementioned thinkers had a different point of view as to where the mother
belongs, all of them are placing and ideal of “duty” upon the mother, at times these ideas of
“duty” may seem as moving the mother as an equal to men, while in reality is finding a place for
her with limited access. Their ideas continue to see the mother as an object and not a subject,
because all have defined for her what her labor should be, where and how to execute her being,
instead of accepting she has agency upon her being, all thinker find a “place” for her, while
displacing her to the margins of dutiful care.
We have seen that Masham is not concerned with the pregnant body nor with the birthing
bond, instead she focuses on the actions related to parenting and with the reasoning capabilities
of women. Although there is no proof as to why, some had speculated this was a strategy she
used to rhetorically infiltrate her ideas to men, to convince them to allow women to have access
to education while indirectly offering a space to educate all potential mothers rather than those
who had already become one, perhaps in an attempt to begin the separation between biological
predeterminism and being. We cannot state that she was the first one to critically engage with
such discourse of women as a thinking subject, but she is certainly within the first female
philosophers to specifically identify the mother as a thinking subject who adds pedagogical value
to the family, hence to society. Later on, in chapter two, we will see how this plays a significant
role within the discourse of maternal subjectivity.
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So far, we had seen what some male philosophers say about the role of women as
mothers in society, taking a patriarchal stance; and we just saw a counter by a female
philosopher whose arguments are in opposition by advocating for a matriarchal structure21, while
also looking at two female thinkers who advocated for the recognition of women’s contribution
to the political aspects of society and for the equality of men and women. What most of them
have in common is that the foundation of their arguments is supported by biological or Christian
reasons. Now let us turn our attention to Simone de Beauvoir.
Simone de Beauvoir initiates volume II of The Second Sex by stating that she “will try to
describe how woman is taught to assume her condition, how she experiences this, what universe
she finds herself enclosed in, and what escape mechanisms are permitted her” (279). As such,
she begins such volume by asserting that “one is not born a woman but rather becomes one”
(Beauvoir 283), later on she delineates the condition of The Mother:
It is through motherhood that woman fully achieves her physiological destiny; that is her
natural vocation, since her whole organism is directed toward the perpetuation of the
species. But we have already shown that human society is never left to nature. And in
particular, for about a century, the reproductive function has no longer been controlled by
biological chance alone but by design. (Beauvoir 524)
Another important inclusion by Beauvoir, is that she takes time to discuss the pregnant body, the
postpartum body and the nuances of these, for her the biological change that occurs during
pregnancy transcends from subject to object, she states: “What is unique about the pregnant
woman is that at the very moment her body transcends itself, it is grasped as immanent: it
withdraws into itself in nausea and discomfort, it no longer exist for itself alone and then
becomes bigger that it had ever been” (538). She adds, “even nursing brings them no joy”, and
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concludes that those mothers “feel hostility” toward their nursing children (551). The focus here
is not the why some mothers find joy on these physical labors while others feel pain, instead this
should serve to illustrate one of many events that will influence the becoming of a mother, as
such her maternal philosophies and the most frequent argument regarding her subjectivity as a
split one.
Beauvoir utilizes this and other examples as proof to demystify the so famously called
maternal instinct, that upon which prior ideas and expectations of the mother had been
constructed, and to some extent upon which Masham’s argument relied heavily. Beauvoir states
that the examples she provided of infanticide and suicidal mothers, serve to “prove that there is
no such thing as maternal ‘instinct’: the word does not in any case apply to the human species.
The mother’s attitude is defined by her total situation and by the way she accepts it” (554), she
completes her statement by saying “it is extremely variable.” These variables will be more
evident as we move toward the chapters, particularly after we discuss maternal subjectivity and
the (m)others in the next two chapters respectively. There is a lot more to unpack about
Beauvoir’s take on motherhood, for example, although she placed value on the mother’s
economic independence, her capabilities to be in the working force, and even the benefits it
provides, it is still unclear whether she saw the mother as a thinking subject.
Within the maternal discourse where we can observe the concerns about the ways in
which mothers exist, become or is a mother in it, one can see this idea of transcending via
biology as a hyper reasoning of the pregnant body, particularly when we want to highlight the
mother as a thinking being. This concern surges for two reasons; first I have not found any
evidence indicating that she understood the pregnant body experientially, as such this seems as
speculation of what the pregnant body can achieve. Secondly, in recent work that surrounds a
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variety of research from scientific to philosophical all the way to artistic practices—all of which
empower pregnant bodies—we had come to gather more information that may lead us to
question to what extent some of the events that Beauvoir identify as transcendental, could be
transformed, evaded or controlled. Thanks to individual accounts of their experiences of
pregnancy and childbirth, we had come to learn that many of the assumptions by Beauvoir had
been debunked, in part due to the increase education about pregnant bodies and their childbirth
processes. A return to trusting, supporting and educating these bodies with tools to better coexist
with that other in their womb. But, this will not be our focus, as here we are mainly concern with
the social practice of mothering, with that of becoming a mother which can be initiated during
pregnancy but which does not require the pregnant body to be the same as the mother-body. This
needs to be emphasized before we continue to dive into the multiple layers of maternal thinking
since we want to consider that which is usually left out of the discourse. I will speak more in
detail about this on the next chapter when I discuss how Beauvoir sees the dichotomy mothers
face in regards to their existence as subject/object. Lastly, it is important to mention that Simone
de Beauvoir’s analysis of the condition of mothers starts by looking at such within bourgeois
society, turning us toward those multiple societal others which are based on oppositions:
men/women, bourgeois/proletariat.
So far, we had seen what philosophers had stated about the mother as either subject or
object. Furthermore, we noticed the limitations based on biological predeterminism that guided
many of the male philosophers’ generalizations and how it influenced the societal prescriptions
they placed upon female bodies. These ideas motivate us to pose at the forefront the question at
hand: can there be such thing as maternal thinking or maternal philosophy? The answer—as we
saw through the work of Lady Damaris Masham—is YES, but is not that simple because we
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must continue to ask ourselves which female voices—particularly mothers—had been the
foremost on this subject? Furthermore, we must consider if the ideas these women philosophers
put forward continues the line of the maternal as instinctively or based upon nature or if their
ideas move away from such mystified traditions? Lastly, it prompts the question: which are the
predominant discourses within maternal philosophy?
On this matter we will evaluate mainly—but not exclusively—Elisabeth Badinter, Sara
Ruddick, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva. In order to explore the basis upon which maternal
philosophers built their ideas and how such moved from the analysis of lived experiences, to
identifying forms of thinking of mothers. While questioning whether a decolonial form of
motherhood has been proposed, the main goal is to unveiled forgotten voices from the margins,
in the remaining of this chapter and further chapters, including key texts by bell hooks and
Claudia Jones, among others.
Maternal Thinking: Sara Ruddick and more…
In the early 1980’s, a new series of works challenging the myths of motherhood and its
limitations emerged. Out of this canon we have Mother Love: Myth and Reality, Motherhood in
Modern History by Elisabeth Badinter whose ideas influenced the discourse between Sara
Ruddick and bell hooks around the maternal as well as their respective proposals regarding the
father:
Under the pressure exerted by women, the new father mothers equally and in the
traditional mother’s image. He creeps in, like another mother, between the mother and the
child, who experiences almost indiscriminately as intimate a contact with the father as
with the mother. We have only to notice the increasingly numerous against their bare
chest. Their faces reflect a completely motherly tenderness that shocks no one. After
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centuries of the father’s authority or absence, it seems that a new concept has come into
existence – father love, the exact equivalent of mother love. (Badinter 324)
But, it is Sara Ruddick who places the mother as a thinking being, whose thinking is influenced
by her experiences as a mother, and not limited to her formal education, not in opposition of her
predecessors like Masham, but as further enveloping the complexities of being, as a subject
whose existences, agencies and experiences, produce ideas. It is important to note that the works
from Badinter, Ruddick and those who followed them, question a variety of experiences related
to reproduction and labor of care by mothers—including, but not exclusively those with female
bodies—occurred after a key historical moment for women. These being what many identified as
the Second Wave Feminism and the Women’s Liberation Movement, from 1960-1980. During
such period, women not only question and thought about the multiple oppressions they faced in
the past and present; but they became activist and worked toward better policies that will ensure
their path toward liberation.
During the 1970s many female artists presented their activism through their art medium,
within it, as in other academic areas a key discourse occurred around the compatibility or
incompatibility of motherhood and feminism. For many artists like Mary Kelly, Mierle
Laderman Ukeles, and the Mother Art collective, it meant they will create work related to their
maternal labor, this as a way to enter the feminist discourse. Parallel to them, other academics
including philosophers, wrote about their maternal experiences, including their labor in the work
force, their labor of care, and their labor at home, including the 1976 book Of Woman Born by
Adrienne Rich, and Badinter’s Mother Love. But it is Sara Ruddick who initially positions the
mother as a thinking being, whom thinking and being is influenced by her maternal experiences.
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Ruddick initially published her essay titled “Maternal Thinking” as an article in 1980.
Later she developed those ideas into a book published in 1989 titled Maternal Thinking: toward
a politics of peace, in it, she argues that “maternal voices have been drowned by professional
theory, ideologies of motherhood, sexist arrogance, and childhood fantasy” (40). In the book she
addresses how this is an expansion of her 1980s essay as a response to some of the critiques
received by the article, including that by bell hooks.
The ideas developed throughout her essay and book around maternal thinking shifted the
focus of motherhood as a social institution into the verb: motherhood as daily activities related to
raising children—what she defined as mothering or maternal—while arguing that such decisions
and actions shaped maternal thinking, concluding in the connection between the mother as a
subject, and the mother as a thinking being. Since its publication there has been a significant
amount of scholarship around the maternal, establishing the field of maternal studies as its own.
As a result, positioning this text by Ruddick as a pivotal moment in the maternal discourse.
Although at the time of its publication Sara Ruddick did not identified herself or the manuscript
as philosophy, this is perhaps one of the first time where the maternal experience as part of being
is identified as a thinking experience. More importantly for this manuscript, it directly places
such experiences in the US American culture which will be our focus on Part III of this
manuscript.
When defining maternal thinking in her book Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of
Peace, she says:
There is a unity of reflection, judgement, and emotion. This unity I call ‘maternal
thinking.’ ...it is important that maternal thinking is no more interest-governed, no more
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emotional, and no more relative to a particular reality (the growing child) that the
thinking that arises from scientific, religious, or any other practice. (Ruddick 97)
Ruddick makes a clear distinction between mother and mothering or birthgiver and caregivers.
She states specific definitions that are key to understand her framework of the maternal as well
as the critique of such presented by bell hooks in “Revolutionary Parenting.22” First, she defines
mothers as “people who see children as ‘demanding’ protection, nurturance, and training; they
attempt to respond to children’s demands with care and respect rather than indifference or
assault” (Ruddick xi). She further adds that the “conception of mothering as a kind of caring
labor undermines the myth that mothers are ‘naturally’ loving. There is nothing foreordained
about maternal response. Birthgivers or legal guardians may respond to children with
indifference, assault, or active neglect” (Ruddick xi). This definitions by Ruddick have multiple
layers of analysis and importance for maternal studies, on the one hand it raises some questions
in regards to gendered language, while on the other it raises consensus about whether we should
call maternal all labors of care? Should we continue to accept and use a gender-based label for
childrearing labor? Such framework created room to showcase and value mothering as a form of
thinking, as a portal to a philosophy, and a way of being and understanding the becoming of a
mother. Lastly, Ruddick framed maternal thinking and mothering as political. Consequently,
other questions arise, for example, are maternal philosophies political as well? Or, are maternal
politics philosophical practices? It may seem that for Ruddick this holds true when she says,
“This practicalist conception of reason, provided a space in which to represent mothers as
reasoners” (xi). As such, we can define maternal philosophy as the politics that gear the actions
of mothers which influence their becoming. Therefore, maternal politics and philosophies are
intertwined.
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On the other hand, bell hooks disagree with Ruddick’s argument to call all labor
maternal, by stating that Ruddick romanticizes the maternal as something that anyone can
become, i.e. a man can become maternal, meaning that he can care in a maternal way. In
“Revolutionary Parenting”, hooks argue that this idea of the maternal as something that anyone
can perform—including men—continues to attach the child rearing and caring as an instinct that
women can perform better or even naturally. In contrast to Ruddick, hooks propose we change
the meaning and usage of the language related to parenting to eliminate its gender-based
definitions to create a shift towards a language based on the actions of parenting and not the
gender prescriptions. For hooks, the inclusion of men within the realm of maternal, is
problematic, to this she says:
Ruddick romanticizes the idea of the “maternal” and places emphasis on men becoming
maternal, a vision which seems shortsighted. Because the word “maternal” is associated
with the behavior of women, men will not identify with it even though they may be
behaving in ways that have traditionally been seen as “feminine.” (hooks 149)
hooks consider this problematic because it “reinforces the stereotypical sexist notion that women
are inherently better suited to parent” (149). hooks propose that instead we create a distinction
between being a mother or a father and parenting. She says “Seeing men who do effective
parenting as “maternal” reinforces the stereotypical sexist notion that women are inherently
better suited to parent, that men who parent in the same way as women are imitating the real
thing rather than acting as a parent should act” (hooks 149). On that matter, Ruddick states that
“fathers are not, simply the male counterpart to mothers”, (42) while reminding us that
historically they have been placed as breadwinners providing for the economic and “material
support for child care and to defend mothers and their children from external threat” (42).
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Perhaps one of the problems with such argument goes beyond her statement that men can act
maternal, it extends to her assertion that men can become mothers. Both the idea of men
becoming mothers or acting maternal as equivalent to caring for their children (or any kind of
care performance), is that it perpetuates the naturalistic value that females can perform care
better, instead of focusing on a sex and gender-neutral form of care, where any individual can
perform care. While she speaks to men becoming and acting maternal, she alienates other types
of (m)others in her analysis.23
If we remove gender from the ideal of care, we can move toward what hooks refers to as
revolutionary parenting; a way of parenting where we remove the oppressive stereotypes of the
ideal of care placed upon the female sexed body. One of hook’s statements to support her claim
is that, “the word ‘maternal’ is associated with the behavior of women, men will not identify
with it even though they may be behaving in ways that have traditionally been seen as
‘feminine’” (149), while at the same time she states that “the word paternal should share the
same meaning” as maternal (149). On the other hand—and contrary to hooks—we have the
predominant argument in favor to continue the use of gendered verbs regarding mothers and
fathers, and to use maternal as an adjective that describes all labor of care, in order to prevent the
erasure of the labor traditionally performed by women. Now, I disagree with both of these
arguments. First, I disagree with hooks when she argues that paternal and maternal should carry
the same meaning. Secondly, I disagree with the predominant use of the word maternal to
describe all labors of care. To the first point, I disagree with hooks because the words paternal
and maternal carry different historical values, and each differed in its general social contexts.
While at the same time I do agree with hooks that there is a series of actions—including those of
care—that should be framed and label as parental in order to prevent the prevalent perpetuation
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of placing both, care, and love as inherently natural to the mother. While also extending such
argument against the use of the word maternal as an adjective that describes all labors of care.
For example, when Ruddick says a father can become a mother and be maternal, or when
Kristeva states that the care provided by nurses is maternal. Although one can find commonality
with the labor a mother performs, by allowing all labors of care to be framed as maternal, we
continue to attach a naturalistic sexed value to human capacities of care.
Combining both the experience and the thinking as a mother within the ideology of
motherhood, we have Maureen Linker, whose work has been influenced by Ruddick. In her
essay “Explaining the World: Philosophical Reflections on Feminism and Mothering” —
following Jean Piaget’s tradition24—she identifies herself as “mother/philosopher”, not as
someone who is a mother and a philosopher, but as someone whose research is drawn from her
maternal experiences, as a methodology to answer her question presented above in regards to
maternal epistemology. She asks whether her own experiences as a mother could be “in line with
a general theory of maternal epistemology?” (Linker 42). Andrea O’Reilly tells us that, “unlike
Piaget, Linker argues that her role is not merely to provide an account on how her son constructs
reality, but rather, how together both mother and child co-constructs a notion of reality informed
by their mutual sense of right and wrong; a sense which is continually open for revision and
reconsideration” (4). In other words, Linker—against Piaget—does not study her child as a
subject that will shine a light of knowledge; what she does is exploring forms of mutual
becoming that arise from the relationship between Linker and her son.
Linker follows Ruddick’s take on maternal thinking and mothering, as a practice of care.
For Ruddick—as suggested on the title of her book—it leads towards a “politics of peace”, for
Linker—not far from Ruddick—such care leads to less violent individuals. When she recounts

83
her son’s observation about grumpy animals, she responded “some are grumpy because no one
took care of them” (Linker 42). Perhaps the problem with both Ruddick and Linker, is that their
general argument based on their experiences is used to justify their universal framework of the
maternal, and the labor of care they deem correct. This is problematic because it places a moral
judgement upon forms of care based on universal standards of care. As we had witnessed in prior
arguments by John Locke and Lady Damaris Masham, it seems that there is a latent agreement
that any moral judgement attached to the labor of care is best performed by the mother. Based on
that, Locke argued for the inclusion of the mother into the governance of the family, while
Masham argued for the education of the mother, so that the mother could educate the children
within the Christian moral standards. Then, one can see their use of maternal for all labors of
care, as a continuum that places the labor of care within a moral framework, that could range
beyond that of Christianity. Therefore, further limiting its meaning and its application.
In addition to Linker we have Judith Andre, who is also influenced by Ruddick. In “The
Virtue of Honoring Oneself”, Andre states that, “Ruddick found in the practice of mothering an
epistemology, a way of knowing, useful not (just!) in the rearing of children, but in something
nearly as essential, that of peacemaking” (79). Later on, she says, that “Maternal Thinking takes
a further step, in treating this central female task not just as important—which everyone
knows—and not just as costly, as Tillie Olsen and [Adrienne] Rich25 argue, but as morally
interesting” (Andre 80). The discourse from Ruddick carried through both Linker and Andre, is
that of the categorization of mothers into the antagonistic binary of good and bad mothers, being
supported by Ruddick’s description of the good mother as that which works towards politics of
peace carried through her understanding of love. It is necessary to question to what extent
anyone can really assert what a good or bad mother is, more importantly, what are the effects of
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these classifications if not to create what Leslie Morgan Steiner calls “mommy wars.” This is a
continuation of the already established tradition of prescribing all mothers the same placement in
society which is attached to her performance for the good of the nation. This whether on Plato’s
Republic, Pizan’s The Book of the City of Ladies, and more recently in Ruddick’s Maternal
Thinking. All of these predetermine the place of a women if they become mothers, it is as if once
someone becomes a mother her importance to society—regardless of value—changes toward a
societal placement and no longer based on one’s desires.
In a later book titled Rethinking Maternal Politics, Sara Ruddick argues that one’s
maternal politics can be driven by war or by peace: “there are war mothers as well as peace
mothers, racist as well as anti-racist mothers. Maternal roles, identities and symbols serve them
all” (369). For example, Ruddick proposes: “This conception of mothering as a kind of caring
labor undermines the myth that mothers are ‘naturally’ loving” (xi). With such conception of
mothering, we begin to question the idea that a mother can be more loving than the father
because of her instincts, to see that the practices of care for a child, and as well as childrearing
are not exclusive to an anatomical sex, but rather ascribed to a performed gender. If we begin to
pay attention to the caring labor, we would see that either mother or father can perform the labor
of care effectively.
As seen through bell hooks’ critique the main problem in the maternal discourse is one of
exclusion masked as one of inclusion through the framing of maternalities as performances of
care that others beside the mother can performed. This is clear when Ruddick—and other
theorists like Judith Andre and Ann Mangoven—frames the care of the father as maternal. This
is also seen when Kristeva refers to the caring practice by other women—like a nurse—as
maternal:
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In other words, a woman doesn’t have to be a mother in order to have a motherly
relationship to the world. I mean for instance, a nurse, a female professor, or other
women can be extremely motherly. Also, there are women who have children and stick to
a military lack of sensitivity. (Kristeva 171)
The problem with this extension of all labors of care as maternal, as bell hooks presents it, is the
constant exclusion of many women and mothers from the different maternal discourses which
lies in the discourse of the family structure and governance, as well as the re-romanticizing of
motherhood via the exclusion of many mothers. She reminds us that “Early feminist attacks on
motherhood alienated masses of women from the movement, especially poor and/or non-white
women, who find parenting one of the few interpersonal relationships where they are affirmed
and appreciated” (hooks 146). On the other hand, within this line of critique, one can also
question Ruddick’s stance of mothering as a path toward politics of peace.
Maternal Philosophies
One of the leading arguments by Ruddick is that if mothering is geared by its maternal
thinking (the thinking of the mother that is linked to her labor as a mother—as per Ruddick), also
that mothering is a conduit of peace and as such it serves politics of peace. She argues that
Maternal Thinking moves toward a politics of peace. But, if one takes into consideration the
essays “Motherhood and Politics on the Far Right” by Claudia Koonz, and “Mothers in RaceHate Movements” by Kathleen Blee, as well as the documentary Hate Rising; we can conclude
that a better and more plausible statement would be “Maternal Thinking toward politics.” In
other words, we can have mothers driven by white supremacist neo-Nazi ideals as part of their
maternal labor and politics, while at the same time have another sector of maternal politics
driven by the Black Lives Matters movement or by environmental issues. If we look into
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maternal practices as a reflection of maternal politics and philosophies, a new structure of
motherhood could be reformulated. In the cases presented by Koonz and Blee, we can see that
maternal care can serve either for politics of peace, or for politics of hate, but perhaps the
question is: does mothering serve morality? As seen before, in the past these ideals had been
used as a vehicle for Christian morality, which extends our inquiry into, whose morality? Or,
whether such placement is there to perpetuate the blame of individuals upon the woman who
either nurture or fail to do so? If mothering can be used by the mothers of the movement of
Black Lives Matters as well as by Nazi mothers, by theologians as well as atheists; then, the
answer is that, socially and historically, mothering has been used beyond the vessel of birthgiving into or towards—like Ruddick’s title suggests—a vessel for religious beliefs, political
views, and ideology to be planted and nurture in a child’s mind. So far, we can state that both
Linker and Ruddick, are not far from prior female philosophers like Masham, whom had framed
and justify a place for the mother based on moral judgements. As such, we can ask, what else can
we do when it comes to seeing the mother as a thinking being in a more revolutionary or radical
way to break with the paradigms of our predecessors?
As we can see it’s been a slow movement towards more radical ways of looking at the
mother as a being, and as a thinking being, due to the multiple societal obstacles female bodies
had encounter through history. In addition, if we continue to trace a line toward thinking
mothers, we can see increased work that support maternal thinking, mainly in the past couple of
decades, particularly since the year 2000. These historical obstacles are linked to the
unrecognition and with the surge of accepting women as thinking beings and more specifically as
philosophers. In her introduction to Feminist Philosophy, Alison Stone states that “we indeed
find that philosophers have said much about death and remarkably little about birth” (179), while
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pointing toward Adriana Cavarero, who argues that such focus on death by western philosophy
“is because men fear the maternal body” (179). She also refers to the argument made by Amy
Mullin, “that bodily pregnancies are understood to have nothing in common with the kind of
intellectual growth and creativity metaphorically associated with pregnancy” (Stone 27). Stone
invites us to “imagine a culture which saw birth and being born—not death—as the central
feature of human life” (179). What would occur if we focus the question of our existence, not to
our inevitable death, but to our inherent birth? In such case, I will agree with Mullin and Stone,
we will have to shift our experience from the universal everybody dies, to the particular of the
female sexed body power-to create life.
Another thinker that follows a similar train of through as Stone, by including an analysis
of the fear men have of embodied experiences related to birth, and who places the birthing body
front and forward of her discussion, is Adriana Cavarero. To support her argument, Cavarero
looks into a series of myths including that of Demeter. She states that:
To put it in more modern terms, the myth of Demeter reveals a sovereign figure of female
subjectivity who decides, in the concrete singularity of every woman, whether or not to
generate. For this sovereign figure, the act of generating is a prerogative rooted in her
power—and therefore in her choice—to carry it out. It is not a duty imposed by a socially
prescribed, external ethics supposedly inscribed in the law of nature. Quite to the
contrary, far from being a force that prescribes an act of generation in which the mother
is supposed to be an instrument, physis shows itself to be at one with the mother and to be
rooted in her choice: the mother either assists or vetoes the birth that constitutes physis,
not vice versa. (Cavarero 64-65)
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Furthermore, she presents that at some point every individual will have noticed the influence of
being born of “their mother and, in turn, that their mother had the power to give or take life is
unique to women” (Cavarero 64). Stone uses Cavarero to present that men fear females due to
their capacity to “give or take life” which both, Stone and Cavarero, see as “unique to women”
(Stone 179). Although these statements are arguable, it is important to present them as part of the
canon that may have led the tradition of excluding mothers as thinking beings as well as the
canon of sanctification of female bodies; where female bodies are placed at a higher position—
like the power to give and take life. What their statements do showcase is a transition into a
greater visibility of female lived experiences and bodily changes as intertwined with their
thinking, which had move us towards two other vertices within maternal philosophy,
embodiment and psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis and the Maternal
Now let us turn our attention to Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, who followed the
psychoanalytical tradition and whom developed work that focus on the use of language, by
questioning its application and presenting reformulations in order to argue in favor of the
inclusion of female voices—particularly on topics related to female experiences—and on
maternal issues. What differentiates Irigaray and Kristeva from the previous thinkers, is that they
centered their ideas around psychoanalysis and language. In one of her talks about the body as it
relates to a mother’s body, Irigaray critiques the absence of male physicians in the audience of
her talk, since it proves once again the attempt to silence the voice of women. In other words,
ignoring the voices of women to continue the perpetuation of investing language from a male
perspective. Around those lines, Kristeva denounces the need to develop a new set of vocabulary
which allows us to expand the language and understanding of women and the body of the

89
mother. While Judith Butler critiques her emphasis on biological determinism carried in her
theories.
In the chapter “Each Sex Should Have Its Own Rights”, Irigaray questions the ideas
Hegel presents about family structures on Phenomenology of the Spirit. Irigaray states that,
“Hegel is unable to think of the family as anything but a single substance within which particular
individuals lose their rights” (1). For Irigaray this is not about losing rights, or even about equal
rights for both sexes, but rather about finding the rights for each sex. The male dominant
philosophical tradition presented a perspective where “the family serves the interests of property,
of material patrimony, and of the reproduction of children” (Irigaray 4). Irigaray supports her
argument by presenting the mother/daughter relationship in the myth of Demeter and Persepone
as an example of how powerful men assert their power by treating both wife and daughter as
property. To change this Irigaray propose the mother should teach her daughter to assert her
subjectivity, to avoid men overpowering them. Although the duty of the mother in Irigaray is one
that should work in favor of the daughter and the future becoming of the daughter, it still follows
the traditional ideas upon which family roles were founded. We continue to see the maternal duty
by limiting ourselves to the question of the rights of each sex, without challenging and changing
the structure of the family, are we not in danger of perpetuating the structures of patriarchy?
In order to tackle the above question, we need to continue exploring how women address
these issues, and whether or not they do it within the existing structure or from a new structure
built by and for the voice of women. While Simone de Beauvoir says, “one is not born a woman
but rather becomes one” (301), Luce Irigaray retorts, “we are woman from the start. That we
don’t have to be turned into women by them, labeled by them, made holy and profane by them”
(212). As such, their remarks extent to the mother as a being that is not born, “but rather
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becomes”, in other words that the biological possibility of becoming a pregnant body should not
assume such body will be pregnant or must be pregnant, let alone that it will become a mother.
While at same time, if we follow Irigaray, we can say that once a mother decides to become a
mother, it should be under her own terms, and only she can turn herself into a mother.
Furthermore, based on their remarks, a plausible question could be, can we hold both of these
statements as truthful within the context of gender performativity? More specifically, how can
we hold such as truthful within the context of the performance of (m)others? We are born with
an anatomical sex, but, does that really define us from the start? Are we really “women from the
start”?
We are sexed from the start,26 and as such a set of socially constructed expectations and
oppressions are imbedded upon ourselves based on our bodies. But, perhaps the most relevant
part of the statement made by Irigaray is, “we don’t have to be turned into women by them”
(212), because we can turn into woman on our own; and not by a patriarchal social prescription
of what a woman should become. If we read them this way, both de Beauvoir and Irigaray are
presenting the possibility of creating our own standards of becoming. The fact that one is born a
sexed female does not equal to becoming a woman, neither to becoming a mother. The acts of
becoming are key to understanding maternal politics and its philosophies, since they are
characterized by intersectionality. Our becoming is directly and indirectly influence by our
surroundings right at the intersection of our culture, biology, gender identity, theological
believes, and the historical instances of it. It is right at that intersectional moment where we
become. In other words, maternal subjectivity is influenced—upon other things—by maternal
politics and maternal philosophies. Moreover, our performances of the self are influences by the
above, turning into a visual and kinesthetic representation of ones’ subjectivity.
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Lived Experiences: Embodiment and Labor
Let us now explore another key moment within maternal philosophy, the move away
from the instinct and mothering as a verb, and the thinking mother framed within the
performance of mothering, toward the epistemology of mothering and the move into looking at
the physical changes of some female bodies and how such canon is part of maternal philosophy.
In the essay “Pregnancy Embodiment” by Iris Marion Young, Stone reminds us she “describe
women’s experience of pregnancy in a way that is informed by phenomenology” (172). Young
draws from Mearleu-Ponty’s awareness of our bodies when we recognize the self in relation to
others and in relation to one’s body (Stone 73). The essay is divided in two sections, the first one
showcases the voice of females who had gone through pregnancy, then, the second section
explores the points of encounters between the pregnant body and institutions. Through her essay
she proves that systematically the pregnant body has been alienated from itself by multiple
institutions. Young follows the line of Kristeva, she shows the pregnant body as a split subject.
This text continues to be of great importance and a classic within feminist, and maternal
philosophical studies as the phenomenology of pregnancy. Young concludes that the attitude of
women toward their pregnant body is aesthetic:
Her skin has a particular color, her face determinate features, her hair particular color and
texture, all with their own aesthetic properties. Her specific body lives in a specific
context—crowded by other people, anchored to the earth by gravity, surrounded by
buildings and streets with a unique history, hearing particular languages, having food and
shelter available, or not, as a result of culturally specific social processes that make
specific requirements on her to access them. All these concrete material relations of a
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person’s bodily existence and her physical and social environment constitute her facticity.
(Young 16)
She states that not only the aesthetic experience of the body is important, but how it relates to the
overall experience of the mobility of the body through a variety of spaces with social meaning.
In her essay “Revolutionary Parenting”, hooks present the increased concern of
motherhood within academia and literary circles; from the resurgence of a romanticizing of
motherhood which she compares to that of the nineteenth century, at the same time, highlighting
the focus on the bonding between the mother and the child. In doing so hooks provides us with a
timeline of seminal work on motherhood from the late 1970s: “Phyllis Chesler’s With Child: A
Diary of Motherhood (1979), Elisabeth Badinter’s Mother Love (1980), Nancy Friday’s My
Mother/My Self (1977), and Nancy Chodorow’s The Reproduction of Mothering” (1978) (146).
With hooks critique of the romanticizing of motherhood we begin to see more clearly the
underlaying problem being one related to the exclusion of other maternal realities from the
predominant maternal discourse. This critique by hooks is once again a direct reaction to
Ruddick, who categorized the differences between being a good mom versus a bad mom, based
on the still latent social definitions of good and bad parenting in US American culture. For
Ruddick one of the key elements for good mothering is to provide attention to their children. To
it bell hooks responds by reminding us that:
In fact, the kind of maternal care that Ruddick evokes in her essay, with its tremendous
emphasis on attention given children by parents, especially mothers, is a form of parental
care that is difficult for many working class parents to offer when they return home from
work tired and exhausted. It is increasing difficult for women and men in families
struggling to survive economically to give special attention to parenting. (hooks 150)
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Identifying that it is easier for a parent to be attentive and present if they do not need to worry
constantly about “their material well being” (hooks 150). She extends her inclusion of other
types of mothering when she states, “It is also difficult for women who parent alone to juggle the
demands of work and childrearing” (150). This is a key element for hooks who is advocating for
collective childrearing when she states that, “the point is not to stigmatize single parents, but to
emphasize the need for collective parenting” (hooks 155). Focusing on the challenges parenting
brings based on class and work overload, she argues for a system of support for the family rather
than an abolition of the family to support the becoming of members in society. This allows for a
move toward collective responsibility in childrearing without appropriating someone else’s
becoming.
As mentioned earlier Ruddick sees as truthful that men can become mothers. The
problem with such idea relies on this desire to continue to exalt the virtue of care as feminine.
Her argument is a clearly a political one within the time she wrote it, but I do wonder if
nowadays it’s finally the time when we redefine father and mother and attach the virtue of loving
care to both. Consequently, allowing us to identify a father’s failure on such care as an
emotionally irresponsible father, the same way societies, media, and even the law, does with
mothers whom for a variety of reasons feel detached from their children.27 This discourse reveals
the major issue at hand, how racism, colonialism, xenophobia, economic disparities as well as
other forms of oppression and privilege, dominate the moral acceptance of parental performances
and the language attached to it.
So far, we had seen that bell hooks argue against the usage of “maternal” as an equivalent
for parental care, while at the same time we have a series of maternal theorists who see a
significant value on Ruddick’s emphasis on the virtue of mothers. As noted, although some place
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themselves against Ruddick’s argument, others embrace her description of mothering and
maternal. This issue is perhaps no different than the one presented by Bandinter a few years
earlier in Mother Love, where she establishes the differences and the shift in meaning on the
concepts of fatherly and motherly, while hooks presents the limited meaning of parenting in
patriarchal society, which has lead us to a work overload on mothers by the heavy lifting labor of
the maternal. Both hooks and Badinter, aim to demystified certain biologically driven ideas
linked to the mother.
Fathers are not the counterpart of mothers, neither biologically nor historically, but in
terms of behavior, if both parents are provided with equal income, a parental partnership could
be achieved. If we remove the genderized aspects of care, we could understand parenting as that
who cares with love and nurtures. More importantly, if we (de)genderize care, love, and nurture,
we could aspire to have a more caring, loving and empathetic world, where regardless of parental
choices, we care for our communities and provide childrearing support as well as care for the
elderly. As such, understanding this genealogy of maternal philosophy is essential to understand
other oppressions carried by societal prescriptions throughout multiple social classes and its
structures. A series of oppressions with layers within maternal philosophy and which are only
apparent once we look at the polyphony of mother types. Such oppressions have leaded us into
the categorization and marginalization of mothers into types, one built upon the exclusion of
many mothers from the predominant canon, turning them into (m)others. Furthermore, such
awareness will mobilize us to change certain definitions, expand its significance, challenge the
status quo, and create new words that will better mobilize us towards dismantling patriarchy
without replicating its power structure and moving to a structure of care and respect where the
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historical oppressions are acknowledge, while recognizing the overcoming obstacles of those
who had been oppressed at certain times, and hopefully repairing the harms from the past.
The care from the father should be framed as fatherly love or fathering. Naming a father’s
care or love as mothering, should be avoided because it limits care to gender. Instead it should be
use to frame historical frameworks of the gendered roles of parenting as well as the social
prescriptions for such roles, parenting should be the verb and adjective that encompassed all care
from a parent not mothering or fathering. Utilizing a parenting language—as proposed by
hooks—in a more self-conscious way could be considered a political action, a performance
perhaps. We can choose to perform our role of mother and father as socially prescribed or we can
choose to challenge it. If we choose to select a more revolutionary language to decolonize
parental roles, we should reframe mothering and parenting for instances in which we want to
highlight the historical framework of such labors.
I want to emphasize that my critique on presenting ideas from a universal stand point,
whether from philosophies, politics, or performances is that these promote exclusion through
universalities. Accepting and acknowledging differences could be equally or more powerful;
moving towards polyphonic definitions of matters that concern the mother, rather than by a false
unity in the attempt to place all mothers under the same umbrella. Female bodies are different
than male bodies; nothing like menstruating whether every twenty-eight days or irregularly to
highlight the biological difference between male and female bodies, as well as the differences
among females. But many of our social differences originated in power dynamics, when those
with power determined the extent to which one should carry these differences. Even more, they
determined a place for male and female bodies into gender roles attached to its biological
assumed predeterminations. As such, mothers and fathers go through different embodied
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experiences, which had been used by multiple social structures to determine their expectations of
parents from a social context. Society place them within a value system that influences their
labor in the social sphere as well as the household, furthermore influencing their mental health as
it has also created a value system for the emotional labor a mother exercise to how it measures
the emotional reactions of each. For example, society expect the mother to be “loving, and
caring” while the father is a figure of authority who is distant and not emotionally involved, this
is seen at a young age with the “boys don’t cry” narrative carried through many cultures. As
adults we see how these emotional expectation are carried by women when some of their
emotions are labeled as hysterics, a word that originates from the Greek word hystera which
translate to uterus. Accepting our differences could be powerful, being empathetic to such
differences could lead to a more just, equitable and loving society; after all we should aim for
harm reduction and for loving, caring and empathic societies and ways of thinking.
With Sor Juana we saw the desire to acquire knowledge for the sake of knowing, the
desire to learn by herself even though it was forbidden for women in the early years of the
colonial Mexican society. She defied society and the Catholic Church by teaching herself to read
and write, and later on by landing herself the job to sonnets for the marquises of Mancera.
Although she did not live her final years how she wanted due to the church’s punitive practices
upon her body, she can be considered one of the first women to directly called out the Catholic
church, Spanish society and consequently colonial Mexican society as oppressive toward women
by preventing them from learning about the world of letters. On the other hand, we saw how
Lady Damaris Masham is perhaps the first female philosopher to speak about motherhood and its
duty in service of the church, while Simone de Beauvoir creates the first comprehensive text
about womanhood by showcasing facts and myth in contrast to lived experiences of women.
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Given that the subjectivity of many types of mothers had been excluded from formal
analysis. I wonder, if it is time to step outside from one’s limited exposure and from the
imaginary to move towards the understanding of other cultures, including their myths, legends
and historical figures? For example, it comes to my mind that we can learn plenty from iconic
mothers from other cultures like Man-deok Kim in Korea to Labotsibeni Gwamile Lamdluli in
Swaziland. Given that maternal philosophies are diverse and not a universal; we must expand the
way in which we think of the maternal influences our thoughts and judgment upon that whom is
a mother, and reconsider parental roles and gender expectations. The experiences of mothers is
crucial in understanding their thoughts, their iterations and more importantly, their subjectivities.
The subjectivity of the mother is constructed through a process that moves from desubjectification toward performative acts of intersubjectivity. Therefore, maternal subjectivity
has been commonly described as a split subjectivity. Not all mothers have the same split
subjectivity, and those who do may differ on their splitness. Their process of becoming a mother
is influenced by several societal conditions including—and not limited to—their socio-economic
status, education, and culture. The next two chapters will expand these ideas by looking into
maternal subjectivities and maternal otherness. Turning our attention to the polyphony of mother
types, their gazes and the rhizomatic subjectivity of mothers, in the hope to decentralize our
notion of motherhood.
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CHAPTER TWO
Becoming a Mother:
Its Subjectivities and The Power Structures That Attempt to Define It
The previous chapter began with the evaluation of what male philosophers said about the
mother to delineated how such ideas had influenced the ideology and institutionalization of
motherhood. Ideas that later on were to be combined with some predominant Christian believes
and served as the foundation of patriarchy and its influence upon the perception of motherhood
present in the predominant discourse carried via media in the United States of America, mainly
in film and television. Later we began to see what some female philosophers had said on the
matter. The delineation of both of those views were intended as a way of tracing some genealogy
of the predominant ideas about the mother as an object and as a subject within society. As such,
the previous chapter examined maternal philosophies, its variations and its progression, from
those that had been placed upon the mother by others, and as that which they (the mothers) had
redefined for themselves. Therefore, this chapter will transition towards the concept of the
subjectivity of the mother, in order to continue the retracing of some paths that have lead us into
the modern and contemporary ideas of the maternal self versus how others see the mother and
the expectations others have about the mother. While in general, subjectivity can be commonly
described as the awareness of being a subject, the consciousness of existence; Miri Rozmarin
invites us to rethink what that means, particularly for those whose subjectivity has been ignored
by others. In other words, what does it mean to be a subject which is recognized by the self but
not by the other, such is the case of many marginalized subjects, for example slaves, immigrants,
women, etcetera. As such, rather than going through the historicity of the philosophical questions
and discourses around subjectivity, we will pivot from the platform of these general agreement,
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that subjectivity is defined as a conscious understanding of the self and what that means to
colonize beings like mothers. Therefore, the main question to be explored in this chapter is: what
is maternal subjectivity? Here I will argue for a reconfiguration of maternal subjectivity drawing
from its prominent definition toward the complexities ignored or displaced by it; while
identifying the power structure upon which it has been defined, understood, and upon which the
predominant and new discourse has arisen. As such we will look at some ideas around the
recognition of the mother as a subject, and at the relationship between power and subject, as a
path to better understand the complexity of maternal subjectivity theories and its reformulation
proposed in this chapter. Therefore, I will present the predominant discourse among maternal
theory to frame my argument that maternal subjectivity is not limited to such predominant
discourse of seeing it as split subjectivity, neither to a lineal multiplicity. Instead I will argue
maternal subjectivity is rhizomatic, because the multiple selves of a mother are in constant flux,
moving from one form of being into another, as well as converging among the multiple selves.
This argument moves us toward one of our main concerns in this chapter which is to question
whether there is a maternal ontology. I will trace the predominant ideas regarding maternal
subjectivity to provide the foundation for my reformulation. Throughout this chapter and
manuscript, I define maternal subjectivity as related to that who identifies as a mother; as a result
I will present the connections between being and its path toward becoming. How does a mother
become a mother? At what moment do we recognize ourselves as such, by the self and by
others?
Before we speak about the mother as a subject, more specifically about the subjectivity of
the mother, it is necessary to look at the general meaning of the word and the power structures
upon which these ideas among philosophers had emerged, including some faith/religious based
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morality. Not in a historical way comparing their specific ideas with a particular moment in
history and its power dynamics, but in a more nuanced way to look at the general structures of
power that socially determine the place of the mother or the place for the mother as either an
object or a subject. Additionally, this will pave the way to better understand the economy of the
gaze of the mother and how in some narratives it could be placed as an object rather than a
subject—which will be analyzed in the second and third section of this dissertation.
Who is MOTHER? And, who is (m)other? Depending on the stage of our existence at
which we may be, we may provide different answers to the question “who is a mother?” or “who
is mother?” In the first question we attempt to find a definition or characteristics for all mothers,
while the second question explores a more interpersonal relationship with the word, meaning, or
being of mother, moder, madre, matter... The first one looks at mother as a noun, the second one
at mother as a verb and/or as an adjective. We can either look at the oversimplified definition in
any dictionary, as “the female parent of a human beoing; a woman in relation to a child or
children to whom she has given birth; (also, in extended use) a woman who undertakes the
responsibilities of a parent towards a child, esp. a stepmother” (Oxford Dictionary), or we can
define it based on the mothers we had known. To a greater extent, we may attempt to defined it
based on our experiences from encounters with mothers to the values we have gather through our
years of existence about what a mother is or whom a mother is? In this chapter we will see ways
in which other had define the mother versus ways in which mothers had defined themselves, this
as a path to understanding the de-subjectification of mothers due to the social power structures
that had pushed them to the margins. In this chapter we will also look at some of the
predominant discourses of maternal subjectivity while on the next chapter we will further
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deconstruct these meanings to understand the importance language has to deconstruct and
reconstruct maternal subjects from fictional to non-fictional imaginaries.
Power Structures
Let us briefly look into some analysis in regards to power structures and its relationships
in order to better understand how power is understood within this project. We will look at what
has been said by Michel Foucault, Simone de Beauvoir, bell hooks, and Marx and Engles, on
power, patriarchy, and family structure. Foucault serves as a general view on power structures
and its relationship to the subject, Beauvoir as to how such power relationships place women into
an othering or second plane, hooks speaks specifically about the patriarchal structure and its
effects on parenting. Then I will present how in their later work Marx and Engles tied some of
their ideas on power and oppression to the capitalist production of the family structure, paying
attention to how the labor of family members and the acquisition of property relates to such
structure, this while having different views on how those influence women’s subjectivity.
Foucault
Through multiple works concerned with power, Foucault presents how some structures
vanish by the implementation of new ones. Foucault argues that there is no escaping from power,
but that one can resist power. He proposes that in order to do so one must study its oppositions
since power is not just a concept but a relationship, there will always be an opposite. In The
History of Sexuality, he asserts that “power must be understood” mainly by “the multiplicity of
force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their
organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens, or reverses them... thus forming a chain or system” (Foucault 92). While on a later
work in The Subject and Power he states that he was mostly interested with creating a “history of
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the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault 777).
Foucault also states that we should start considering the development of oppositions within
power structure as a starting point to understand it, “opposition to the power of men over women,
of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of medicine over the population, of
administration over the ways people live” (780).
One of the questions at hand is what does such chain or system—whether patriarchal or
not—has to do with one’s subjectivity? In The Subject and Power, Foucault is interested in
creating a line of inquiry about how one becomes a subject:
1.

The objectification of the speaking subject

2.

The objectification of the subject – in what I call dividing practices

3.

To study the way a human being turns himself into a subject

He states that, “there are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by
control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both
meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (Foucault 781).
Through this we look into, language, subjectivity and the split of the self, he states that “the
subject is either divided inside himself or divided by others” (777-778). Through such a
multiplying process of subjectification, the subject also creates divides within the self that
influence not just its portrayal by others but also its self-portrayal. The role a subject performs or
resists within a power structure creates a divide within the self and shapes its subjectivity. The
performance of this role is an attempt to unravel the answer to the forever longing question of
how we perform ourselves, more specifically how a mother performs her maternal self and how
maternal subjectivity is created? Particularly within a structure that has neglected to
acknowledge her capacity of being.
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If we take Foucault’s advice and take as the starting point oppositions within the power
structure within the family governance, we can agree that this will lead us to the power
relationship that concerns us the most in this project: patriarchy.
Patriarchy: what is it?
If we define patriarchy in simplistic terms, we can state it is a social structure where men
have power over women. In chapter two will see how such is a power of men over women by the
assertion of men as authors of domination, and control of other power structures that maintain
the power dynamics between them and women. bell hooks defines patriarchy as: “[a] politicalsocial system that insists that males are inherently dominating, superior to everything and
everyone deemed weak, especially females, and endowed with the right to dominate and rule
over the weak and to maintain that dominance through various forms of psychological terrorism
and violence” (4). On the matter, hooks emphasize that these patriarchal thoughts are embedded
since childhood, she states “patriarchal gender roles are assigned to us as children, and we are
given continual guidance about the ways we can best fulfill these roles” (2). This aspect of the
patriarchal system is what concerns us the most on this chapter, are these patriarchal thoughts
embedded within us since childhood? If so, how much of this early learned behavior stays with
us into and toward adulthood? Do we ever disconnect from such guided standards of socially
accepted behaviors and placements so heavily gendered? Later on in the next chapter we will
extend such inquiry into how some social institutions prevent us from seeing those who
challenge the status quo pushing them into the margins in an attempt to erase their stories.
It is precisely within this patriarchal power structure where the social prescriptions of
what a woman should be—and her expected behaviors—originate within a capitalist society.
Therefore, how do women perform the self? Do we perform womanhood in self-objectified ways
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that reflect our desires, that of others or set by a social standard? How these patriarchal social
structures influence, or pre-determine motherhood as an ideology in service of patriarchal
structure? These questions, served only as a starting point to think about how multiple cultures
expect womanhood to be fulfilled via motherhood, by limiting the female body to its
reproductive labor capabilities, moreover extending this to the naturalization of the labors of care
as female. When discussing gender performativity Judith Butler states, “performativity is not a
singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in
the context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration” (xv). As
such, we can revisit the question into how mothers perform the self? What are the repetitions and
plural acts of motherhood which allow us to sustain these cultural temporal durations? How the
performances, i.e. some rituals and repetitions lead to the assumption that in order to fulfilled
womanhood one must become a mother? How does the juxtapositions of these selves collapse
into a spiral of displacement of selves? Our performances can be fictional or non-fictional, for
the aesthetic pleasure of an other or for our own pleasure, or perhaps for no pleasure at all but as
a form of economizing our mobility in society.
Simone de Beauvoir
On the other hand, Simone de Beauvoir speaks about the condition of women within
patriarchal societies. Such is not fixed on its medium and as such it could change through time,
creating some illusion of liberation and improvements on the condition of women. If the
beneficiaries of these liberations and improvements is a limited group of women, we must
identify these as illusion. For example, if only women with academic degrees, or if only women
from a certain social status or if only white women are the beneficiaries of better conditions or
better access to education, to certain work positions or even to better health care, then the
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liberation is an illusion because it only benefits a few, it will only benefit those with privilege. In
order to state that the condition of women has improved, we must liberate all women and
improve the opportunity to all, regardless of their socio-economic-faith-culture status. These
illusions will become evident as we see the evolution of the narratives and characterizations of
female characters, including those of mothers, during the Twenty-First Century where we see an
increasing number of narratives where the female character has more agency or even its
characterization seems less as an object and more like a subject.
Marx and Engels
As noted in chapter one, the capacity of acknowledgement of women’s subjectivity is a
one of the key aspects that differences Marx and Engles analysis from other male philosophers.
They see the capacity of their female counter parts and the oppression imparted upon them as a
result of class difference. Their work and their legacy in other feminist theorists, showcase how
power structures and oppressive situations are presented, in the work force and within the family
structure respectively.
Background on Subjectivity related to women and mothers
Although the idea of “a conscious understanding of the self” may sound simple, there are
more nuances driven by power structures which complicate the acceptance of selfhood by others,
to the extent to which that lack of acceptance by others may affect one’s subjectivity. Moreover,
these same structures ignore what occurs outside of their accepted canons of selfhood or
existence of becomings, such ignorance leads to wrongful and universal definitions and
expectations for those in a community or its citizens. As stated before, within this project we will
focus on how some of these structures influence maternal subjectivity, from the illusion of
universality—as if all mothers had the same subjectivity—to the way others see the role of the
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mother as a vessel for another or a function within society neglecting her selfhood, all the way to
the discourse by female theorist who shifted the conversation—like Irigaray and Kristeva—to
maternal aesthetics which focuses on new materialisms that allow for the visibility of other
subjects. This chapter will focus on the maternal subject and the articulation of maternal
subjectivity and its discourses. This is why before we dive into maternal subjectivity, it is
important to overview some of the influential theorists to the framework of such in this project.
We could state that our general understanding of subjectivity is the understanding of being or the
awareness of being; to be, one must become into such being. As such, we should not ignore the
tradition of displacement of women as beings, as subjects into objects or vessels for reproduction
and care.
As mentioned in other sections of this manuscript, let’s review, once again, Beauvoir and
Irigaray. On the one hand, Simone de Beauvior says: “One is not born a woman but rather
becomes one” while Irigaray speaks about the agency one has over our own subjectivity. Both of
these ideas are present as we think about how does someone becomes a mother and whether such
becoming is universal or not? Does one become a mother by the biological events which
transform a female sexed body into a pregnant body? The answer to such a question has a lot of
nuances that I can oversimplify by stating, yes and no. Yes, only and in so far as your becoming
pregnant is part of your becoming a mother, whether decided at the moment of knowing your
body is temporarily morphing into a pregnant one or not. The answer could be no, if your
becoming pregnant is in service of others’ parental becoming,28 or if you do not identify by the
social pre-codifications of gender parenting, i.e. non-binary parents. I can think of more reasons
for both, but for now let us limit the answer to these two examples. The definitive answer to the
question: when does one become a mother? is as varied as there are mothers, the beginning
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stages of becoming a mother may be similar among mothers, but the becoming a mother is
constantly shifting. One becomes a pregnant body, or one begins the insemination process, or
one begins the process of adoption29, etcetera.
Let us consider that some conservative30 views will limit the becoming a mother to
pregnancy, to the extent that even surrogate bodies are identified as surrogate mothers by those
who hold conservative views, as their traditionalism limits their view of the mother to the
biological aspects of female reproduction. For those who hold conservative views, insemination
and adoption are not seen as the paths to motherhood. Conservatives tend to avoid the
insemination and surrogacy as paths toward parenting, while they see adoption as “saving” an
other instead of an option to parenting when someone cannot conceive biological children. This
on itself gets more complicated, perhaps because many conservative views are based on the
literal reading and application of rules within a power structure—generally orthodox
church/religious structure with traditionalist values—, there is little to no room for interpretation
or adaptation of such rules/standards.
Subjectivity of the Mother
As just noticed, the becomings are varied, but then the question of maternal subjectivity
emerges from this multiplicity, what is it and who determines the meaning of such? Particularly
since historically—as presented in chapter one—women and mothers had been excluded from
philosophical discourses. To the point that they had not been recognized as subjects by men,
instead had been objectified and seen as bodies that serve as a vessel for the becoming of
another. This project will not look into the historicity of subjectivity and its articulations through
modernity, but in order to understand the dismissal of maternal subjectivity by these
philosophical traditions and the feminists’ articulations of it, it is necessary to mention two key
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points. First, it’s important to look into how Stone unpacks the meaning of subject and
subjectivity through time:
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘subject’ only came to denote the
conscious, thinking subject from the later seventeenth century onward, a trend that
gathered momentum during the nineteenth century. Previously, the term ‘subject’ either
meant someone subject to the dominion of some ruling authority or referred to a thing of
substance or to the grammatical subject of a judgement. (Stone 54)
In other words, that the meaning of subject as we understand it today has not been around for too
long, moreover, its previous meaning was attached to a power structure where someone else had
dominion over or placing a judgment regarding meaning/value. Therefore, the genealogy of this
word carries a notion of recognition as a form of power either to assert oneself or to be
recognized by others.
Secondly, we must include in this framework, Kristeva’s reformulation of the subject,
which is grounded on Kantian subjectivity while grounding it in the connection with language
and how we construct meaning even the meaning of oneself, she argues that one must create
such meaning, through language. For Stone, a key difference between Kantian subjectivity and
the reformulation by Kristeva, is that: “Whereas for Kant the subject continually does produce
itself, for Kristeva it only continually strives to produce itself, never finally doing so” (56). Then,
what does it mean to be conscious of oneself as it relates to the mother and its phases?
Throughout her work on the maternal, Alison Stone explores similar questions as the one
presented above by evaluating not just our understanding of subjectivity in the present, but
particularly the mother-child relation, and its effect on language and subjectivity of both the
child and the mother. For her is important to note that “maternal subjectivity is (I take it) a
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variation on female subjectivity, but it is important to treat the two as distinct, otherwise we lose
sight of what is peculiar to maternity” (Stone 4). She continues the psychoanalytical tradition of
exploring the relationship between mother and child and how separation between them
influences both into being. As such she examines how others understand maternal subjectivity
while at the same time she reconfigures it.
In regards to the mother Stone states that the becoming of the mother as a subject is
parallel to that of the child, she states, that “the developing child becomes situated in a maternal
space, which simultaneously enables mothers to emerge as subjects in their own right, distinct
from this imaginary space” (2). The imaginary space to which she is referring is the space
between child and mother, a space that gets better defined as the mother begins to separate her
body from that of the infant’s needs.
Furthermore, when exploring maternal subjectivity, she says that the mother not only has
the experiences related to her child, but also those of separating from her own mother, both of
these experiences influences maternal subjectivity. She states that,
If breaking from the mother makes possible modern subjectivity in its typical form,
conversely re-situating oneself within maternal body relations makes possible a different
form of subjectivity. Re-situating oneself, as the mother does, within past maternal body
relations that are recurring with a difference makes possible yet another form of
subjectivity. (Stone 5)
Following this, we can continue to add that for Stone, maternal subjectivity is the resituation of the self with past maternal relationships and with new embodiments. She goes on and
proposes that there is some “kind of pre-subjectivity embodied between mother and child”
(Stone 6). These embodiments are also connected to language formation. For Stone, this idea is
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connected to Kisteva’s ideas which see the subject as always in-process and never fully
accomplishing this separation from the maternal body.
I believe that Stone’s definition of maternal subjectivity, limits and confines maternal
subjectivity to maternity. As established in the introduction, this project defines maternity as the
biological process related to pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding, the biological processes
exclusive of the female body and related to mothering. My intention in this chapter is to expand
the signification of maternal subjectivity as that which is related to all mothers regardless of
whether they go through maternity or not. Maternal subjectivity refers to the subjectivity of that
who is a mother, becoming a mother can, but is not limited, to the biological process of
pregnancy, as a result the same is truthful for its subjectivity. An adoptive mother as well as a
mother whose biological child is conceived through surrogacy, also experience the process of
becoming a mother, but their process resides outside of the experience of the embodiment of
pregnancy and the physical changes of the body. Furthermore, there are aspects of maternal
subjectivity and the forever mobility of such becoming that are beyond the physical changes and
effects of maternity, which includes gestation, pregnancy and breastfeeding. Maternal
subjectivity also includes the kinesthetic memory of the labor of care, the invisible labor, and the
transformative effects that loving and caring for an other have on oneself. But it also includes the
moments of abjection, burden and tiredness that can arise from motherhood. As such, maternal
subjectivity is a rhizomatic system, I will explain this later on in this chapter.
We can either confine maternal subjectivity to that which is particular of maternity or to
that which is universal to all mothers, but since there is no universal becoming for mothers, and
not all mothers go through the experience of physical attachment or transformation, we must
consider the subjectivity of a mother as a panoply in constant reconfiguration of ones becoming.
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Becoming a mother, becoming a mother of a tween, becoming a mother of a teen… of a young
adult… becoming a grieving mother… the list is as extensive as there are mothers and stages
within the caring of that other.
The problem within the predominant accepted maternal subjectivity theories—like the
ones presented by Stone, and Irigaray—is that it excludes a large number of mothers based on
their physical and social circumstances, for example trans mothers, undocumented mothers,
mothers living under the poverty line, homeless mothers, activist mothers, and many other
mothers from underrepresented and underprivileged communities. As a result, we must question
this illusion of universal maternal subjectivity. To some extent we can state that the main
problem is the assumption, or the idea that being a mother has some essential characteristics, to
essentialize motherhood. Basically, the naturalization belief of motherhood has created these
essentialization of the term and the preconceptions it carries, with the now global understanding
of the differences among believes system, plus our understanding of biological differences a
wider understanding of beings is possible, with it the de-essentialization of gendered oriented
forms of existence, like mother and father—among many others.
We must look at the performative elements of how one portrays itself to others and how
mothers are represented through fictional performances, specifically in moving image narratives,
precisely because of this history of equating the maternal body relations to its subjectivity. This
while also looking into the underrepresented performances in such forms.
For Iris Marion Young the subjectivity of the mother is linked to the morphing of the
pregnant body and that feeling of an other, she says “Pregnancy challenges the integration of my
body experience by rendering fluid the boundary between what is within, myself, and what is
outside, separate. I experience my insides as the space of another, yet my own body” (49). This
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not being something exclusive to Young, but one of those dichotomies of pregnant bodies
whether the cellular process occurring within one’s uterus develops into a life, whether such
development within comes to full term or not, whether it is for the possibility of one’s own child
or for that of an other. But one thing that we can perhaps agree on is that regardless of how the
idea of “what is within myself, and what is outside” may affect the subjectivity of a woman,
moreover, of a mother; one thing we can assure is that such relationship its dependable on
multiple factors including socio-economic divisions, class, faith, race and place.
At this point, after seeing the displacement of women into motherhood or labors of care,
and the displacement of mothers into limited labors of care and turned into an object in function
of particular social structures, now we turn our attention towards what has validated them as
subjects. Therefore, to think about the decolonization of the maternal gaze, we need to consider
the ways in which the mother has been validated as a subject, both phenomenologically and
through psychoanalysis. While Young focuses on the experiences of the pregnant body, Luce
Irigaray and Julia Kristeva focus on the traditions that had influence changes and progression in
language, they propose women should be able to reshape language and create new ways to
identify, describe and value experiences unique to their bodies and experiences. Alison Stone
explains further and says that for Irigaray “the meanings of being female and male are set in
place by the symbolic order (or the social imaginary” (177). Furthermore, Stone says that for
Irigaray “to become an agent who can choose values, one must first take on a language and
culture and, with them, a male or female identity” (177). The analysis presented by Stone serves
us to understand why thinkers like Beauvoir, Irigaray, and more recently Stone herself, had
reformulated language to serve in function of describing and providing visibility to women,
particularly mothers, as subjects.
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Maternal Subjectivity
When speaking about maternal subjectivity, two prevalent aspects come into discussion:
the displacement of mothers as subjects into vessels for the becoming of an other subject, and the
actual becoming of a mother into their mother-self. It will be hard to separate both, but for this
project it is important that we attempt to do so in order to question and better understand its
complexity as well as its slippages toward the displacement of (m)others. I want to highlight that
the becoming into a mother-self is not exclusive of biological mothers, but that while maternity
(biologically driven) is a step many mothers experience, it is not exclusive to—nor of becoming
a mother. In other words, becoming a mother through or during the maternity stages is not a
requirement, nor the universal beginning of becoming a mother. We will see this more in detail
in the next chapter as we dive into the tradition of displacement of certain types of mothers from
the main discourse. But, as we continue the analysis in this chapter, I will present some of the
tendencies around the maternal subjectivity framework, not to place a judgement or opposition,
but to showcase the predominant discourse and to highlight what is missing, as a way to justify
my argument.
Taking this as the starting point, we have two becomings, on the one hand the becoming
of a pregnant body and on the other, the becoming of a mother, these becomings could converge
but are not exclusive nor determinant of one another. The becoming of a pregnant body occurs at
the same time as the cellular becoming of the possible31 physiological becoming of that other,
often32 this occurs at an unknown moment, at times without the knowing of the soon to become
pregnant body. Furthermore, the distinction between becoming a pregnant body and becoming a
mother is important to include mothers who become mothers through surrogacy assistance or
adoption, while at the same time making a distinction among female sexed parents who do not

114
identify within gender binaries, as such whom may experience the becoming a pregnant body
and becoming a parent, but who do not experience becoming a mother because they do not
identify as such. These, are some of the mothers that will be the highlight of the following
chapters, by asking how the lack of visibility of their becomings affects and influences the
stereotypes reflected in narratives portrayed in the most viewed films and television shows the
United States of America? But, one thing all mothers have in common, is that their subjectivity
as mothers is constantly shifting and is in constant evolution as their children are, as the years
pass. Even when the permanent absence of a child is present, their maternal subjectivity
transforms through the grieving process and through the lasting experiences of living as “the
mother of” without a body.
Perhaps we can agree that regardless of the manifold of maternal subjectivity, it will
always be dependent on the existence of an other to whom one intends to provide care, to whom
one is expected to do so or to whom one did. But then, one can argue that this is truthful for all
parental subjectivities, and one can continue to question, what differentiates maternal
subjectivity from that of the father? With this question our quest for a universal definition of
maternal subjectivity gets complicated by what I would like to frame as its rhizomatic structure.
A structure that is highly influenced by maternal performances, and the societal parental
prescriptions where the historicity of maternal subjectivity fits in. Within parental subjectivity,
we have a predominant acceptance of a split between the gender binary of male and female
parents (father and mother), as such those expectations, and as a result one’s parental
performances will vary. Such variability will be based on the society that one lives in, but also on
one’s ancestry and upbringings; which are also influenced by the ideologies of individuals and
the communities they live in. As such, maternal subjectivity will be explored, question, and re-
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framed based on the predominant ideologies and structures which had steer the popular societal
prescription of motherhood, one that we can unapologetically label as patriarchal.
Regardless of how often female theorists and mother theorists acknowledge or create a
body of work around the maternal; one of the recurring topics is the concern with maternal
subjectivity. As such, the recognition of maternal subjectivity is kept at the verge of recognition
by others, it tends to be limited to the scope of another body—that of the child or the individual
care that is being provided for someone else. For the purpose of this section, let us agree that
maternal subjectivity is in a constant struggle due to its un-acknowledgment which has
influenced its displacement, colonization and over simplification within psychoanalysis where
we continue the line of the female hysteria into the mater hysteria, promoting the Oedipus
complex interpretation (perpetuating the un-recognition of the mother as a subject), and to the
objectification of its body and function. If we accept this we can have room for the recognition of
the multiplicity within maternal subjectivity as rhizomatic in nature and nurture, due to its
continuous movement between what the mother experiences (both bodily33 and psychologically)
and what is expected of her in certain societies. Furthermore, the rhizome of maternal
subjectivity will allow us to see it as the complex, in constant flux and movable network it is.
Other theorists had drawn from Foucault and Lacan, to identified maternal subjectivity as
one characterized by a split subjectivity. I am not proposing to place the rhizomatic maternal
subjectivity in opposition or antagonistic to such ideas. Instead I am highlighting such split
subjectivity is one of the possible moves within maternal subjectivity. Let me be more explicit; I
am trying to show that maternal subjectivity is more complex and it goes further than moments
of division or splitness. A split moment is the fragmentation of a whole into parts, is the
separation of a something into a multiple, but a split whether lineal or curved is definitive (unless
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a processed of repair occurs). To the extent where psychoanalytical theory has frequently seen
the split subject as equal to a state of insanity, as such, if we limit maternal subjectivity to split
subjectivity, we place the mother as subject at the risk of being seen as an insane subject or as a
subject that needs some repairing.
The Rhizome of Maternal Subjectivity
By recognizing maternal subjectivity as a rhizome rather than one limited to a split, we
can allow for the re-write of such subjectivity, a re-write that expands the territory of all those
split moments of the self a mother embodies and inhabits, but, not as a one definitive individual
with one definitive split of the into two parts. But as multiple splits that converge and multiply
into the self as part of the evolution of the always becoming of the ONE that co-inhabit that
which many believe to be one, but who exists in the us, and is only possible by they, us, and we.
This re-write is a way of decentralizing the mother from the patriarchal notion of vessel and care
and into the freedom of the self.
Deluze and Guattari see the rhizome as anti-genealogical (11), if we take this premise and
we extend it to maternal subjectivity as rhizomatic, then we can assert that we cannot pin point a
moment of origin of maternal subjectivity, because such subjectivity is to some extent also
influence by the relationship—or lack of—with our parents. Maternal subjectivity is also linked
to other experiences of care, as such this flux of experiences that at times feel like a change into
another being, is nothing but the evolution of the self. But, what makes the maternal different
than other subjectivities, is that it is a movement from a direct relationship to an other. For some
mothers that relationship begins with the physical changes of the body, while for others it begins
with not having a physical transformation and instead choosing being the mother of a being that
someone else brought into the world. As such if we assert that maternal subjectivities are
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rhizomatic, we can further break the Judeo-Christian tradition of mothers as vessels of being or
performers of care. Furthermore, by accepting my proposal of maternal subjectivity as
rhizomatic, we can assert the deterritorialization of the mother from the shackles of patriarchy by
creating a rhizome which will allow to “increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the
line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of
consistency” (Deluze and Guattari 11). A rhizome allows for those overlapping and constant
movements from multiple ones that are in a continuous algebraic equation of parenting, one
where a - b not always equal c, because the value of each is socially prescribed, as such its
quantification will always have variants.
I am proposing a subjectivity that exist outside of the psychoanalytical canon, or perhaps
one that when needed, it will lie at its margins moving from psychoanalysis, into the social and
the schizo. Deleuze and Guattari state that, “schizoanalysis, on the other hand [contrary to
psychoanalysis], treats the unconscious as an acentered system, in other words, as a machinic
networks of finite automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an entirely different state of the
unconscious” (18). Furthermore, and to complicate things for the sake of understanding the
misconceptions within female subjectivity and maternal subjectivity. We can agree that most of
our gestational physicality originates inside a uterus, but, we must not forget the Judeo-Christian
conception of god making the woman out of a man’s rib as part of this social misconception and
fight against who was here first which has lead us into a patriarchal understanding of the
biological being. If we remember and accurately present such story from the Old Testament in its
Hebrew origin, the word which is commonly translate as “man”, has no gender, as such, we can
question such myth by its manipulation and inadequacy of language.
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Maternal subjectivity as an Embodied Practice
Maternal subjectivity is an embodied practice, but it does not mean that is limited to the
stages of the body during maternity. In the introduction I draw the attention to the differences
between maternity, maternal and motherhood; I would like to redirect us toward those
differences as we looked into how such differences may influence a variety of beings that inform
the maternal subjectivity of a mother while at the same time highlights the differences between
the maternal subjectivity of one mother in contrast to that of an other.
Alison Stone reminds us that, “ethical critiques of the subject such as Irigaray’s are most
coherently read as establishing that we need to reconceive subjectivity – not to reject the concept
altogether, but to rethink and re-imagine it outside its usual traditional parameters” (4). On the
other hand, within a rhizome we have convergence of multiplicities to the point where we cannot
identify its beginning. Let us briefly observe this with two hypothetical scenarios that attempt to
answer what is maternal subjectivity, by looking at how a MOTHER becomes a MOTHER and
how she may recognize herself as such. Both of these scenarios are fictional creations to support
this theory, in a later chapter I will examine other fictional scenarios from specific mainstream
US American films from the Twenty-First Century.
Scenario #1
Ashely is now in her early 30s, she is recently married and is at the last stage of her pregnancy.
Ashely grew up on a suburbia neighborhood on the East Coast, both parents are still alive and
identified themselves as happily married and close to retirement. Ashley has two younger
siblings, men and female; she was the first one from her siblings to get married, have a BA and
an MBA, she holds a managerial position at a high banking firm in NYC. As a child she played
with Barbies, had a Cabbage Patch and loved watching Disney’s animated movies: Little
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Mermaid and Beauty and the Beast. She often played in a pretend kitchen. As a teen she helped
her mom almost daily around the house with cooking, laundry and keeping her younger siblings
out of trouble. When the time came she had a sweet sixteen, got a job babysitting in the
neighborhood, and participated in her school’s debate team. During the years of her bachelor
studies, she attended the closest college to help her parents and when it was time for her master’s
studies, she left town and moved to New York City where she met her husband and where she is
building a family.
Ashley’s mom was a stay home parent, she was in her children’s school PTA, she made daily
breakfast for her children and packed healthy lunch choices all the way through middle school.
She cooked dinner every weekday and often hosted house parties for her children’s friends and
for other parents.
As Ashley gets closer to her expected delivery day, she has become more concerned with
childcare, evaluating what she believes are the positive and negative aspects of having a fulltime
nanny versus having one stay at home parent. Ashley and her husband subscribed to two
magazines: Parenthood and Parents, they had read the “What to Expect” series, attended prenatal classes, birthing classes, pre-natal yoga and have a doula for support. But, her due date
approaches she begins to reflect on those moments when she loved having her mom at all her
school events, she begins to struggle between placing her mom at a “good mom” almost “super
mom standard” while accepting that is not what she wants her maternal experience, to be.
Scenario #2
On the other hand we have Natalie, she attended Ashley’s schools and they’ve been friends since
kindergarten, they played together, had sleep overs, and had celebrated many birthdays together.
Contrary to Ashley, Natalie was an only child, her parents still enjoy life together and also claim
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to be in a happy marriage. Natalie’s mom worked as an elementary teacher for 30 years and is
about to retired. Natalie moved to NYC at 18 years old to study, she also holds a masters and
became a High School Science teacher. Natalie has been married longer that Ashley, she became
an adoptive mother of a 3 years-old child about two years ago.
Now, if we looked at these hypothetical scenarios. When does their maternal subjectivity
begin? By witnessing and acknowledging their own mothers? By the moment where each one of
them decided to become a mother to someone else or by the moment when they actually have a
being to mother? Perhaps we can state that for Ashley it seems that her maternal subjectivity
started at some point during her pregnancy when she began to question her future as a “stay at
home mom” versus “nanny.” For Natalie, it was not during a physical change, as such, does her
maternal subjectivity began at the moment she begins the adoption process or does it begin at the
moment she actually has her child, or does it begin with the legal process of signing the adoption
papers? Or perhaps, we should consider that their maternal subjectivity began during their
upbringing, what roles such upbringings played while playing with their Barbies? Or, how does
Ashley’s labor while helping her parents, versus Natalie’s experiences as an only child, shaped
their expectations, from study, to child bearing all the way to their recognition as an individual
who provides care into their maternal self? Can we truly identify a moment A to B for their
becomings as mothers? Or can we see the possibility of all those moments being a begining, as
such there is not a point A where maternal subjectivity begins but multiple possible and multiple
actual moments where it could originate, as such there is a rhizome that creates, feeds and
nurtures the mother-self; or perhaps the rhizome is that mother-self.
Let us continue to envision the possible entry points from single parenting, foster parents,
surrogacies, insemination, etcetera. The possible moments of becoming a mother only grow and
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become more complicated on its own. Now what if we consider this becoming as a body without
organs that is based on an embodied experience that may or not start from our bodies but whose
becoming is not limited to a body? Perhaps we should think beyond the physical body to
consider childrearing as a form of maternal embodiment, by including lived experiences of
mothers we can include mothers who have not gone through maternity as part of their
becomings, as such expanding the understanding of maternal subjectivity. Alison Stone reminds
us that psychoanalysis had link the becoming of a subject as that which occurs through the
separation of the mother, the end of the dependency from the mother, and how such idea has
geared the predominant ideas that neglected the mother as a subject. At the same time, she argues
that in order to see the mother as a subject, she must create it in a way that it is distinct from her
subject-position as a daughter. But what if we see this beyond the body? What if we reformulate
these series of embodiments as performances creating a distinction between the biological bodily
experiences and the performative bodily experiences? Let us see BwO as a form of embodiment.
A body with organs is related to that “natural” body/ the organic as the natural. As such, if we
see performances as embodiments, we can see performances as a BwO, an embodiment that
occurs in a body but whose embodiment is based on social construct, experiences rather than an
essentialized idea—in this case, rather than the essentialism of the mother. Then perhaps we can
see the autonomy of the self into a subject through embodied practices, an autonomy that could
be related to the biological/organic but which is not limited to a physical body, nor to a body
with organs.
Perhaps this is where it also gets more complicated and why it should be determined by
oneself and not by others. If a pregnant person feels their maternal identity begins during the
maternity stage, it is their right. Who are we to tell an other when someone is a mom, or to treat
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the unborn fetus as a human? This questioning is one of those complicated predicaments. This is
when the Pandora’s box gets opened: when we pretend to create a universal definition of “life”
as by unborn versus born, with it comes the trying to create a universal idea of “becoming a
mother.” I will avoid taking such stand, this is where conservatism and its view gets it wrong,
with their “pro-life/anti-abortion” arguments. I will not go into the discussion of those conflicts,
but, let us consider for a moment, the pregnant body as a vessel (object) versus the pregnant
body as a mother, as the “mama” or as the beginning of their motherhood. Some examples of this
will be presented in chapter eight through the analysis of the characters who are temporary
pregnant with a human and non-human fetus. As the vessel, it is control by multiple laws that
determine where one can end the development of a pregnancy, either by choice or by need,
which can be also driven and supported by medical, social or economic circumstances. By being
seen as a vessel they are stripped from their subjectivity, the subject is erased, substitute by
turning it into an object, the vessel.
It is precisely these body controllers the ones who also predetermine/establish the
pregnant body as the beginning of a mother. Which can lead to the difficult (due to the
polarization of views and feelings) question of whether we should call a pregnant body a mom or
not? By allowing ourselves to recognize us as mothers, as the “mom” since pregnancy, we
permit the responsibility of care to fall fully over the pregnant body, there are no choices right?
After all, one may argue that the pregnant body is the only one on control of what it can eat, what
it can be exposed to as it is growing a body inside, etcetera. These body controllers also, permits
us to grief the loss of an expected and desired pregnancy, whether via abortion, miscarriage or
D&C procedure34 at any stage of pregnancy. But, and here comes the big BUT of the
patriarchal/capitalist/faithful hypocrisy; these pregnant bodies who identified as mothers since
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the moment of conception and whom had a loss, are socially neglected and as such are expected
to go through their grief in private and many times alone. The American Psychology Association
reminds us that: “The tragedy of miscarriage has traditionally been private, an event grieved
largely by the mother, on her own. Health-care professionals advised these women that the
sadness would grow less pronounced over time, especially following a successful pregnancy”
(Leis-Newman, 56). While the World Health Organization reminds us of the social taboos
attached to the loss of a child: “Losing a baby in pregnancy through miscarriage or stillbirth is
still a taboo subject worldwide, linked to stigma and shame. Many women still do not receive
appropriate and respectful care when their baby dies during pregnancy or childbirth” (WHO
website). Therefore, when it comes to the end of a pregnancy willfully or not, whether a
pregnancy ended by choice or not, there is a lack of social transparency with the grief process, it
is as if publicly your pregnant body is only good enough as long as it plays the part of the happy
goddess like cosmogonic story of creating a human. But when the loss arrives, no matter what,
those bodies are treated as defective and shameful, as such unspeakable, only in private can one
inhabit the space to exist as a pregnant body that is not that of a mother, turning them into a full
other. As such, we can see how there is a system that constantly attempts to control these bodies,
their actions, and their emotions. Furthermore, it attempts to control the spaces in which it can
manifest and how.
Loss of Recognition
Then we can also examine the aspects of loss related to one’s becoming or one’s
recognition as a mother? The loss of control upon once body or the loss of recognition of the self
in the eyes of the other. This other could either be a human to whom we have a relationship with
or it could be an institution. Some institutions go to the point of deeming what is legal or not

124
upon one’s body, like the government. Other institutions monitor and influence the moral
standards of those who comprise their communities or those they profess to serve, like religious
and educational institutions. These legal actions that serve as a form of surveillance of morality
had been put in place by the institutions based on their limited understanding of the female body.
As such, they had predetermined what they believe is the labor of the female body, one limited to
biological predeterminism. But if such becoming is self-determined, how can we become
subjects which are neither subjugated nor objectified? Alison Stones states that, “if mothers are
subjects, they can only be subjects of a new kind, who generate meanings and acquire agency
from their place in maternal body relations” (3). That is how she interpreted maternal
subjectivity in her book Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and Maternal Subejctivity, “as a specific
form of subjectivity that is continuous with the maternal body” (Stone 3). Stone is proposing to
reappropriate and change what it means to be a subject whose meaning originates in the
phenomenology of their existance. She propose that to achieve this we need to acknowledge the
“historical reality of female-centered child care” as a mode to rethink subject
relationships/formation and language, her goal is that once we do this we can then “extricate
women from exclusive absorption in child care (since the maternal relation is inherently one of
differentiation) and would include men fully in child care” (Stone 18). This ideas of
decentralizing care from the biological potential of the female body also moves us to think about
the biotechnologies that allow for other forms of becomings and the bioethics attached to these
practices.
In “Generative Grafting Reproductive Technology and The Dilemmas of Surrogacy”
Elina Staikou propose we consider biotechnological advances like in vitro fertilization, somatic
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reproduction and surrogacy as generative grafting. I would like to point out three particular
things from her proposal. The first one, that she reminds us that somatic reproduction:
[W]ould be another future development, which would rely on techniques similar to those
used in therapeutic cloning but would involve the production of viable human gametes
from homologous somatic cells – for example, skin cells – from both intended parents
and the creation of a human embryo by first inducing meiosis in the somatic cells, then
fusing them and, finally, ‘transferring the new nucleus into an enucleated donor oocyte’.
(Staikou 40)
This reminder presents us with more questions than definitive answers, how would this shift the
becoming of a mother or how would it change the way in which we define and identify mothers,
fathers, parents? For some it may mean the possibility of parenting without the constraints of a
physical body that carries the baby, for others it will be an aberration and anti-natura, etc… the
possibilities of social sentiments this could generate is extensive and currently hard to enumerate.
The second point I want to highlight is that when Staikou defines certain concepts, she
poses new questions about how we have conceived the maternal body, as such, influencing our
perception of the maternal subject. Staikou reminds us that:
‘Generalized surrogacy’ is a name for what is perhaps the most inaugural and unthinkable
substitutability, inextricably tied to an archaic fantasy that continues to generate the
appropriations, exclusions and empowerments which surround, traverse and preside over
the enigma of the creation of life: the fantasy of a unique and irreplaceable mother.”
(Staikou 41)
How would these ideas of becoming outside of the maternal body and into a machine or a
different apparatus, would shift our understanding of the subject and maternal subjectivity?
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General surrogacy suggests we decentralize the subject as inherently connected to the biological
mother, as such it will leave more open doors in regards to subjectivity, particularly for maternal
subjective. Which leads us to the third point I wish to highlight, one that questions the social
notions of the mother as an irreplaceable vessel:
The supposed ‘naturalness’ of this bond defining maternity has always supplemented the
disavowed origin of filiation. That is to say, it was always used to assert the mother’s
irreplaceability by paradoxically putting her in the place of a surrogate (bearing a child
for someone else – the father – while being naturally excluded from patrilineage) and by
at once duplicating and putting under erasure the originary operation of supplementation.
(Staikou 41)
The mother as a vessel and a surrogate of beings for the state or for the father, and her exclusion
of these patrilineage society allows us to comprehend even better how there is not one ultimate
definition of maternal subjectivity, because the becomings of being and of the mother are always
shifting/evolving. As such we can only conclude that maternal subjectivity is different from
mother to mother.
Legal Impositions and Social Expectations
In regards to the mother we have on the one hand the legal implications that are placed
upon pregnant bodies versus the social expectations that are placed upon the act of mothering;
one being in direct service to them or of the state, while the other one has its nuances which can
be navigated between the public and private, between the law, the state, and among other
institutions including the family. Which constantly swivels the mother among these multiple
spaces between the self and the other, between the public and the private, between multiple
systems of governance including that of the family. These laws that regulate the pregnant body,
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as well as the social expectations that are placed upon mothering (all kinds), highly impacts the
invisibility of mothers as subjects. Through both, legal and social expectations, a limited
framework is created, one that displaces the pregnant and the maternal being. Legal expectations
create an accepted standard of disenfranchisement, one attached to some form of punishment, for
instance the many states in which ending a pregnancy is charged as a criminal act. The social
expectations are also a form of displacement and disempowerment, affecting the process of
becoming a mother. Both the legal and the social expectations affects the treatment and the
acceptance of a mother as subject, by creating standards to both in directs and indirect ways,
these power structures displace the mother into a category of an object, one that serves the
bearing of children or one that provides the care for them. In the next chapter we will see how
those who pushed from these margins towards the center to be seeing as subjects rather than
objects, and whose subjectivities are also outside of the predominant canon, could be placed as
others.
Family Governance versus Parenting Industry
“Western civilization as a whole has been matricidial.” (Stone 7)
My intention here in this section is to tie the ideas of family governance from chapter one
(Masham and Locke) with the power structure of the family from Marx and Engles with Stone’s
quote stating that Western civilization is matricidial. In other words, to support her claim, that
such matricidial act is about the object versus subject, as such reclaiming the subjectivity of the
mother as a way of claiming our existence through visibility. Furthermore, recognizing the
fluidity within maternal subjectivity is a path to avoid the matricidial tradition of Western
civilization. One of the questions is, how can one, for example continue to uphold certain
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practices and faithful religious believes if those feed this matricidial acts, practices, and
traditions from Western civilization?
My argument is trying to move towards the influence of capitalism as another culprit of
the power structures that have pushed the female bodies into the institution of motherhood to
show how capitalism created illusions of liberation of the mother with its products, production
and practices. For example, the Neo-liberal ideas of entrepreneurship to create devices and
gadgets to “help” with certain maternal acts, when one can argue the fault is within the state
power structures that prevent better policies to dismantle the still prevalent ideas that the
caregiving is performed better by women. Here we have professions of care as motherly acts,
like nursing and teaching, particularly early-childhood and elementary teachers. Also, in here, we
can present an alternative narrative to that of preference theory35, where is not the preference of a
mother, but the economies that once again serve as an illusion. This is not to place myself in
opposition to preference theory or to these devices, but to question it by looking into new
narratives, to present what are the popular ideas about what is a mother? As a result, what does a
mother needs? At the moment the predominant social answers to these questions are heavily
grounded in a capitalist economic structure link to the Judeo-Christian morale. As such, to
deconstruct the word itself cannot be done without looking deeply into these multiple structures
which ultimately serve the a few and not the many structures which are homogeneous and based
on binaries. Therefore, if we look at the schizophrenia of capitalism and its current putrefact
corpse, then we can acknowledge with more ease that the subjectivity of the mother is one that is
rhizomatic and that seeing it as such will widen the path towards the liberation of mothers,
parents, and beings in general regarding of whether they choose to parent or not, regardless of
whether they choose to care for an other or not36. Because the care will be performed by choice
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and not by a social precondition. Therefore, at the moment, we can conclude in this chapter that
the performativity of one’s maternal subjectivity as rhizomatic promotes the decentralization of
maternal subjectivity as seen within patriarchal and capitalist structures. Is from such
decentralized state that we will move to the next chapter where we can begin to see the slippage
into conscious recognition of the multiple types of (m)others.
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CHAPTER THREE
(M)others in the Maternal Discourse
In the previous chapters, we noticed the complicated historicity of recognizing mothers as
thinking beings and subjects. In chapter one, we prove and conclude that certain predominant
western thoughts about the maternal revolve around the binary of matriarchal or patriarchal
family structures and its philosophies. While in the second chapter, we focus on how such
moves/slips toward the psychoanalytical approach that evaluates mothers as thinking beings who
are transformed by their experiences while exposing a more complex theory about the
subjectivity of the mother. These chapters expand the current discourse about maternal
subjectivity by presenting the subjectivity of the mother as one that is rhizomatic and moves
toward those multiple selves to comprise ONEself, a ONE that is constantly morphing by its
many experiences and its multiple iterations of themselves.
Both chapters delineate the genealogy of the predominant thoughts, but one must ask,
what is missing? One must look at such genealogy critically. Both chapters showcase voices that
validate the thinking mother and the mother as a subject rather than an object, but even such
discourse is exclusionary. Such discourse includes a limited scope that excludes other aspects of
one’s identity, by including mainly mothers—as presented in the previous chapters, and here in
more detail—within the Judeo-Christian tradition; therefore heavily founded upon Hebrew
(his)tories whose interpretations lay the foundation of multiple morals of Christian thoughts from
Catholicism to Protestantism, that had influenced the western philosophical canon. Furthermore,
those thoughts had played a role in the attempt to erase first nations’ narratives in service of their
attempt to evangelize and prevent other forms of being and other faiths, leading to the
predominant colonial practices and ancestry.
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This chapter intends to focus on the voices that had been excluded by such traditions to
argue that the prevailing western notion of mothers originates from such Judeo-Christian
tradition, rather than a naturalistic or multi-cultural origin. In her most recent book, Mothers: An
Essay on Love and Cruelty, Jacqueline Rose argues “that motherhood is, in Western discourse,
the place in our culture where we lodge, of what it means to be fully human. It is the ultimate
scapegoat for our personal and political failings, for everything that is wrong with the world,
which it becomes the task—unrealizable, of course—of mothers to repair” (1). Taking this as one
of many discourses or frameworks about mothers, this chapter will begin by looking at some of
the predominant definitions and redefinitions of the word mother as a concept of being, moving
towards some queering forms of the term, like (m)other. This etymological analysis will go along
with the revision of some creationist myths, including the Genesis (which is similar in three
predominant religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), to deconstruct the word and highlight
the predominant definition ignores. We will proceed to describe the use of (m)others in this
manuscript to attempt to unveil the genealogy of the deconstructed version of the word and how
such deconstructions allow us to begin the visual decolonization of mother(hood).
Generally, people would start defining mother based on their understanding of this being
a gendered and sexed individual with the statements, “a woman” or “a female parent”37; but its
genealogy has complicated the term and its existence to the hyphen adjective of maternal
transitioning the word mother to an action (a verb). This two-part definition, noun, and verb,
have also moved us toward a multiplicity of definitions and actions that some will traditionally
identify as actions better performed by the female parent. In other words, relating it to the sexed
body of that parent, as if the affections that gear the parenting actions were organically linked to
that parent’s sexed body. This limited definition moves us toward the unavoidable, undeniable,
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but frequently avoided identification of (m)others, leaving us with the central question of this
chapter, who is a (m)other?
As noted in previous chapters, this project has (m)others at the core of its analysis. Here it
is defined as the mothers who are usually pushed to the margins and ignored in maternal
discourse, but who should be considered within. This chapter will look into the layers and root of
the term and its move into the definition proposed throughout this project. It is hard to find who
(if anyone) coined the term. However, we can identify a few moments in which other theorists
and artists had used the term, including Shirley Nelson Garner, Claire Kahane, and Madelon
Sprengnether, whom edited a selection of feminist essays in 1985 titled The (M)other Tongue:
essays of feminist psychoanalytic interpretation, Jane Gallop who dedicated a chapter to discuss
the post-structuralist deconstruction used by the editors of The (M)other Tongue in 1989, and
more recently many artists had played with the term within the title of some of their projects,
including the film (M)other by Antonia Hungerland. Even though the above mentioned—and
others—had used the term (m)other, none have provided a definition, and its visual existence is
open to one’s interpretation within a moment. As such, one can argue that providing a straight
definition is hard because it is a term/word intended to name that which has been excluded;
furthermore, it aims to deconstruct the ideologies and preconceptions attached to it from within
itself. As such, the word (m)other, etymologically, can comprise the deconstruction,
decolonization, or maybe queering of the word and concept of mother, which is attached to a
form of existence and being. As such this chapter will argue for a redefinition of (m)other, I will
argue that by highlighting the otherness within the word mother, one can focus on that and those
who had been pushed toward the margins allowing us to construct an option of (m)other[hood]
where the coexistence of multiple identities can be part of the maternal subjectivity as well as
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part of the communities and institutions to which they belong. Such process allows for the
decolonization of the language we use to construct expectations related to motherhood and its
convergence with other institutions.
As such, we ask, which are some discourses of otherness within maternal traditions, from
philosophy to aesthetic forms? Where can we find those voices that had been ignored? What is
the origin of the displacement of mothers who do not fit the societal prescription of motherhood?
If women are placed as other (the second sex—de Beauvoir, the sex which is not one—Irigaray)
in comparison to man, how is the mother placed in contrast with the identity of women, and
(m)others to mother (evaluating an other of an already other and its multiple otherness)?
Therefore, I will argue that philosophical traditions created a binary ideal of mothers into good or
bad. Such binary has offered continuum support to the ideology of motherhood. It has been
constructed by the ideals of a privileged class which attempts to dispossess mothers from
marginalized communities from their subjectivity by unrecognizing their existence while keeping
them in the periphery. I will further argue that the lack of diversity in the maternal discourse
created a displacement of mothers who do not fit the societal prescription of motherhood. I will
propose to reframe displaced mothers under the term (m)others to provide visibility within a
category that is diverse, highlighted by its differences, and in constant morphology. In doing so,
we will reformulate the discourse of mothers as others, as well as the discourse of otherness
within the maternal. I will conclude that nowadays, understanding maternal otherness is relevant
to create visibility of maternal diversity and break the celluloid ceiling, which will be the focus
of Part III of this manuscript.
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Etymology of the word Mother
As we may remember, regardless of our upbringing, we all learn some story—
mythological or scientific—about the creation of the world, while at the same time we all know
“where babies come from?” but when did we began to identify the pregnant body as that of a
mother? Or at which point did we begin to identify the female parent as a mother? If almost all
civilizations have some sort of creation story, where and how we construct the word mother.
Have these creationist stories contribute to the displacement of mothers into a universal
definition attached to expectations of actions? Furthermore, how has it contributed to the myth of
motherhood?
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the Merriam-Webster dictionary, and the Online
Etymology Dictionary, the word means “female parent, a woman in relation her child”, the latter
one provides the most details about the origin of the word, stating that it can be traced to:
Proto-Germanic mōdēr (source also of Old Saxon modar, Old Frisian moder, Old
Norse moðir, Danish moder, Dutch moeder, Old High German muoter, German Mutter),
from PIE *mater-”mother” (source also of Latin māter, Old Irish mathir,
Lithuanian motė, Sanskrit matar-, Greek mētēr, Old Church Slavonic mati), “[b]ased
ultimately on the baby-talk form *mā- (2); with the kinship term suffix *-ter-” [Watkins].
Spelling with -th- dates from early 16c., though that pronunciation is probably older.
(Online Etymology Dictionary)
Furthermore, we think about the words that have a similar root as matr and which meanings
carry some connection to the mother, and the list expands to maternity, maternal, matrimony,
matrix, and more. The site Membeans (a website designed to reinforce encoding vocabulary
through applied “psycholinguistics and economics”) provides a comprehensive illustration with
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words derived from the Latin matr which definitions are close to its root and mother (see
appedinx E). By looking at its oversimplified definition provided by Membeans we can see how
each of its traditional definitions is somehow related to the word mother:

Fig. 3, root matr.
The origin of the word mother originates from the Latin matr, and its derivations are
related to the creation of something or someone and to the place of an origin, like in matrix. As
such, I wonder how these words relate to other stories of origin. If matr means matter and the
mother is that which symbolizes the matter of the origin of humans, do we see all gods as matr,
as mothers? There are many mythological stories of the creation of the world. I would briefly
point to a few, just to pave the road of our questioning of the essentialism of the mother or its
naturalization. As slightly presented in previous chapters, there seems to be some correlation
between the confinement of the female body into motherhood and Judeo-Christian traditions.
However, before we can assert such, we should briefly look into other creation stories where the
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female sexed body performs beyond childrearing and where other bodies and entities have the
potential to create matter and humans.
Cosmogony and Myths
Regardless of where in the world we were born and raised, of one’s migration and one’s
ancestry; at some point in our lives we heard some story about how the world came to be or
about how humans came to existence, we may or may not believe it, but we are undoubtedly
familiar with some of these narratives. These cosmogonic myths are as varied as the civilizations
that had existed in the world, some of these stories had been lost, but many are still being told
from one generation to the other, leading to the transcription of some of these into books that had
shaped the morals and believes of many faiths and religions. Mari Womack says that “Creation
myths are symbolic stories describing how the universe and its inhabitants came to be. Creation
myths develop through oral traditions and therefore typically have multiple versions. Variations
in a particular creation myth reflect differences in language and regional affiliations” (81). Some
creationist theorists identified five main types of cosmogonic stories: elements of chaos prior to
creation, the world created from nothing, creation from the body parts of a primordial being,
emergence, and earth divers. This project does not aspire to analyze each type nor to present all
cosmogonic stories, but it will briefly present some examples and the general ideas of each type
to frame the matter of creation in other cultures. The aims to situate the Judeo-Christian
cosmogony in context to other stories which had been pushed to the margins of western
civilization as a result of colonization. Paying attention (even if briefly) to these cosmogonic
stories will assist us into possibly mapping the “first mothers” or the “mother goddesses” to
juxtapose its contrast to the Judeo-Christian thought that has been presented in preceding
chapters.
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Throughout their extensive work of cosmology, mythology, and religions of the world,
Mircea Eliade and Charles H. Long, respectively, had identified and recorded a series of myths
from around the Globe. Through the three volumes of the book titled History of Religious Ideas,
Mircea Elaide provides details of the different ideas of religion from the Stone Age, Gautama,
Buddha, Christianity, Muhammad, and the Age of Reform. Eliade focuses on myths of eternal
return, occultism, witchcraft, and mythologies of death in other books. On the other hand,
Charles H. Long wrote a book that focuses on the myths of creation, but his most well-known
work is a series of essays that bridge our understanding of the history of religions with the
present and its effects on our society. As such, both had identified some commonalities as well as
the most influential ones since the idea here is to provide an overview of stories and not the
details of each. Following Eliade and Long’s findings I will briefly mention some cosmogony
myths that can follow under the following sub-themes of cosmogony: elements of chaos prior to
creation, creation from nothing, creation from the body part of a primordial Being, emergence,
and earth divers.
In several cultures, there are cosmogonic stories where the origin of the world as we
know it starts from chaos or like Eliade puts it when referring to the Enuma Elis38, “rather
somber cosmogony and pessimistic anthropology” (72), here we can include the story of Apsu
and Tiamat presented in the Enuma Elis, a cosmogonic poem from the Akkadian39 religion (72).
We can also place here the story of the cosmic egg of Orphism; in this story, Kronos makes the
primordial egg “from which emerges the first of the gods, Eros, also called Phanes” (Eliade 188),
depending on where the myth is heard some state that later Phanes creates the other gods and
world, while others say that Phanes in union with Nyx, created the universe. In both cases, at
some point after creation, Zeus swallows Phanes and creates new worlds (188). Another story
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that originates from chaos and has a cosmic egg is the Hindu and Vedic myth included in the Rig
Veda, which extends to the Upanishads, this is the poem of Hirangyagarbha, which means the
Golden Womb, where there is a narration for a supreme creator of all life.
Another recurrent theme of origins of the world is Ex Nihilo, this means creation out of
nothing, in cosmogony we see this manifested when a being creates the world from nothing, this
could occur either from its own will or accidentally, the most familiar example in Western
Culture is the Genesis book, this story is represented in the same way in the traditions of
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, where God creates the world in 6 days. In all of these
traditions, such moment is marked with the exact words “let there be light.” Another god that
creates from nothing is Ptah from Egypt, although to some extent we can find similarities with
the Islam-Judeo-Christian origin, Eliade says that Ptah’s is probably “the most philosophical”
(89), as “Ptah creates with his mind (his “heart”) and his word (his “tongue”), it is Ptah who
created the other gods, this god assume physical bodies and enter into “every kind of plant, evet
kind of stone, every kind of clay, into everything that sprouts on its surface (i.e., of the earth) and
by which they can manifest themselves40” (89). Another story from central Africa is that of
Mbombo, also known as Bumba. In the Dictionary of African Mythologies, Harold Shaub shares
the story:
Bumba, was the creator. At the beginning of time, there was only darkness and water, and
Bumba, the first ancestor, was alone. Then he vomited up the sun, and there was light.
The water dried up, and the outlines of landforms began to emerge. Bumba vomited up
the moon and stars. Then he vomited again, and a leopard emerged, then a crested eagle,
a crocodile, a fish, a tortoise, and the lightning, the heron, a beetle, and a goat. Finally,
many men came out. (Harold Shaub 34)
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The next category of stories is the creation of the world from a Primordial Being, one of
the most known stories of this type comes from Norse mythology and the story of the giant
Ymir, who was dismembered by three gods who are brothers, Odin, Vili, and Ve, from each
body part a different part of the universe was created, “from the flesh they formed the earth, from
his bones the rocks, from his blood the sea, from his hair the clouds, from his skull the sky”
(Eliade 156). It is important to note that in Norse mythology, there are Nine Realms, and the
story of creation of Ymir illustrates only the creation of Midgard, the realm where humans live, it
is said that Midgard was created from Ymir’s eyebrows. In Maori/Polynesian cultures there is a
myth which creates life from the forced separation of its primordial beings, this is the story of
Rangi (Father Sky) and Papa (Mother Earth), they only birthed multiple male children who lived
in a small space full of darkness, this space contained between Rangi and Papa. Rangi and Papa
were created by “two ancient beings —Te Po (night) and Te Kore (emptiness)— who existed in
darkness before the creation of the universe” (Encyclopedia). Rangi and Papa were surrounded
by darkness, and their children felt entrapped in such darkness. Their children felt trapped
between their parents and desired to see the light, this resulted in a series of attempts by each of
them to separate their parents. Tane is the god of the forest, Tane places his head on his mother
Papa and “raised his feet in the air, and pushed upward against his father Rangi” (online
encyclopedia). Tane was successful and separated his parents into Sky and Earth, it is said that
the space between them was full of light, and “deities, humans, and other offspring who had been
trapped” spread into the world.
The fourth type of creation story is that of emergence, these are more common among the
First Nations in what is today the United States of America, including Navajo, Hopi, and Zuni,
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among others. In the Diné Bahane from the Navajo Nations, the story of the myth narrates how
the spirit of humans originate before humans and before the world they will inhabit:
One
Of a time long, long ago these things are said.
It is said that at Tó bil dahisk’id white arose in the east and was considered day.
We now call that spot Place Where the Waters Crossed.
Blue arose in the south. It too was considered day. So the Nilch’I dine’é, who
already lived there, moved around. We would call them Air-Spirit People in the
language spoken today by those who are given the name Bilagáana, which means
White Man.
In the west yellow arose and showed that evening had come. Then in the north
black arose. So the Air-Spirit People lay down and slept. (Paul G. Zolbrod 56)
This native story is an example of how they see the energy as nourishing souls from the womb
prior to their birth. Another emergence story is that of the Hopi tradition, where we see the
constant emergence of worlds. The Hopi (peaceful ones) people “live in nine villages in a
reservation on the mesas of northeaster Arizona” (Sproul 548). Until the present, they are
believed to be the “least white influenced of the American Indian peoples” (Sproul 548). For
them, the questions that surround the emergence of their world and their people are at the core of
their myths, “Who are we? Why are we here?” (Sproul 548) and like other cosmogony stories
from around the world we had seen, the original story has multiple creators. For the Hopi people,
there is the one creator Taiowa who was by himself and whom created others which they
themselves further created other aspects of our worlds.
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The Hopi myth of emergence begins with Taiowa, who created Sotuknang, who “arrange
the nine-tiered world” (Sproul 548) and who formed Spider Woman. It is Spider Woman the one
who had the power to fertilize and who created the form of the world along with a pair of twins
who harden the earth and who guard the world at its poles. Once the world was created, she
created all the other living beings to inhabit it, from plants to animals and made the four colors of
people (Sproul 548).
The last type of cosmogony is that of the Earth Divers which generally come in the form
of magical animals who dive into a primordial sea and create the form of the world. The origin
story of the Cherokee people is rooted on an earth diver:
When all was water, the animals were above in Galun’lati, beyond the arch; but it was
very much crowded, and they were wanting more room. They wondered what was below
the water, and at last Dayuni’si, “Beaver’s Grandchild”, the little Water-beetle, offered to
go and see if it could learn. It darted in every direction over the surface of the water, but
could find no firm place to rest. Then it dived to the bottom and came up with some soft
mud, which began to grow and spread on every side until it became the island which we
call the earth. (Barbara C. Sproul 517)
As briefly presented, the Ex Nihilo stories are the only ones with an omnipresent god to whom
their descendants referred to as “father”, while other stories like the cosmic egg, the golden
womb, and the emergence stories have female and feminine characteristics, none refer to the
gods as “mothers.” Whenever the connotation of mother is used in these are in the emergence
stories, similar to the Pachamama in The Andes region, where the mother is not a god but the
Earth.
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Perhaps this subtle detail about the usage of the word mother and father within these
stories may provide an entry point to the displacement of women into motherhood and as
secondary, the mother/father binary as one attached to power, and the stories that follow from
such Judeo-Christian as a patriarchal lineage. Elisabeth Badinter reminds us that this narrative
from the Genesis is characterized by three acts: first act, the creation of man (Adam), who name
all things, and the creation of woman (Eve) from his rib and to satisfy Adam’s desire for a
companion (see appendix F); second act, “woman, guilty of sin, is the ruination of man”
(appendix G); which results in the third act, the curses. These curses also come in three, the first
two directly affecting Eve, bearing children, and the ruling of the husband over wife: “To the
woman he said, ‘I will greatly increase your pangs in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth
children, yet your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you’” (Genesis 3:16).
In contrast with the other multiple myths of cosmogony we had seen above, and many others
which we do not have time to explore here, we can assert that the Islamic-Judeo-Christian idea of
women as the sole being for creation and nurturing whom is only limited to such labor is not
common in other cultures and faiths, particularly is not common in native nations around the
world from the Polynesia Islands, to Norse Mythology, Egyptian and Natives in The Americas.
In these cultures, the female and goddess characters are seen with respect and not submission,
they are seen as those who give and nurture but also as those who guide through new learnings as
beings who carry and nurture knowledge. At the same time, in some of these cultures, the
creation is attached to multiple gods, and the creation of beings is shared among the different
gods and goddesses, is neither a matriarchal nor patriarchal structure, but a flux of creation
whether from chaos, divers or from the mind of a primordial being. With these varied stories in
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mind, along with the origin of the word mother, let us transition into understanding the mother as
an other and the (m)other.
The mother as an other
In chapter five of Around 1981, Jane Gallop dedicates a chapter to the analysis of “The
(M)other Tongue: essays in feminist psychoanalytic interpretation”, she discusses multiple
aspects of the anthology, including how mother with the parenthesis around the m only appears
in the title, it is a tricky pronunciation, and the lack of its inclusion within the chapters leaves the
reader with many possibilities as to the meaning of such. While Gallop points this out in the
chapter, we never read a definition of the word, but its implications are clear. As such, I would
like to draw our attention to three points made by Gallop. First, she states that:
The play on mother and other reminds us that in psychoanalytic theory the mother is the
subject’s first other, the other in opposition to which the self is constituted. Or rather, as becomes
clear in object- relations theory and particularly in the work of Nancy Chodorow, the mother is
the site of something which is both other and not quite other, of the other as self and the self as
other. Thus the monstrous word- “Mother-other”-in its double identity could be said to body
forth the borderline status of the powerful, early mother, so central to psychoanalytic feminist
theory. (Jane Gallop 57)
As such, Gallop highlights that the mother is seen as an other in relation to the child, but
not just any other, but the first other. While at the same time, due to the biological connection
(for those whose mother is biological), that other get fussed and confused with the self, which is
an other that is part of the self. This goes both ways for the biological child and for the biological
mother. Then, it is in that dichotomy where we see the mother-other as a monster because of the
power relationship that it establishes prior to being born, prior to coming into being.
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Secondly, Gallop reminds us that the application of using a parenthesis or brackets
around certain parts of a word aligns with the Derridian tool of language deconstruction: “The
play of its parenthesis, using the material of language to reflect on the language, resembles the
stylistic devices of post-structuralist writers such as Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray as well as
American feminists such as Mary Daly” (59). This points toward the primary goal of this project,
the deconstruction of language to deconstruct the meaning of preconceived patriarchal structures
of power which had shaped our imaginaries and misconceive understanding of mothers as if all
were the same. This deconstruction is needed to reconstruct our imaginaries either to change the
present or to reflect the polyphony of maternal beings.
The third point from Gallop to which I want to draw our attention, and perhaps the most
important for our application of the word (m)other, is when Gallop states that, “we are not
looking for a new language, a radical outside, but for ‘the other within’, the alterity that has lain
silent, unmarked and invisible within the mother tongue” (59). Because this is what we want to
highlight, the intention with this project is to change the paradigm of the way in which our
society has shifted our gaze to a universal mother into the many other mothers that exist within,
as such to pay attention to all we must recognize (m)others. Furthermore, this project proposes
that change must come through language, including both verbal and non-verbal language;
particularly, we propose to apply Gallop’s proposal to film.
If we blend all of these three elements we can support the argument presented above, the
word (m)other is a form of deconstruction that provides visibility to the other within, a within
that is pushed to the level of otherness by those outside of its existence, experience, and reality.
Therefore the word (m)other deconstructs both the patriarchal and matriarchal notions of mother
in order to open our eyes to the existence of what lies within to demystify the monstrous myth of
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the “Mother-other.” The word (m)other embraces its otherness, the otherness from within, the
otherness that has been laid into such by outsiders to itself, this to empower the MOTHER, the
meta MOTHER, the MOTHER as a creator of beings, not just on the literal/biological sense of
creation, but to the extent of the existential beings, stretching the MOTHER from that who
creates flesh being and expanding it to that who creates a panoply of existences.
From queering to inclusion
When we look at the mother, we tend to avoid her like that with coexisting identities and
how such match the social normativity of seeing the mother as equivalent to woman. Some may
think this chapter will define (m)other as a queer mother or queer mothering. In order to avoid
confusion, we will make a distinction between the visual representation of the word by following
Alexis Pauline Gumbs take on Black queer feminists and its genealogy for radical mothering
when they introduce the term of m/other as a queer mother, in it, they define queer as that who
identifies as part of the LGBTQ+ community. At the same time, looking at (m)other as a term
that includes all mothers, but which emphasized and attempted to highlight the mothers that had
been historically placed as an other by societal constructions such as gender and by the
institutions that normalize and regulate it such as religious, educational, and cultural institutions.
Being these institutions, the apparatuses which ultimately serve the state instead of individuals
and the communities they belong to. As such, (m)other includes m/others, but it is not limited to
it. It includes LGBTQ+ individuals who identify as mothers, but it is not limited to these
individuals.
Contrary to Gallop, who focuses on Derrida’s difference deconstructive poststructuralism theory (heavy on psychoanalysis), my intention is to decolonize the term mother by
focusing on its multiplicity and the moves within such, rather than its differences. Focusing on
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the now overused term diversity rather than multiple differences that can or not co-exist, that
which is diverse has encountered the moves among different spaces, selves, and collectives
which allows us to diversify oneself, similar to the fetomaternal microchimerism41 that occurs on
some bodies during the maternity and post-maternity phases of their bodies.
I want to propose we see this process as one that reveals what its encompassed within the
term in order to unveil what has been hidden in plain sight, that which is hidden, geared by the
intention of institutionalizing that which could be organically in constant flux and not fixed
within institutional parameters. As established before, motherhood in the western sense is an
institution, one that with very little doubt has a historicity of oppression. An institution that
revolves around the mother or that who mothers an other, by encapsulating the letter m within a
parenthesis, we can see to different aspects of this term which highlights the displacement of
otherness that the word itself carries.
An Aesthetic Example: The m/other project, an artist practice-based research
Although I have not been able to find someone who coined the word (m)other or
someone who had to use the term in the same way as intended here, in addition to Gallop’s
application of the word, I was able to find an artistic platform that goes by the name “The
M/other Voices”, this platform uses the term “m/other” and “(m)other” indistinctly. The group
“rose from the research project ‘(m)other voices: the maternal as an attitude, maternal thinking
and the production of time and knowledge’ led by Deirdre M. Donoghue (artist, writer,
researcher) at Witte de With Centre for Contemporary Art, between June 2013 and June 2014”
(website). The goal of their project was for others to see the maternal figure as a producer of
thoughts and knowledge, “rather than as a subject of representation and as a domestic figure
inseparable from human emotions” (website). Furthermore, by considering the maternal as an
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attitude, their project moved towards our being-in-the-world, and as a practice held together by
“an ethos of ultimate hospitality towards ‘the other,’ (m)other voices foundation explore
relations between maternal work and—experience,—thinking and -time and the production of
knowledge within arts and beyond” (website). The project brings together scholars, writers,
artists, curators, and historians from various corners of the world and takes place through
specifically framed human encounters, exchanges, and contributions between people from
various disciplines and backgrounds. In this project, the other of mother is the mother that
focuses on maternal thinking, theory, and research, including academic and artistic research. As
such, we can find a thread that connects and supports the proposal of deconstruction and
reconstruction presented in my argument, where the new imaginary lies in language and visual
representation. Both through aesthetic representations and as well as through the visual
representation of language that only a slash or a parenthesis can provide us with, as in m/other
and (m)other.
In addition to this platform, there is an independent German film by Antonia Hungerland,
which goes by the title (M)other (2019). The film criticizes the present institution of motherhood
in Western cultures. Although the description of their film highlights how in the present these
concepts of being a mother have shifted, the press release states that:
The mother has become an artificially glorified ideal, which nevertheless is often
legitimized by the ‘nature of the woman.’ We live in a time when three people could
claim to be the same child’s mother: egg donors give their genes to beget children,
surrogate mothers deliver babies which they give away immediately after birth, and men
raise children by themselves – without a woman at their side. Hence the question arises:
What makes a human being a real mother? (Press release (M)other, website)

148
As presented in the statement, this film already highlights other forms of being “mother”
which are outside of the socially preconceived notion of the “mother” as such gearing our gaze to
questions around the mother and who does the institution of motherhood serves; lastly, they
describe the documentary as a poetic expedition “that raises socially highly relevant and
forward-looking questions” (website), perhaps we can add this element to the reconstruction of
the mother and our definition of (m)other. To view (m)others is to dive into an expedition of
poetic motherhood as a coopting of its institution to reconstitute it into the imaginary that is more
inclusive, one where the other is not at the margins being otherized by the masters, but instead, it
moves within, around and across to create new ways of the self. (M)othering is a rhizomatic
poetic expedition of the self and our relations to our own cosmogonies.
At this point, we can conclude that we need to continue to revisit philosophical texts,
question and comment on the arguments generated by men about the role of women as mothers
but introducing the voice of those who identified as women and as a mother. However, we need
to include the voice of (m)others. Let us be witnesses and vessels for those who had been denied
a place at the table of ideas instead of perpetuating assumptions based on dominant perspective.
Lastly, to acknowledge and recognize (m)others, we must look inside and outside of traditional
philosophical canons. This is why I propose we look at the role of gaze economies in our modes
of thinking about the mother, (m)others, and their role as producers of knowledge. Furthermore,
to consider how the gaze economy influences ideas of selfhood, particularly for mothers and
(m)others.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Maternal Politics and the Dispossession of Its Bodies and Spaces
Verbal and non-verbal language has disposed mothers into social prescriptions of being
and ignored their becomings; as such, every individual who has attempted to move outside of the
margins to assert their mother self as per her own standards is exercising maternal politics. This
chapter intends to delineate several pending matters needed to understand the complexity of this
project. So far, we have seen how the mother was pushed towards her current placement in
society to promote a type of mothering that functions for a specific kind of family and in service
of the state. We have seen how philosophical traditions neglected to include women, more
particularly mothers, from such conversation. We noticed how such progression led to a
prescription of motherhood as an institution that serves the agenda of the patriarchal ideology
where men continue to have the social power in the workforce and other socio-economic and
socio-political spheres of society. While revisiting the foundational ideas that influenced such,
we unveil that even though men who maintain the status quo attempted to silence women, there
is plenty of written work that proves women’s intention to enter the conversation and to present
their perspectives by using their experiences. This lineage is what interests us the most. But, in
the process of such unveiling, we noticed, even the voices of women like Alison Stone are
limited to some type of mothering, limited to women with either religious or academic education,
women from certain socio-economic strata, privileged women. This observation points us
towards the voices we barely acknowledge or hear, the voices that the prevalent discourse
attempts to keep silent or erase.
This precedent is what leads us to the present point where we ask ourselves how women
ended up dispossessed of their bodies to decide whether to be or not to be pregnant or birthing
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bodies? Furthermore, how does such dispossession displaces women and mothers? Lastly, how
those displacements and dispossessions guide the politics of motherhood of those who become
mothers and their maternal politics? But, then you may wonder, what are the politics of
motherhood or even, what is maternal politics? To that, I will add the question of how does our
society views mothers in political roles and activism? Moreover, could we reformulate the
definition of maternal philosophies by including maternal politics and its diverse voices? We
must ask this to better placed the mother as a subject with agency to decide upon what is best for
her and the society she is a member of. Lastly, which of these are acceptable for the popular gaze
in mass media? This last question will be explored in the following chapter.
By considering these inquiries, this chapter adds another piece to the puzzle of the
construction of the social prescription of motherhood. Via the lens of politics comprised within
motherhood and the displacement of the mother, and the further displacement into the periphery
of government and socio-economic structures, which secluded many into an othering, turning
them into what we identify as (m)others. Questioning the status quo will allow us to understand
even better the displacement of (m)others in society and within the gaze economy, which will be
further explored in the following chapters when we expose the analysis of the characterization of
mothers carried through the representations and (mis)representations in US American film and
television during the twenty-first century up to 2019.
Therefore, the main question in this chapter is, what is maternal politics, the politics of
motherhood, and the political mother? Furthermore, if this project argues for further inclusion of
(m)others and their voices, how can we reimagine political spaces for them? In this chapter, I
will argue that patriarchal western traditions have dispossessed women of their right to choose
over their bodies from biological to social actions, to the extent of displacing their social role
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into the margins. As such, I will argue, mothers have no other option but to exist as political
beings that can either benefit or counter the State’s agenda. I will argue mothers had been
displaced and dispossessed by pushing them towards predominant social prescriptions of
motherhood, these actions varied based on the culture and the era. As such, we need to look into
the roles of these political and philosophical displacements and dispossessions imposed over
mothers, in service of the state, or religious apparatuses. I further argue this is needed to create a
better path for the decolonization of maternal subjectivity; in other words, to decolonize maternal
subjectivity, we must further the analysis of maternal thinking and its subjectivities into the
politics that influence it and the politics that arise from it.
The politics of motherhood originate within the institution of motherhood of a particular
culture during a specific time, these are the politics that influence the maternal, as well as “antimaternal” actions of those who performed them during that time and place. These politics branch
into maternal politics, maternal activism, and the political mother. These politics range from
child-bearing and child-rearing choices all the way to civic education. On the other hand,
maternal politics have a strong connection to the personal and may change from mother to
mother, these are influenced by the politics of motherhood but are geared by individual ideals of
being, of becoming, and of caring for an other. We also have the mother as a subject in the
political sphere, this moves us towards maternal activism and political mothers, both of which
are influenced by maternal politics and the politics of motherhood to act toward change of those
same structures in conjunction with changes in other socio-economic and political realms.
The following sections will evaluate the analysis from politics of motherhood to maternal
politics and later looking at the political mother as a subject. In tracing the analysis through this
trajectory, we can see the parallels between political actions and philosophy, both, from its
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dispossessions toward the importance of seeing the maternal subject as one which should be
considered in politics and which is political as well. Here we can see more clearly how the role
of mothers has shifted and how far have they come as political subjects, especially if we
remember Lady Damaris Masham. She was arguing for the importance of the mother in the
governance of the household, here we see the mother outside of the private labor of governance
of the house and into the public as an agent and active member of politics to influence
governments.
Politics of Motherhood
So far, in previous chapters, we have seen the progression of ideas connected to the
mother as a subject versus the mother as an object, we began to question and reframe these
polarizations of the mother as subject and the mother as object/vessel. In The Politics of
Motherhood Activist voices from Left to Right, Diana Taylor reminds us of the conflict between
mothering and not mothering during the second wave of feminism. At the same time, in Mother
Love, Elisabeth Badinter speaks to the mothering acts that challenge the predominant or the
prescribed materiality up to that time, 1980. Taylor highlights the dilemma women face in
regards to certain social arrangements and expectations carried by the institution of motherhood.
They saw motherhood as a prescribed role for female-bodied individuals, as a result, they had
been working towards the liberation of women from such limitations. In this book, Taylor, along
with Alexis Jette and Annelise Orleck as co-editors, selected a series of essays that illustrate the
complexities of politics connected to mothering. The book showcase essays that illustrate the
multiple paths carved by mothers, from activists to scholars, during the seventies, eighties, and
early nineties, to perform their maternality in service of their political ideology, or how the

153
politics of their time changed the direction of their maternal labor. In these essays, we can notice
how each one shapes the complex and nuanced politics of motherhood.
When referring to Marianne Hirsh, Taylor states, “for many feminists writing in the
1970s, everything surrounding the ‘mother’ question seemed to be a product of patriarchy”
(349). In “Feminism at the Maternal Divide: A diary”, Hirsh presents examples of how feminist
mothers reside in the divide of a polarized situation. As an example, Hirsh cites Robin Morgan’s
Going too Far: The Personal Chronicle of a Feminist:
Since the patriarchy commanded women to be mothers (the thesis), we had to rebel
against our polarity and declare motherhood a reactionary cabal (antithesis). Today a new
synthesis has emerged; the concept of mother-right, affirmation of a woman’s
childbearing and/or childrearing when it is a woman’s choice... It is refreshing at last to
be able to come out of my mother-closet and yell to the world that I love my dear,
wonderful, delicious child. (Morgan 8)
In other words, among feminists in the 70s, there was the predominant idea about mothering, that
if one chose to mother, one did so only by reproducing the patriarchal structure. However, if one
did not mother, one was constantly scrutinized not only by men and the patriarchal expectations
of motherhood but also by the initial feminist view of it. Part of the problematic discourse was
the assumption that mothers were synonyms of nurture and care. A consequence of this
ambiguous situation was that for many feminists, it was troublesome to be at peace with
feminism and its portrayal of the mother as a symptom of the patriarchal condition of women.
This conflict arose from the dismissal of the mother as a thinking subject from both sides; from
it, a new binary within motherhood developed—the feminist mother and the mother who
accepted the societal, and usually patriarchal, prescriptions of motherhood. New maternal voices
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emerged from the intersection of motherhood and feminism to change, challenge, and make
visible the ideas of the mother.
These changes that create a new vision of motherhood, the mother-self, and the role of
the mother in society, have always been political actions that shape the politics of motherhood.
Although, these proposals of new maternal roles were not a phenomenon of the seventies, as
presented in the first chapter, these political actions started with Christine Pizan, Mary Gournay,
Lady Damaris Masham, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, and many others. We tend to focus mainly on
the second wave feminism due to the broader production of ideas and the greater access to those
texts, and due to the tools utilized to question patriarchy and propose other actions, but let us
keep in mind these were far from being the first ones. In the following sections we will look at
some examples of maternal politics with the aim to see the differences and nuances between the
mother-self, its politics, political performances, and how those arise from the social
dispossession of the mother as a subject.
Maternal Activism and Politics of Care
Maternal activism originates in the personal experiences and moves towards the
community, the common good. In it, one can notice how the care for one’s child can move a
parent, in this case, the female parent, towards activism to challenge and change the status quo,
injustices, and even policies. The lingering question is, could we separate the politics of care
from maternal activism? If so, what is the main difference between the two?
Maternal activism is part of politics of care, what distinguishes it from it is that it
originates in the personal rather than the social misconception of equating care to love, here, it is
love what gears the desire for a better care. As such, maternal activism originates in the private
space, but once a mother sees that their personal needs are not exclusive to themselves and their
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child, they unite with others for the cause of a common good. It can be performed by mother
activists and by their allies. Their allies promote and defend mother activists’ causes, they are not
mothers themselves, this could be child-less individuals and/or fathers.
Politics of Care
All these, politics of motherhood, the maternal political subject, and maternal activism
can be seen as performances that fall under the politics of care. In Matters of Care: Speculative
Ethics in More Than Human Worlds, Maria Puig de la Bellacasa reminds us that it is Carol
Gilligan who “rooted the origins of a caring ethical subjectivity in the mother-child relations”
(2). Puig de la Bellacasa also dives into how polemic Gilligan’s argument was and how it
prompted a series of studies that look at multiple aspects of care outside of the maternal scope.
To it, she contributes more lines of inquiry while delineating numerous matters in regards to
care, one of the highlights being the politics of care, she states it “engages much more than a
moral stance; it involves affective, ethical, and hands-in agencies of practical and material
consequence” (Puig de la Bellacasa 4). At the same time, Puig de la Bellacasa argues for ethicopolitics of care that are not limited to the mother, neither to humans. I present this to provide a
general idea that although these maternal aspects fall under politics of care, politics of care are
not exclusive of the maternal, nor is it of humans, while at the same time, the way in which
society tends to think about it is rooted on the mother-child relation and the woman as that who
can better perform care.
To further understand politics of care, we need to understand how such has been
evaluated in relation to the self and subjectivity and how that affects or influences the politics of
care of mothers and (m)others and their subjectivity. Here we speak of the twofold influence
politics of care has for the self as part of one’s subjectivity, and politics of care for an other as
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part of the maternal and how both delineate a path towards understanding maternal activism,
maternal politics and the mother as a political subject.
In Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, Michel Foucault turns our attention to Alcibiades by
Plato, he sees his questioning of “the ‘care of oneself’—epimeleia heautou” as the starting point
of recognition of one-self. Foucault says that such inquiries “appears in [the] text as the general
framework within which the imperative of self-knowledge acquires its significance” (88).
Furthermore, he reminds us that Christian morality has imbedded into Western society a morale
of renunciation, where knowing oneself is more valued than taking care of oneself, this as a
paradoxical form of self-renunciation (228), and isn’t this what is constantly being asked of
mothers? The social prescription of motherhood asks and defines mothers as caretakers and
bearers of life, even in the predominant discourse of maternal subjectivity of split subjectivity,
we see this renunciation present, the knowing the maternal self, but we do not hear about caring
for the maternal self as part of preserving the value of the maternal subject.
Can “taking care of oneself” provide an alternative to the western psychoanalytic idea of
subjectivity? I argue that individuals who had experience coloniality, either as lived experiences
or inherited the politics attached to it, can decolonize themselves and reclaim their subjectivation
and demolishing the objectification by others by reclaiming the Platonic idea of “taking care of
oneself” as Foucault presents it, furthermore by extending the taking care of oneself as taking
care of our communities. Therefore, only by looking at the survival strategies carried through the
experiences of colonial, post-colonial, and Neo-colonial communities can we actually write our
subjectivity outside of the Christian moral narrative. As such, we should revisit what some, like
Foucault, identify as the “beginning of subjectivity” (if one can really point at a beginning).
Then, we must ask, how did Plato shift from “taking care of oneself” to the individuals of society
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who take care of others—remember our discussion in chapter one. Therefore, one can argue that
Plato is the first one to de-subjectify the mother as a mother by placing some women into the role
of bearing the leaders but not the care of one but the care of many children by many females.
Once again, in what some may see as groundbreaking, we can see as the beginning of the idea
that caring for an other equals no existence. In other words, if we fully accept the platonic
proposal of selfcare as an element of subjectivation, and we acknowledge his neglect of certain
female bodies exclusively to care for others, we must ask why he divided both? As a possible
answer grounded in the path of maternal philosophy seen in the first chapter, we can conclude
such division was intended to separate caretakers as a medium for labors of care of others and to
ignore seeing them as subjects. The proposal here is to acknowledge the politics of care to merge
both the care of the self and the care of the other as maternal politics, which recognize and value
maternal subjectivity as rhizomatic to recognize the movements between cares of self and cares
of the other. As such, we ask, who is the mother within politics?
The Mother as a Political Subject
The politics of motherhood include the mother as a political subject and not as a vessel to
breed political subjects for its society. The mother as a subject in politics, in
state/local/community politics, a mother as an essential character within the political structures
of the state, and/or its community. In the introduction of “The Politics of Motherhood: activist
voices from left to right”, Annelise Orleck reminds us that “motherhood is not an isolating or
individualized experience, but rather the basis for inclusion in an activist community, the
inspiration for and the foundation of visions of large-scale social change” (3), while also inviting
us to dive into the selection of essays the book presents. The book focusses on “the many way
that motherhood has been politicized, both as a means to control women—through state
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regulation, medical intervention, and brutal military assault—and as a mean by which women
have sought to regain control over their lives and the lives of their children” (Orleck 3-4).
Furthermore, she states that among the authors in the book, we will notice the voice of women
for whom “Becoming politically active change [their] understanding of themselves as mothers
and as individual adult women” (Orleck 4). Moreover, “these women found that becoming
mothers transformed them in new and profound ways, challenging and reshaping their
perceptions of themselves as activists” (Orleck 4). This is an example of how maternal politics
influences the moves within the maternal rhizomatic subject by transforming themselves into
political beings that can advocate for social changes while continuing their maternal labor, while
at the same time transforming the form and performances of their maternal labor, asserting
themselves as political subjects of society.
Both maternal activism and political mothers are based on action strategies, in other
words, acting as an agent/subject for change. In doing so, not only does she asserts her
subjectivity and agency, but she contends her value for society, a value that is not limited to
mothering neither to economics. Although, what mainly differentiates these two is the choice of
action towards change, these are not complete opposites, and we can encounter a mother
navigating between both of these realms. The activist mother enters the world of politics via a
social justice structure that exists outside of traditional establishments. In contrast, the political
mother enters it via other social and governmental structures. For example, on one hand, we have
the case of the Black Lives Matter’s mothers in the U.S.A. and Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in
Argentina, who are activists’ mothers whose political labor is community based. While on the
other hand, we have mothers who become politicians and whose politics are grounded in labors
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of care; an example of these mothers is the way in which both the Republican and Democratic
conventions in the United States of America frame the role of the first lady.
But, we also have mothers who go into politics on their own terms geared by labors of
care that originate from their mothering, like Kelda Roys, who ran for governor of Wisconsin in
2018, and who during her campaign was breastfeeding and included footage during the Spring
2018 campaign “in which she talked about her efforts to ban a potentially harmful chemical
prevalent in children’s products” (Annika Neklason July 23, 2018). Political mothers may or
may not be influenced by their maternal politics and their political actions for a community, city,
state, or nation. The political mother reframes and expands the limits of the traditional
expectations for a mother as a political being. This by increasing their political ideals outside of
the care of their loved ones. These politics related to the maternal change based on time, faith,
culture, and geographical location. In this group, we can also place Hillary Clinton’s career as a
senator of New York State and as the 67th United States Secretary of State.
Previously we saw the importance of Maternal Thinking: towards a politics of peace by Sara
Ruddick, we focus mainly on her definitions of the maternal, and more particularly on the
mother as a thinking being, a being whose thinking is influenced by her maternal experiences of
care. Ruddick argues that maternal actions of care inform the thinking of that being and it can be
used as a tool for peace, these by how one raises a child. Later on, she wrote an essay title
“Rethinking Maternal Politics”—included in the collection of essays edited by Jette, Orleck, and
Taylor—, in it, she discusses the possible motifs for maternal politics in service of war or peace:
“there are war mothers as well as peace mothers, racist as well as anti-racist mothers. Maternal
roles, identities, and symbols serve them all” (369). In her essay is clear that Ruddick refers to
peace as that related to warfare conflicts and not as its possibility to expand onto other social
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wars against women, particularly towards the mother. In this regard, Alison Bailey says that
most white women frame peace as a contrast to militarism.
In contrast, “many women of color have not gotten involved in mainstream peace
movement” because they have other things to worry about for their daily survival (196). Bailey
further concludes that “if discussion of maternal practices does not address the variety of
relationships different races and classes of mothers have to institutional violence and/or military,
the resulting peace politics can draw only incomplete conclusions about the relationships
between maternal thinking and peace” (196). Taking Ruddick’s framing of peace and Bailey’s
critique into consideration, we can further state that maternal politics—like maternal
subjectivities—should be seen outside of binaries because these are influenced by various
philosophies and driven by all its differences, which can range from social, political affiliations,
economics, faith, gender identity, etcetera. The difference being that maternal politics can evolve
and transformed but are not constantly in flux as one’s politics can drastically change in a
revolutionary way. While at the same time, maternal politics can influence maternal subjectivity
and vice versa.
We can see a clear example of this in the documentary Hate Rising produced by Fusion
and Univision in 2016, as well as in the essay “Mothers in Race-Hate Movements” by Kathleen
Blee—included in Politics of Motherhood. In both of these works, the audience is made aware of
the opinions of women and mothers whose politics occur within or are initiated by the white
supremacist ideology. This challenges our notion that only one side of a conflict is political.
Maternal politics will always be rooted in an ideology, which can be grounded in multiple ideals,
some that could be in opposition to other maternal politics. Accordingly, there are mothers
whose maternal politics, labor, and philosophies are committed to the white supremacist and
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neo-Nazi ideals as a part of their maternal labor and politics. Hate Rising is a 50 minutes
documentary by award-winning journalist Jorge Ramos; in it, he gains access to several meetings
of Neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, and Alt-Right movements. This documentary provides clear
visibility of the key ideas of these groups, ideas geared by hate toward others. In one of the
instances, we can see that many of them are parents, mothers, and fathers who not only think
their hate will serve their children better but who instill these ideas in their children aiming to
increase their movement in the near future. It presents the clear rising of hate. It is important to
state that the documentary was done in 2016, and it showcases the connection between the rising
of hate and the political campaign lead by the former president of the United States of America,
who was a candidate at that time.
This may turn many to say, “the hate is rising because of such campaign”, but is it? Can
we really blame it fully on a few months of the campaign, or have these groups been waiting in
the shadows. The essay by Kathleen Blee is one of several included in Politics of Motherhood,
under the section of “Nationalist Motherhood”, the overview of this section by Orleck starts with
the following:
The rise of conservative movements and political parties around the world during the
1980s and 1990s has been accompanied by a surge of right-wing women’s activism. In
western democracies, like the United States and Italy, conservative and religious
fundamentalists women have built on the gains made by feminists during the 1970s to
open up a place for women as candidates, lobbyists and strategists for right-wing political
parties and organizations. (Orleck 225)
Claudia Koonz reminds us that these mothers are successful on their claims because their
initiatives are rooted in the institution of motherhood, she says: “These women’s initiatives
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rooted in mothers’ demands have succeeded because of their own dynamism, and also because
the institutions against which they protested valorized the motherly ideals invoked by the
protesters” (229). In other words, since they are performing their part according to the institution
of motherhood, where their job is to produce, nurture and educate (beyond academics) the future
citizens, they have a better chance of being heard. We can see this in the way mothers at both
ends of the spectrum of racial politics present their arguments and how both find someone that
listens and supports their claims.
We can see how Koonz’s argument relates directly to Ruddick’s maternal thinking,
Koonz presents what we could see as a counterargument to Ruddick’s proposal or maternal
thinking as a path towards peace. Koonz follows by stating, “as we praise maternal thinking and
admire the female consciousness that inspires women to unite in defense of their rights, other
discordant images from television newscasts crowd in on our vision” (229). Here Koonz brings
us back to how narratives are framed, whether fiction or non-fiction, visibility, and framework
will provide the gaze of existence into our social gaze, creating a vision that could either be clear
or clouded.
To further explore this, we can return to Blee, who presents that racist mothers have
different motivations to join organized racism:
For example, some mothers join racist groups because of deep-seated racist beliefs that
have nothing to do with motherhood, but then insist that organized racism is necessary to
protect their children’s future. Conversely, other mothers join racist groups out of
concern for their children’s education, safety or opportunities—concerns that have little
necessary connection to race—but, once involved in racist politics, becomes convinced
that these are indeed racial issues. This potential disjuncture between movement goals
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and member motivations illustrates the complex role of maternalist appeals in political
organizing. (Blee 252)
Whereas parallel to these Neo-nazi-white-supremacist maternal labors take place, there is a
different sector of maternal politics mobilized by the Black Lives Matters movement —for
instance. Mothers whom also may be motivated either by what they considered being their role
as mothers, or conversely, it starts with their desire to protect all black lives and then carried on
to the protection of their own children. With this example, we can see how in maternal politics,
like in maternal philosophies, we can observe mothers who wish to continue with the patriarchal
illusion of the maternal value as solely placed on the care of their child or children. We also see
mothers who engage in maternal politics that will influence children in their communities and
not just limited to the scope of their household, furthermore, who see themselves as subjects who
can affect and influence all aspects of society and not just those limited to labors of care. In the
next section, we will focus on the social dispossession of mothers to understand another aspect of
politics that affects mothers.
Dispossession of Mothers
The concept/idea of dispossession will provide another entry towards the rhizome of
maternal subjectivity and the politics attached to it. As Athena Athanasiou and Judith Butler
present to us in Dispossession: The Politics in the Performative, there is a difference between
“being dispossessed” and “becoming dispossessed.” Our next section will look into the meaning
of dispossession, being dispossessed and becoming dispossessed; furthermore, it will pay
attention to how the mothers’ dispossession has been traditionally ignored in lieu of the
recognition of the dispossession of the child, and how such has created a constant becoming
dispossessed.
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When we think about the word dispossession, the first thing that comes to mind is that
there is a given possession that can be then dispossessed. But what is the meaning of
dispossession? Athanasiou and Butler enumerate a series of inquiries and signifiers related to
dispossession. Athanasiou says; “dispossession signifies an inaugural submission of the subjectto-be to norms of intelligibility, a submission which, in its paradoxical simultaneity with
mastery, constitutes the ambivalent and tenuous processes of subjection” (1). She continues to
affirm that “the subject comes to “exist” by installing within itself lost objects along with the
social norms that regulate the subject’s disposition to the address of the other” (Athanasiou 2).
As noted, these signifiers are loaded with the same inquiry presented above, when speaking
about politics of care and subjectivity, here we also have the relation of the self to the self and
that of the self to the other as part of the process of subjection and subjectivation, but here the
other is not limited to another being, but also to other objects.
It is important to highlight that when we say objects, we speak both of inanimate and
animate objects while also including the objectification of others since to a great extent,
dispossession has roots in ideas of negating the subject value of others and objectifying their
labor and their bodies. To which Athanasious continues as says that:
On the other side (the extent to which this side can be assumed as “other” will have to
remain in suspension for a while), being dispossessed refers to processes and ideologies
by which persons are disowned and abjected by normative and normalizing powers that
define cultural intelligibility and that regulate the distribution of vulnerability: loss of
land and community; ownership of one’s living body by another person, as in histories of
slavery; subjection to military, imperial, and economic violence; poverty, securitarian
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regimes, biopolitical subjectivation, liberal possessive individualism, neoliberal
governmentality, and precaritization. (Athanasious 2)
She asserts the role power structures of social norms have over dispossession, particularly the
relationship a subject has with such set norms either by accepting them or by changing its
meanings. Although Butler agrees with Athanasiou, she contributes to the argument by adding,
“dispossession is precisely what happens when populations lose their land, their citizenship, their
means of livelihood, and become subject to military and legal violence” (3). She continues by
stating that, “we are dispossessed of ourselves by virtue of some kind of contact with another, by
virtue of being moved and even surprised or disconcerted by that encounter with alterity” (Butler
3). This contribution by Butler connects two of our previous critiques, that of Sara Ruddick’s
limited view of peace and the maternal as a political agent to achieve peace, and the narrow view
of maternal subjectivity as a split subject.
As you may remember, Ruddick limited the scope of peace to war and military aspects.
In contrast, others like Butler expanded the definition of war into the different elements of
dispossession which are carried in society. When Butler speaks of the dispossession of ourselves,
we can see similarities with the arguments for maternal subjectivity as a split one. Still, I would
like us to consider taking Butler’s argument as an invitation to decolonize the self from these
societal dispossessions. Athanasiou also shifts the conversation into presenting the difference
between “being dispossessed” and “becoming dispossessed”, she states that:
Although the two senses of dispossession are bound to each other, there is no
ontological, causal, or chronological link between “being dispossessed” (as a primordial
disposition to relationality that lies at a fundamental level of subjection and signals a
constitutive self-displacement, that is, the constitution of the subject through certain kinds
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of foreclosure and preemptive loss) and “becoming dispossessed” (as an ensuing,
derivative condition of enforced deprivation of land, rights, livelihood, desire, or modes
of belonging). (Athanasiou 5)
Some may argue that the mother will always be dispossessed because “being dispossessed by the
other’s presence and by our own presence to the other is the only way to be present to one
another” (Athanasiou 17). But then, can we identify the mother as a dispossessed being versus as
a proprietary body that becomes dispossessed? If we recognize the mother as a disposed subject
by an other (the child) and by the self (due to the societal prescriptions) we can argue that their
maternal subjectivity needs decolonization and that such can be achieved by the recognition of
their subjectivity as rhizomatic, rather than a split. These ideas of the connection between
colonized bodies, subjectivity, and desubjectification as also carried through Athanasious’s
argument when she says:
Subjectifying and simultaneously desubjectifying and dispossessing violence (as in the
genealogies of colonialism and the slave trade, but also the new imperialism and the
neoliberal international order, and their gendered implications) emerged as a prerequisite
for (property-owning, white, male) subjectivity; such a subjectivity is constituted
through, and inhabited by, processes of desubjectifying others, rendering them usable,
employable, but then eventually into waste matter, or of no use: always available, always
expendable. (Athanasiou 27)
We can trace connections of how mothers had gone through a similar path through history, we
noticed this, particularly in the first chapter. As part of this progression, we saw how first women
with affiliations to the Church or with Christian based arguments were given a recognition to
speak about the role of the mother. Later on, we saw the feminist arguments arise, while at the
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same time we had seen the discourse outside of the predominantly middle-class white feminist
arguments into arguments that place the socio-economical and racial differences of mothers and
the displacement of many into the margins turning them into an other within motherhood.
The mother, as that who takes care of an other, therefore is dispossessed of the
recognition as a subject by others, instead, its dispossessed of her own knowledge and care to
expect her to become a vessel of care. It is precisely this type of perception that intensifies
medical practices throughout each stage of a pregnant body, birthing, and breastfeeding. Perhaps
if we turn towards the aboriginal and first nations where practices of care combined knowledge
and nourishment and where the body is seen as part of the spirit rather than limiting it to its
materiality and function, then we can decolonize the mother and see all (m)others as subjects.
Moreover, if we consider this in conjunction with present scientific knowledge, perhaps our
societies will cease their insistence of dispossessing females of their agency upon their bodies.
Can we have dispossession without the idea of possessing? As presented in prior
chapters, monotheistic traditions and prior to what is commonly known as proto-feminism, we
noticed men as those whom felt entitled to the possession, the authority, and the governance of
the household and its economies. It is with Lady Damaris Masham that we see a direct proposal
that includes furthering the education of women in order to provide them with the possession of
knowledge that would lead them to a new position in the governance of the household. Still, they
will continue to be displaced to the household and without any social power, but it was the
beginning to move towards an expansion of their roles as mothers. And now we are seeing how
there is a need to recognize such dispossession to decolonize it and to recognize that precisely
because maternal subjectivity is more complex than a split. By recognizing maternal subjectivity
as rhizomatic, (m)others can reshape the narratives that construct their subjectivities and
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challenge the social expectations other may have from them. By doing this, we can clearly see
(m)others open the path for their re-subjectification. Both Athanasiou and Butler argue for a
resubjectification that can be prompted by the self, I want everyone to consider this as an
invitation to reclaim the gaze others can have of the self. In this case, for a mother to tell their
stories so that we can see all the various subjects of (m)others and change our paradigms of
motherhood. But before we can see this in detail in the last three chapters of this manuscript. I
will like to highlight some of the discourses around some (m)others to present a clearer picture of
these dispossessions.
Wet Nurses and Slave Mothers
During the modern era, aristocratic and bourgeoisie French mothers moved towards the
dependency of wet nurses for infant feeding and a detachment from the so-called maternal
instinct, what Badinter calls “maternal indifference.” Before then, it was common for French
families to send their children to wet nurses, Badinter reminds us that:
The custom of the hired wet nurse is an old one in France, and the opening of the first
agency for wet nurses dates back to the thirteenth century. We know that during this
period the phenomenon affected aristocratic families almost exclusively but that during
the eighteenth century the custom of placing children with wet nurses spread to such an
extent that a shortage of nurses developed. (Badinter 40)
In addition to this practice, it was commonly expected that some of these children would not
survive. It was also common for these wet nurses to have children of their own who did not pass
the infancy stage. As such, there is parallelism between wet nursing and a lack of grief for the
children that they were obligated to nursed (according to several accounts). To this, Badinter
provides two examples from Michel de Montaigne’s remarks from his Essays Book 2, the first
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example narrates: “I lost three children during their stay with the wet nurse—not without regret,
mind you, but without any great vexation” (et. Badinter xii) While the second example, presents
a more critical observation: “Every day we snatch children from the arms of their mothers, and
put our own in their charge for a very small pay-nurse, with whom we will not trust our won, or
to a she-goat” (et. Badinter 41). What Montaigne is referring to, is one of many historical
examples that illustrate maternal dispossession. But these dispossessions are also connected to
displacement, it’s not just the dispossession of the breastfeeding body. While Badinter uses these
examples to focus on the question of maternal instinct and maternal love, seeing this as a
maternal dispossession makes us think about the parallels of those practices in the Americas.
Such dispossessions move us into a particular question, one that until recently has
significantly been avoided or ignored by many maternal theorists, when speaking about the
maternal, what is the effect of slavery and low pay childcare labor? To attempt to answer such
question, we need to think about colonial mentality and the impact of economic and territorial
colonial histories, here we think about the double colonization, that of a territory, and how it
affected the psyche of the people who inhabited it. We even speak—like in this project—about
its decolonization, post-colonial and Neo-colonial. But, when we look into the effects of
economic structures within mothering practices and its maternal qualities, we mainly look at the
workforce versus the governance of the house. When speaking about the materialisms of
motherhood old and new, we tend to focus on the objects attached to one’s maternal labor,
whether for the daily performances or for the production of artwork that repurpose this
experiences and object to create art, what in 2012 Natalie Loveless coined as new maternalisms.
In the 2012 catalog for the exhibit title New Maternalisms, Loveless states that “New
Maternalisms pulls us into the material, durational, and endurance aspects of the maternal,
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invites us to respond to and dwell with them, spurs us into relations of both interruption and
care” (exhibition catalog), later in her 2018 curatorial reflection she expands and details how she
came to the term and its origins. In “New Maternalisms: Redux”, she states:
When I coined the neologism New Maternalisms back in 2012, it was quite simply as a
contraction bringing the terms of the maternal together with that world of thought that has, over
the past decade or so, been gathering together in the name of feminist new materialism. My hope
was to help name a new generation of artists for whom concerns with individual maternal labour
and political systems of support are brought together with broader accounts of what Karen
Barad, from a feminist new materialist perspective, has called “intra-action. (Loveless online
catalog)
But, how many times do we look closely to the maternal experiences of slaves, both
slaves who birthed but weren’t allowed to mother, as well as the slaves who were obligated to
performed labors of care of the child of that who enslaved them or how often we look at the
current practices of low income workers rooted in these slaves practices? I want us to take a
pause from the academic tone, and in the spirit of the artist-philosopher, shift for a moment to a
poem Hess Love published on her Facebook page on March 21st, 2017, it reads:
I wish I dried up
I wish every drop of my milk slipped passed those pink lips and nourished the ground
Where the bones lay
Of my babies
Starved while I feed their murderer
I wish I dried up
So the missus babies would dry up too
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And be brittle
So I could crumble them to dust
Return them to the ground
Where all children of my bosom lay equal
(Hess Love, 2017)
In this poem, we notice the weight of personal grief, the grief of the self which has been
dispossessed by the child of that who enslaved her, a dispossession that turned her into an object
that performs a care to her future master. This poem highlights what has also been dispossessed
by philosophy, maternal studies, and the mainstream media. It raises the question, how that
which has been seen as a simple act [the poem] to shift our attention to the experiences that had
been hidden from popular narratives of the maternal, like the experiences of the slave mother,
how would these new gazes make us question our own perception of the (m)other? The general
narratives of maternal studies had neglected to mention enough about these experiences. In this
case, the wet nurse slave is a (m)other, a (m)other by the way in which she was prohibited to care
for her own children.
As we noticed already, among the different mothers popularly recognized, we can find
the biological mother, the adoptive mother or second mother, and the surrogate mother. But, the
analysis did not question why the word “wet-nurse” instead of “nursing mother”? If for so many
years, popularly the word mother has been attached to surrogate when it comes to surrogate
bodies? Why then was it not called nursing mother? Perhaps this would be one of the early
stages of an economic benefit for some upon the dispossession of the body of an other. We can
also see this as an example of when a white mother is seen as a subject, but a black woman is
seen as an object. How the tradition of subjectification of an other—woman—still excluded
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others from its own otherized category—a black woman. The abuse, the forceful task of
breastfeeding the child of that who had prevented their freedom, that who actually has prevented
them from raising their own children:
Where the bones lay
Of my babies
Starved while I feed their murderer
Are these bones any different than those of the lost children of the wet nurses in France? Not that
different, the thing is, that while Badinter is using this to argue against the nature of maternal
instinct as part of the maternal love, we can argue about the silent grief, and at other instances,
the infanticide of slave children by their mothers out of love.
Another thinker who speaks about slavery, labor, and exploitation of black women is
Claudia Jones. Claudia Jones was born in Trinidad in 1915; her family migrated to New York in
1924, where she fought against the lynch law; although her formal education ended early, her
education continued throughout her community involvement and activist work. Her essay titled
“An End to the Neglect of the Negro Women!” was published in 1949. Contrary to Pizan,
Gournay, or Masham, Jones presents a mother who is a guardian/protector whose responsibilities
redefine our notions of care. She illustrates how black mothers became the guardians of their
children and how they needed to protect their own from Jim Crow to the Lynch terror and police
brutality.
Jones adds another piece to the puzzle of maternal politics and dispossession, let us turn
briefly to what Claudia Jones says regarding the connection between economics and the
recognition of mothers. First, Jones presents the historical neglect of the voices of black women
and how their voices had been undervalued. She says:
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Historically the Negro woman has been the guardian the protector of the Negro family.
From the days of the slave traders down to the present, the Negro woman has had the
responsibility of caring for the needs of the family, of militantly shielding it from the
blows of Jim-Crow insults, of rearing children in an atmosphere of Lynch terror,
segregation, and police brutality, and of fighting for an education for the children. The
intensified oppression of the Negro people, which has been the hallmark of the postwar
reactionary offensive, cannot therefore but lead to an acceleration of the militancy of the
Negro woman. (Jones 3)
To this, she adds that black mothers protect their children physically and have no choice but to
participate in the labor market while being significantly underpaid. She reminds us that women’s
wages were less than men’s, while black women were paid half compared to white women
performing the same job. She stated that “the large proportion of [black] women in the labor
market is primarily a result of the low-scale earnings of [black] men” (5). Furthermore, black
women were limited to the lowest-paying jobs, domestic jobs, and their “maternity death rate
was triple that of white women” (5).
Jones supports her argument by presenting some data from the 1945 report by the Negro
Women War Workers. She summarized it as follows: “Of a total of 7 1/2 million Negro women,
over a million are in domestic and personal service. The overwhelming bulk - about 918,000- of
these women are employed in private families, and some 98,000 are employed as cooks,
waitresses, and in like services in other than private homes” (5). To this, she adds how the
economic arrangements that provided structure for each black family - formerly slaved -after the
Civil War created the foundation for the laddering of inequality between black men and black
women. She states that “the new economic arrangement, the change in the mode of production,
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placed the Negro man in position of authority in relation to his family” (8). This new position of
black men was also extended to their churches, which also placed men as an authority over the
family.
Furthermore, positioning men as authority resulted in women and their children as slaves
of their husbands because, in many instances, the law prohibited those emancipated from staying
in the state after a specific date. Therefore, Jones reminds us that “the only way for many Negro
wives and children to remain in the state was to become “enslaved” to their relatives” (8). Lastly,
Claudia Jones utilizes her argument to question how “white chauvinist ideology” had seen and
displaced black women as that which is “backwards, inferior and the natural slaves of others”
(Jones 7).
To this scope presented Love, and Jones, we may add another important point made by
Badinter, that toward the late eighteenth century, influenced by Romantic and Rousseauian ideas
of the natural men/women and the new economic value placed upon the children shifting to a
higher valuation of childhood. Later on, during the Romantic era came what Badinter calls the
cult of childhood, now the child was value as that who exemplifies goodness:
The early nineteenth century witnessed an obsessive new concentration on childhood
hygiene and diet that heralded the end of swaddling and a massive return to the practice
of breast-feeding. Sentimental intimacy between mother and child became an obligation.
The cult of childhood promoted by the Romantics and the Philosophers was bolstered by
the nascent science of demography, which preached that population increase could play a
crucially advantageous role in nations’ political and economic well-being. (Badinter xiii)
With it, the ideas of the hospitality of the maternal as natural based on biological predispositions
return. As presented in this chapter, there is a codependent relationship between maternal politics
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and maternal subjectivity. On drives, influences, and shifts the other, in a way, we can visualize
maternal politics as the stolon of the maternal subjectivity rhizome, as the connector among all
roots of the mother self.
The social reality of maternal performances includes a wide array of the complex
multiplicity of beliefs, philosophies, and politics. As discussed, maternal subjectivities and
maternal politics are interconnected; its aesthetic representation influences the mother as a
subject and her politics as a female parent. Here we are considering maternal politics to be a
starting point for examining the function of the maternal gaze in multiple areas of society and for
the focus of this project, in films. Foucault says that:
Writing was also important in the culture of the care of the self. One of the tasks that
defines the care of the self is that of taking notes on one-self to be reread, writing treatises
and letters to friends to help them, and keeping notebooks in order to reactivate for
oneself the truths one needed. (Foucault 232)
If we follow Foucault’s proposal of writing the self, then we can further argue that aesthetics
representation by oneself is also necessary to merge multiple forms of existence and recognitions
by oneself and in the face of the other. In such spirit of writing about on-self and to understand
narratives that include others, in the next chapter, we will look at the economic structures of film
and the gaze to appreciate its influence on maternal subjectivity.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Film Economics and The Gaze Economy
In the previous chapter, we dove into the progression of the societal prescription of
motherhood and how the myth of the maternal love and the maternal instinct are linked to the
philosophical tradition of placing the mother as that who can better perform care due to the
biological capabilities of female bodied individuals. But since this project evaluates the impact
characters of mothers in US American films have upon mothers who are seen as an other, we
will assess the acts of looking at such other: (m)other. At different moments in the timeline of
philosophy, we have had percolating ideas, from the idealists to the existentialists, including
Hegel, Kant, Sartre, Lacan, de Beauvoir, and more, who speak about the notion of looking at the
other to find some level of recognition of the self, to question the desires of looking at the
fictional like Foucault and Mulvey, to inquiries in regards to choices of looking and active
looking like hooks and Gwendolyn.
In their textbook Practices of Looking: an introduction to visual culture, Marita Sturken,
and Lisa Cartwright remind us that “Visuality is about the conditions of negotiation through
which something becomes visible and under which it can be erased. How invisibility is seen and
made meaningful is an important question for visual studies” (Sturken & Cartrwight 4).
Therefore, in this chapter, we will add another piece to the puzzle of the societal welcoming into
motherhood, which is being seen and its influence in the process of recognizing someone as a
mother or as an act of exclusion. As such, the prior chapter delineated the social construct and
misconceptions of what a mother should be. At the same time, this chapter intends to present
how the tangled complexity of recognizing someone as a mother is connected to the practice of
being seen as such by others. Furthermore, I would like to propose the existence of mothers as
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that who sees herself as well as that who is being seen. This chapter will explore these complex
practices of seeing and looking as part of the gaze economy.
I define gaze economy as the constant flux of exchange between the one who sees and the
one who is being seen, such exchanges are influenced by the polyphony of the gaze and its
critiques, including – and not limited to the following:

systems of power

practices of looking
pedagogy

familial

psychoanalysis
Other
male gaze

Gaze

oppositional gaze
media
spectatorship

local

market

tourist

international
imperial

gender
colonial

post-Colonial

Although the gaze economy is not limited to aesthetics forms and their economies, for the
sake of my study, I will limit the discussion to the gaze economy within the moving image
economics, which includes film/cinema and more recently television and streaming platforms.
Taking as the starting point the modes of production and consumption which are part of what I
referred to as Film Economics. As such, this chapter will present a brief summary of multiple
considerations of the gaze across disciplines to reformulate it and define the gaze economy as it
relates to film economics. Such framework will serve for the analysis of the dearth of
representation of (m)others in US American media in the last section of this manuscript.
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Moreover, the progression of this chapter will be built upon the concept of the maternal
gaze and the economy of the gaze. As such, the central questions to be explored are: what is the
maternal gaze? What is the gaze of the mother? How does visual culture influence the gazing of
mothers and (m)others? What is the role of the aesthetic gaze and the attempt to unrecognized
(m)others? Generally, the maternal gaze is framed as the gazing between mother and infant (Eti
Wade). I will reframe the maternal gaze as a polyphonic gaze that includes: mother-child,
mother-mother, grandmother-mother, father-mother, mother-self, strangers-mother, and more. I
will argue that the polyphony of the gaze takes place within a political-economic structure which
I will identify as the economy of the gaze. Later on, in the third section of this project, I will
illustrate how recent media characterizations of mothers create a gaze attached to the binary
classification of mothers as good or bad.
This chapter will be divided into two main sections: the gaze and its economies and film
economics. Both sections will look at the exchanges that occurred between the participants and
beneficiaries of the exchange, including but not limited to monetary exchanges and production
exchanges. First, we will examine the exchanges between the one who looks at and the one who
is being looked at. Followed by the examination of two parallel progressions: one the cinematic
invention as a medium for artworks, the other its economic production. Lastly, a third section
will introduce the concept of market choice that pivots into the last section of this dissertation.
This section will conclude that the plurality of the gaze: from psychoanalysis to neuro-marketing
creates a gaze economy, an economy which market driven economies attempt to manipulate
therefore influencing our gaze in everyday life and outside of the realm of the imaginary, leads to
both active and passive gaze economies.
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In the historical and critical analysis of visual culture, Sturken and Cartwright consider a
multiplicity of actions that employ looking, from looking at the self to looking at others, from
glancing to gazing. This chapter will consider these series of practices as part of the gaze
economy. The gaze economy is one based upon, but not limited to, a political economy, and it is
influenced by visual apparatuses. In this project, I develop the gaze economy within the context
of the cinematic apparatus since it can allow us to understand the polyphony of the gaze
economy from its economics to its political economy. Within the cinematic apparatus, the gaze
economy privileges those with capital at both production and consumption levels. At the
production level, it favors those who can afford to engage in a certain economy of production,
post-production, and distribution. At a consumption level, the privileges are more nuanced where
it privileges those who can afford to spend money in certain modes of entertainment from
purchasing a ticket to the movie theatre to acquiring a streaming or premium cable subscription,
including the rental of a given film, and more recently (2020 pandemic) streaming and
subscription only film releases, i.e., Mulan's release on Disney +.
Film Economics Early Production
As part of the origins of the film industry, we had witnessed the inception of its economic
structure, which ranges from toy-like inventions, and viewing spaces, all the way to a whole
system of production that contributes to other economic spheres in the United States, including
the local economies of the places where these films are shot. Before the possibility of
photography and the invention of cinema, scientists were concerned with how we see what we
see? They were also interested in knowing more about the functioning of the human eye. Their
inquiries led to the inventions of optical toys that created the illusions of moving images, this led
to the development of devices such as the phenakistoscope and the zoetrope, this last one became

180
a popular toy during the Nineteenth Century. After the invention of photography, some inventors
created devices to project images, and later with the capacity to project moving images; among
these Émile Reynaud and his Projecting Praxinoscope and Thomas Edison's Kinetoscope. You
may wonder what is the importance of these inventions for this project? It is important to look at
the origins of the moving image as a production of capital, the zoetrope was sold as a toy, and
shortly after its invention, Edison's kinetoscope became highly profitable at that time:
On April 14, 1894, the first Kinetoscope parlor opened in New York. Soon other parlors,
both in the United States and abroad, exhibited the machines. For about two years the
Kinetoscope was highly profitable, but it was eclipsed when other inventors, inspired by
Edison's new device, found ways to project films on a screen. (Bordwell and Thompson
8)
Kinetoscope parlors are the precursors to movie theaters. Later on, the Lumiére brothers
created a system that created the foundation for the commercialization and profitability of the
moving industry:
The Lumière brothers, Louis and Auguste, invented a projection system that helped make
the cinema a commercially viable enterprise internationally. Their family company,
Lumière Frères, based in Lyon, France, was the biggest European manufacturer of
photographic plates. In 1894, a local Kinetoscope exhibitor asked them to produce short
films that would be cheaper than the ones sold by Edison. Soon they had designed an
elegant little camera, the Cinématographe, which used 35mm film and an intermittent
mechanism modeled on that of the sewing machine. (Bordwell and Thompson 8)
This example illustrates how from its inception, the industry has had the goal of reaching as
many people as possible and to make as much profit as possible.
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When looking at key moments in film history, many historians mark December 28, 1895,
as the birth of cinema. In the fourth edition of Film History: an introduction, when speaking
about the origins and the invention of cinema, film historians Kristin Thompson and David
Bordwell recall a moment which is commonly recognized as the origin of cinema:
On December 28, 1895, one of the most famous events in film history took place. The
location was a room in the Grand Café in Paris. In those days, cafés were gathering spots
where people sipped coffee, read newspapers, and were entertained by singers and other
performers. That evening, fashionable patrons paid a franc to see a twenty-five minute
program of ten films, about a minute each. (Bordwell and Thompson 9)
As such, it should come as no surprise that an industry that is highly defined by its profits
due to the monetary exchange between spectator and filmmaker not only does it have this
element from the early stages, but that the defining moment of its inception was marked by such
exchange. From its origins, the film industry has been profit-centered from the mode of
production to the showcasing of the product. On day one, the viewing spaces originated as
cinema cafés in France, these developed shortly into the boom of Nickelodeons in the United
States of America. With their innovations also came the development of production firms from
the expansion of the American Mutoscope and Biograph (AM&B), Georges Míeliés's Magician
Cinema, and the American Vitagraph company, as the early filming groundbreakers. These
former firms looked at multiple aspects of film production, which have been restructured in the
present among production companies, production studios, and production equipment
development companies. These firms were the first to provide the systemic structure to operate a
given production by composing its body from a pool of people with varied skills needed for a
specific project/production. On the other hand, studios provide a permanently fixed space that
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can be transformed based on the project at hand. At present, productions are filmed on location,
at a studio, or a combination of both.
These structures of productions influenced the greater economy of the United States of
America in the last decades, turning the film industry into one of the fastest-growing industries,
where its employees range influences not only those who work within it but also the economy of
the locations where they shoot. The Motion Picture Association issued a statement regarding
how the film industry promotes economic growths in the United States of America. In it, they
state that it employs around 2.5 million individuals across every state, “and across a diversity of
skills and trades” (website), totaling “$181 billion in wages annually” (website). Furthermore, it
states how they support and boost local economies:
When a movie or television show shoots on location, it brings jobs, revenue, and related
infrastructure development, providing an immediate boost to the local economy. Our
industry pays out $49 billion per year to more than 280,000 businesses in cities and small
towns across the country—and the industry itself is comprised of more than 93,000
businesses, 87 percent of which employ fewer than 10 people. As much as $250,000 can
be injected into local economies per day when a film shoots on location. In some cases,
popular films and television shows can also boost tourism. (Motion Picture Association,
Website)
Furthermore, when addressing the Global Creative Economy, they state that their
narratives are shared worldwide, and it produces $17.2 billion annually in exports. They further
argue to promote new market structures for the protection of the product, production, and
distribution. By doing so, they can maintain the “competitiveness and reach global audiences”,
furthermore they argue in favor of an “open access to markets around the world via forward-
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looking trade policies that reduce trade barriers, address intellectual property theft, and improve
international copyright laws” (Motion Pictures Association, Website). These statements and
comprehensive data from the Motion Pictures Association should give us sufficient food for
thought to understand the importance and complexity of the economy of the gaze.42 As a creative
economy that promotes creative industries by creating jobs, but which also promotes the
consumption of a product without the need to own a physical object, but by investing time in
consuming the ideas and imaginaries of other creatives, by gazing.
Additionally, it is important to note that such viewing also defined some of the still
predominant elements of film narratives, showcasing everyday moments; at the beginning, one
of the appeals of the seventh art form, which we know as cinema, was to capture everyday life
moments. Thus, for example, at the December 28, 1895 showing, Augustine Lumiere presented
Déjuner de Bebé, a short film of him and his wife feeding their baby, he also showed a comic
scene titled L'arroseur arrosé, also knows as “The Waterer Watered”, this scene is “a staged
comic scene of a boy stepping on a hose to cause a puzzled gardener to squirt himself” (Bordwell
and Thompson 9).
Audiences of the time felt drawn to the new art form and their non-fictional subjects,
there is an agreement among historians that early films attempted to cover the news, but since
cameramen could not make it to the scene, many filmmakers opted to recreate the events in a
studio, this was particularly interesting at the end of the nineteenth century, and the events of the
Spanish-American war, another example, “in 1898, both American and European producers used
model ships in miniature landscapes to recreate the sinking of the battleship Maine and other key
occurrences relating to the Spanish-American War” (Bordwell and Thompson 11). One may ask,
what is the effect or the relationship between these early stories and the gaze? But first, we must
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review some key theories about the gaze and the cinematic work for us to better understand the
proposal of the Gaze Economy.
The Gaze
The gaze can be oversimplified by its definitions. As a verb, it means to “Look steadily
and intently, especially in admiration, surprise, or thought” (Oxford) or “to fix the eyes in a
steady intent look often with eagerness or studious attention” (Merriam-Webster dictionary). As
a noun, gaze has two definitions: “A steady intent look” (Oxford English Dictionary) or “a fixed
intent look” (Merriam-Webster). In literary and critical theory, it is defined as “a particular
perspective considered as embodying certain aspects of the relationship between observer and
observed” (Oxford English Dictionary). This last definition influences many theories of the gaze
to be discussed.
This discourse around the gaze has been common in philosophy, art criticism, and film
theory. There are analyses of the gaze by Jean-Paul Sartre, who in part III of Being and
Nothingness, questions the role of the gaze and one's subjectivity in two ways: the gaze of the
Other as a form of recognition, and the gaze as a form of being enslaved. There is also the
analysis of the gaze within a painting, such as that of Las Meninas by Michel Foucault, in The
Order of Things, where he describes the viewer versus that which is viewed within the painting
and in the spectacle created when spectators view the work of art. In addition, Jacques Lacan
reminds us in his lectures that the gaze has more than one instance, and the role of the gaze of an
Other, as part of the recognition of the self and the mirror stage. This line of thought influenced
the development of the theory of the male gaze by Laura Mulvey in her article titled “Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” This last one resulting in the response by bell hooks, who
questions the passivity of the gaze in her essay The Oppositional Gaze: Black Female
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Spectators. Not limited to these, we also have others like Gwendolyn Audrey Foster and Yasmin
Ibrahim, who, like Michel Foucault, actively recognize the power relationship of what I identify
as the gaze economy. Foster argues in favor of the decolonization of the gaze in Women
Filmmakers of the African and Asian Diaspora: Decolonizing the Gaze, Locating Subjectivity,
while through various articles and books, Yasmin Ibrahim explores and analyzes some of the
economic implications of the gaze and its politics.
Due to Laura Mulvey's contribution to film studies and critique and her theory of the
male gaze, it is common to place feminist film critique of the gaze within psychoanalysis. I
would like to acknowledge that other philosophical schools have contribute greatly to the
understanding and analysis of the gaze, like Mulvey said: “needless to say the psychoanalytic is
simply one among many possible critical approaches” (Mulvey xvi). Furthering this
acknowledgment into an intentional inclusion of these ideas to support the polyphony of the gaze
and to further our understanding of it outside of binaries or unilinear schools of thought. The
gaze is part of the way in which we understand and experience many moments and is part of how
we recognize ourselves and others in relation to oneself and others. The gaze is also how others
place and construct ideas of us. As such, we must attempt to understand these diverse ideas to
see where they converge and where they divert from each other. Within these theoretical
approaches of thinking, critiquing and studying the gaze, two prominent philosophical
approaches can be easily identified, psychoanalysis and existentialism, particularly Jacques
Lacan and Jean Paul-Sartre. I would like to propose we place the label of these schools of
thoughts to the side and focus on what they said in regards to the gaze and how these ideas
illustrate the polyphony and the complexity of the gaze as a whole. In doing so, we can
understand the complexity of the maternal gaze.
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For Sartre, it was important to pay particular attention to how being looked by others
plays a role within one's subjectivity. As such, he speaks about the gaze of the other as a possible
site for recognition, but he also sees the gaze as an act that can carry some type of enslavement.
He states that:
Thus being-seen constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which is not my
freedom. It is in this sense that we can consider ourselves as “slaves” insofar as we and
appear to the Other. But this slavery is not a historical result—capable of being
surmounted—of a life, in the abstract form of consciousness. I am a slave to the degree
that my being is dependent at the center of a freedom which is not mine and which is the
very condition of my being. In so far as I am the object of values which come to qualify
me without my being able to act on this qualification or even. to know it, I am enslaved.
(Sartre 267)
Moreover, for him, the look describes how subjects fight for power, in part because subjects are
establishing a world of objects. Furthermore, for him it's not about the presence of someone else,
but about that someone provoking a feeling similar to being a type of ornament to the presence
of the other, being an object that exists for the other. He says, “the problem of Others has
generally been treated as if the primary relation by which the Other is discovered is object-ness;
that is, as if the Other were first revealed – directly or indirectly – to our perception” (Sartre
253). One of his concerns is that these other-to-other interactions where I am an ornament for the
other and vice versa, can lead to shame. The concept of shame is an existential mood for Sartre,
which results from the look as long as the other strip us of our freedom, he states that “is shame
of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at
and judging” (Sartre 261). For him, the look has the potential to transform us into an object
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because once we feel shame by the look of the other it forces us to take a new identity we did not
take ourselves, and for him, we look to maintain a sense of subjectivity. Later on, in this chapter,
we will revisit how this idea about the connection between being looked at, shame, and
ornamentations are one of the possible paths within the gaze economy, particularly the gaze
economy of mothers.
Lacan and the psychoanalytical origins of the Gaze
It's hard, perhaps even impossible to choose a “right” starting point to talk about the gaze.
As such, I will choose to start with one of the most known theorists on the matter, and perhaps
one of the most contended as well, Jacques Lacan. Within the multiplicity of his work, Lacan
examines several concepts which delineate a mapping for the gaze as a contrast to Jean-Paul
Sartre's looking. In this next section, I will briefly present the key aspects of Lacan's terminology
which will allow us to understand some of his ideas about the gaze upon which other theorists—
like Laura Mulvey—had built their visual theories and criticism.
For Lacan, there is a preexistence of the gaze while examining the I (subject) and the Eye
(object). Lacan argues that what one projects into the world is not what the other sees and vice
versa. In this process, where the other sees me, I become a picture to them, and they become a
picture to me. He argues that the gaze turns the subject into a picture, which is a form of object.
In part, he says, this occurs because I can never see the other from the place where he sees
himself, and vice versa, since both I and them are looking and turned into a picture
simultaneously. He believes that the gaze of the world and that of what we see can never match
up because we can never grasp reality, except for glances of it.
Lacan develops the desire for recognition, following the Hegelian tradition as well as
Sartre's existentialism since for him, we exist to the other as ornaments and one does not desire
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to be recognized by the other since such recognition may lead us to the existential mood of
shame. Three recurrent themes in Lacan, which are key to understand his concept of the Gaze
are: symbolic (language), imaginary, and real (that which one cannot control, is not synonymous
of reality). Lacan says “the unconscious is structure in language” or “as language”, but not as in
verbal language, but as in semiotics. It seems that for Lacan, the Gaze is the Super Ego of the
World.
Although for Lacan the action of gazing reduces the subject to an object, this objecthood
is different than Sartre's object-ness, perhaps because Lacan's development of the gaze and the
subject/object duality is one founded upon the desire for recognition which follows the Hegelian
tradition. While on the other hand, for Sartre is an existential state, inquiry, mood. While one
connects the subject/object to desire, the other sees subjectivity and object-ness as one attached
to the possibility of shame that leads to performing other versions of oneself to avoid judgment
instead of a path to satisfy desire.
In Lacan’s visual construct of actions of looking that he labels as the gaze, one can say he
creates a form of mapping of these actions or practices of looking, where the subject is reduced
to the object. In part or as a whole, this happens because the scopic drive aims for recognition.
But, perhaps, in his view there is a moment of interchangeability where the subject becomes the
object and vice versa. Here is when Lacan introduces the first variable of his algebraic
expression, object petit a. This object petit a is the onset of desire, one that can satisfy one’s
desire. Although for Lacan desire can never be achieved/satisfied, desire is also the one that
alludes representation, therefore for him, this object petit a is as close as one can get to desire but
is not the satisfaction of such, and this is as close as one can get to the real. This real is what, for
Lacan, insists on being represented but are found outside of language and culture. These ideas of
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representation, desire, and realness is why cinema analysis initially limits their analysis on the
possible connection between such: representation of the real or fictional, the idea of representing
that which we desire or that which reflects our realities.
In addition to the object petit a, and the analysis of desire, another Lacanian idea that is
commonly part of film analysis is the mirror stage. Lacan suggests that the mirror stage has a
twofold value. The first being historical, and the second one being related to the body image and
its drives. He states that “in the first place, it has historical value, as it marks a decisive turningpoint in the mental development of the child. In the second place, it typifies an essential libidinal
relationship with the body-image” (Lacan 14). Furthermore, regarding the mirror stage, he states
the following:
It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an identification, in the full
sense analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject
when he assumes [assume] an image—an image that is seemingly predestined to have an
effect at this phase, as witnessed by the use in analytic theory of antiquity’s term,
“imago.” (Lacan 76)
It is this particular concern with false identifications and the imaginary recognition that gears the
development of the male gaze theory by Laura Mulvey.
The Male Gaze
As previously mentioned, Lacan’s psychoanalytic ideas had been highly used by many
feminists to further a variety of theories, among these and perhaps one of the most prominent
applications of psychoanalysis from Freud to Lacan, is Laura Mulvey, who has created an
extensive body of work that analyzes and critiques cinema, while also proposing or envisioning a
different cinema, including a feminist cinema. One, if not the most known works by Mulvey, is
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“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, written in 1973 and published in 1975, in it Mulvey
“brings together four key elements: Hollywood, psychoanalysis, feminism, and the avant-garde”
(Mulvey xi). In a panel celebrating the 40 years of the publication of her article, Mulvey recalls
her early years as a feminist activist, while in the introduction for the second edition of Visual
and Other Pleasures, she recalls that at first she and other activists “read Engels and LeviStrauss in search of an ethnological ‘origin’ of women’s oppression” but for Mulvey the key
moment was in a “subsequent encounter with Freud” who in her opinion redirected the myth of
“women as falling from grace” into “the unconcious and to the Oedipus complex as a possible
source of the endlessly repeated inscription of women's subordination within a patriarchal social
system” (Mulvey xv). For Mulvey, psychoanalysis provided her with a polemical language that
could be used as a political tool to demonstrate how “the unconscious of patriarchal society has
structured film form” (14), with a particular focus on scopophilia and Jacques Lacan’s mirror
stage. These two concepts being key to move Mulvey’s argument in “Visual Pleasure” forward.
Both of these concepts are relevant to understand the origins of the male gaze theory and the
gaze within cinematic experiences.
Mulvey creates a parallel between the mirror image of the self and the screen image as a
reflection of the imagined self. Mulvey’s reading of Lacan’s mirror stage led to her argument
that fictional or imagined reflections of selfhood produce ego ideals as well as a pleasure in
looking (scopophilia) via a power structure of either active or passive participants.
Mulvey recalls that, “Jacques Lacan has described how the moment when a child
recognizes its own image in the mirror is crucial for the constitution of the ego” (Mulvey 18).
For Mulvey this is relevant to her argument because during this phase the child imagines
themselves as complete, she states that “the mirror phase occurs at a time when children’s
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physical ambitions outstrip their recognition of themselves is joyous in that they imagine their
mirror image to be more complete, more perfect than they experience in their own body”
(Mulvey 18). Furthermore, she moves her analysis forward when she presents psychoanalytic
ideas that link recognition of the self with the misrecognition of the self within experiences
linked to projected images, which leads to an ego ideal:
Recognition is thus overlaid with misrecognition: the image recognised is conceived as
the reflected body of the self, but its misrecognition as superior projects this body outside
itself as an ideal ego, the alienated subject which re-introjected as an ego ideal, prepares
the way for identification with others in the future. This mirror moment predates
language for the child. (Mulvey 18)
This connection between the child's developmental stage of recognition of the self with
the reflection of images projected on the screen is important to Mulvey because it links multiple
imaginaries; the human/child development of the imaginary with the human/adult conscious and
subconscious imaginary. In regards to this developmental stage, Mulvey draws from Lacan and
states that “it is an image that constitutes the matrix of the imaginary, of
recognition/misrecognition and identification, and hence of the first articulation of the I, of
subjectivity. This is a moment when an older fascination with looking (at the mother's face, for
an obvious example) collides with the initial inklings of self-awareness” (Mulvey 18). This
moment of fascination to which Mulvey and Lacan referred to is recognized by neurologists and
neuropsychologists as the maternal gaze (more on this later on). Here what Mulvey wants is to
draw the connection between the reflected image of the self as a form of awareness, as the early
stages of one's subjectivity.
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However, for Mulvey, the desire of what one thinks to recognize in the mirror as one’s
complete self is really an illusion of it, therefore a misrecognition based on an imaginary. She
believes the cinematic spectator’s look is scopophilic and at times is a voyeuristic gaze. For
Mulvey, these two elements play a role within the narrative structure of the film where the male
character is active and the female character is designed to please the male. Furthermore, since the
images of the female stars were designed for the male gaze, for her it was key to propose “the
destruction of pleasure as a radical weapon” (Mulvey 15) that will assist us in conceiving “a new
language of desire” (16). She states that her intention is to “discuss the interweaving of that
erotic pleasure in film, its meaning and, in particular, the central place of the image of woman. It
is said that analyzing pleasure, or beauty, destroys it” (Mulvey 16). Mulvey’s focus on pleasure
and desire allows us to see through another window of the gaze, one that questions and redefines
the pleasure and desires that originate in our practices of looking, in our practices of gazing, at
the other, at the self and at the imaginary. In several of her essays, she speaks about scopophilia
and the scopophilic gaze, earlier in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” she states that one of
her reasons for film analysis is because “cinema offers a number of possible pleasures” (Mulvey
16). Among these pleasures, she includes and focuses on scopophilia, which she defines as
“pleasure in looking” (Mulvey 16); the pleasure is the one that gives room to the voyeuristic gaze
and the male gaze.
For Mulvey, there is an element of voyeuristic gaze attached to the performances of the
“female star”, she speaks about this in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, and in other
essays, in the former, she states that:
The now familiar and banal pause enabled by the new technologies can also reveal and
illuminate the significance of stillness in the cinema, previously overlooked or apparently
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irrelevant to the aesthetics of 'the movies', creating a cinema delay. The performance of
the female star had always involved moments of narrative delay, a display for the
voyeuristic gaze. (Mulvey xxiii)
In a film, a narrative delay43 is a cinematic tool often used when writing a script, is not limited to
the female star, but Mulvey argues the Hollywood female star has been used as such.
In her earlier analysis, like the one in “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, she states
that the “conditions of screening and narrative conventions give the spectator an illusion of
looking on a private world” (Mulvey 17). This illusion is what allows the voyeuristic gaze to
manifest, to be practiced. But one of the moments when cinematic productions can be different
from the production of ego ideals is through the narrative and performances of the stars. As such,
let us focus now on the star effects, specifically for the gender imbalances to which Mulvey
draws our attention, she says that “the cinema has distinguished itself in the production of ego
ideals, through the star system for instance. Stars provide a focus or centre both to screen space
and screen story where they act out a complex process of likeness and difference (the glamorous
impersonates the ordinary)” (Mulvey 18). Mulvey divides the analysis into the following
sections: A Political Use of Psychoanalysis, Destruction of Pleasure as a Radical Weapon,
Pleasure in Looking/Fascination with the Human Form, and Woman as Image and Man as
Bearer of the Look. Through these sections of analysis, she addresses how films reflect and
create a spectacle of gender relations.
Mulvey creates a parallel between the mirror image of the self and the screen image as a
reflection of the imagined self. This reflection led to her argument that fictional or imagined
reflections of selfhood produce ego ideals and a pleasure in looking with a power structure of
either active or passive participants: “In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in
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looking has been split between active/male and passive/female” (Mulvey 986). Furthermore, on
this matter, Mulvey states as follows:
…film reflects, reveals, and even plays on the straight, socially established interpretation
of sexual difference that controls images, erotic ways of looking… At the same time
cinema has distinguished itself in the production of ego ideals as expressed in particular
in the star system, the stars centering both screen presence and screen story as they act
out a complex process of likeness and difference … The image of woman as (passive)
raw material for the (active) gaze of men takes the argument a step further into the
structure of representation, adding a further layer demanded by the ideology of the
patriarchal order as it is worked out in its favorite cinematic form – illusionistic narrative
film. (Mulvey 14–27)
Mulvey's male gaze theory has valuable points towards the spectacles created within media that
ultimately caters to an individual’s pleasure in looking and furthermore, into the Lacanian mirror
stage of recognition. The idea of creating such theories as claiming them to be true for all women
and for feminist advocates is problematic because it excludes many groups of women. On this
matter, bell hooks remind us that “much feminist theory emerges from privilege women who live
at the center, whose perspectives on reality rarely include knowledge and awareness of the lives
of women and men who live in the margins” (ii). As such, bell hooks' theories, especially her
oppositional gaze theory will be better suited to frame and advance the maternal gaze theory and
its decolonization in this project.
These ideas around the female spectacle and the female star as it relates to the gaze in the
argument presented by Mulvey is important for this project for several reasons. First, it is
important because we will see in chapters seven and eight, how some of these imbalances persist
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in Hollywood narratives in more recent times. Second, bell hooks present another possible gaze
for spectators, particularly for black females—which can apply to other marginalized subjects—
which allows hooks to argue the existence/practice of the oppositional gaze.
So far, we have the possibility of the gaze as a medium through which one recognizes the
other, the self via the mirror stage, and through which one can look at that which one desires,
some extending to the notion of the pleasure it can give us to look. But there is still more to be
explored about the gaze, including the power carried with the act of gazing, as well as the
marketability potentials of the gaze—which have the potential to be attached not to the act of
looking, but to the knowledge of manipulating what others looked at. This framework will allow
us to evaluate the oppositional gaze, the tourist gaze, and the consumer gaze, to understand
another aspect of the economy of the gaze.
During the early 1990’s bell hooks wrote an essay titled “The Oppositional Gaze: black
female spectator.” In it, she argues the experiences of black women spectators to illustrate some
of the ideas proposed by Michel Foucault which focus on “the ways power as domination
reproduces itself in different locations”, she supports this with her personal experiences of her
upbringing as a black child and the experiences of black women during their engagement with
films. She begins by recalling:
When thinking about black female spectators, I remember being punished as a child for
staring, for those hard, intense, direct looks children would give grown-ups, looks that
were seen as confrontational, as gestures of resistance, challenges to authority. The
“gaze” has always been political in my life. (hooks 253)
With this statement about her childhood and how it framed her gaze, she opens the door to the
gaze as a political one and the act of looking as one which carries power, whether it is the right
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to look or the prevention of it. She states that “all attempts to repress our/black people’s right to
gaze had produced in us an overwhelming longing to look, a rebellious desire, an oppositional
gaze” (hooks 254). To this, she adds that oppositionality goes beyond the possibility of staring; it
is about the aim to go changing reality, is about the possibility that through the oppositional gaze,
one can actively change the power dynamics and challenge power dynamics through critical
engagement. On such matter hooks adds:
The “gaze” has been and is a site of resistance for colonized black people globally.
Subordinates in relations of power learn experientially the there is a critical gaze, one that
“looks” to document, one that is oppositional. In resistance struggle the power of the
dominated to assert agency by claiming and cultivating “awareness” politicizes “looking”
relations—one learns to look a certain way in order to resist. (hooks 255)
Regarding these politics of the gaze for black people, she adds that “before racial
integration, black reviewers of movies and television experienced visual pleasure in a context
where looking was also about contestation and confrontation” (hooks 256). Taking this into
account, we can assert that black cinema and cinematic spectatorship has been constructed upon
a legacy of resistance that influences the development of an oppositional spectatorship from
everyday interactions to cinematic experiences. But it is not as simple as to state that all black
spectators practice an oppositional gaze, nor carried through the same level of oppossitionality.
hooks provide an example of this concept of the gaze as oppositional when she counters
some of Mulvey’s statements about the role of desire and pleasure with one’s gaze. hooks
contrast Mulvey by presenting examples of the desires and pleasures a black male spectator and
the black female spectator may have and how these differ from that of the white male and white
female. Regarding black male spectators, hooks says:
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As spectators, black men could repudiate the reproduction of racism in cinema and
television, the negation of black presence, even they could feel as though they were
rebelling against white supremacy by daring to look, by engaging. Phallocentric politics
of spectatorship. Given the real-life public circumstances wherein black men were
murdered/lynched for looking at white womanhood, where the black male gaze was
always subject to control and/or punishment by the powerful white Other, the private
realm of television screens or dark theaters could unleash the repressed gaze. (hooks 257)
Let us unpack this a bit more. On the one hand, we have the repressed gaze, which I will
define as the suppression of looking by the self, by an other, or by a system, prevents the
individual from looking when desired. Therefore, when provided with the opportunity to look at
that which is forbidden—the white woman—through the cinematic apparatus, black men may
have felt they were engaging in a rebellion against the system that prevented them from looking
in the first place while reproducing the phallocentric male gaze. We can even see that as an
oppositional gaze, not to the male gaze but to the social prescriptions for the gaze. On the other
hand, regarding black female spectators, hooks assert:
With the possible exception of early race movies, black female spectators have had to
develop looking relations within a cinematic context that constructs our presence as
absence that denies the “body” of the black female so as to perpetuate white supremacy
and with it a phallocentric spectatorship where the woman to be looked at and desired is
“white.” (hooks 258)44
She identifies this phenomenon as cinematic racism and supports her argument by
compiling a few examples from additional theorists, including Anne Friedberg and Julie
Burchill. To this, she adds the example of Lena Horne, a black female actress whom most white
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spectators were unaware was black. Furthermore, hooks remind us how the conventional
representation of black women in film has damaged the image of black women and how these
cinematic actions were violent.
At the same time hooks mentions that some black women chose not to engage in these
cinematic experiences, while others chose to avoid analyzing the films they watched “to
experience fully the pleasure of that cinema” (hooks 260). But the prevailing hanging question
threading through the end of hooks’ analysis is how could they “bring pleasure in the midst of
negation?” (hooks 260). In her quest to answer this question, hooks present how Toni Morrison
“portrait the black female spectator”, while at the same time she looks for non-fictional
experiences that support the portrayal of black female spectatorship by interviewing a few black
women, to which she concluded: “Most of the women I talked with felt that they consciously
resisted identification with films—that this tension made movie-going less than pleasurable; at
times it caused pain” (hooks 261). From that point on, hooks continue to illustrate how once they
analyzed a film, the pleasure stopped, how the acknowledgment of the erasure of one’s body in
film changed the relationship with the gaze, and how there is no longer that pleasure. Instead,
there is an avoidance and eventually the development of an oppositional gaze.
To be clear, the oppositional gaze is not the avoidance of looking, but the avoidance of
looking at that which obligates us to be part of a status quo of looking it is one of the possible
starting points to develop the oppositional gaze. When speaking about her experience, hooks
states:
When I returned to films as a young woman, after a long period of silence, I had
developed an oppositional gaze. Not only would I not be hurt by the absence of black
female presence, or the insertion of violating representation, I interrogated the work,
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cultivated a way to look past race and gender for aspects of content, form, language.
(hooks 262)
The series of nuances presented by hooks about the experiences of black spectators
allows her to look at another angle of the analysis presented by Laura Mulvey in “Visual
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, an angle that also contributes to the development of the
oppositional gaze. Regarding Mulvey, hooks says: “Reading Laura Mulvey’s provocative essay
‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, from a standpoint that acknowledges race, one sees
clearly why black women spectators not duped by mainstream cinema would develop an
oppositional gaze” (hooks 263). At the same time, hooks acknowledge the moments of
divergence between these dualities of black/white or male/female spectators.
One of the counterarguments presented by hooks is that black female spectatorship is an
active and not a passive one—contrary to Mulvey, who identify its spectators as active/male and
passive/female. hooks says that “black female spectators actively chose not to identify with the
film's imaginary subject because such identification was disabling” (hooks 263). This active
gazing allowed black female spectators to constantly deconstruct Mulvey's proposition of binary
opposition where the woman is the image and the male is the one who practices the look. In
other words, hooks is not denying Mulvey's analysis, instead she is presenting a wider scope by
presenting how other power structures influence the gaze.
While also looking at power structures, Audrey Gwendolyn Foster reminds us that
changing the gaze power dynamics within film and cinema will not be an easy task, she reminds
us that “decolonization of the “gaze”, and the re/construction of sites of filmic diasporic
subjectivity is particularly difficult because of the persistence of white hegemonic Hollywood
constructions of spectatorship, ownership, and the creative and distribution aspects of

200
filmmaking” (Foster 1). Foster presents strategies used by diasporic women filmmakers to
decolonize the gaze, furthermore she argues these filmmakers had been able to “ground their
films in subjectivity” (Foster 7). She states that “these films all begin the very important work of
decolonizing the gaze, and articulating fresh and flexible diasporic modes of subjectivity in the
cinema” (Foster 9). Foster’s argument establishes the clear connection between subjectivity and
the gaze and how we can construct a gaze of the Other or of the self, as such she is indirectly
pointing us toward the influence the gaze has upon one’s subjectivity, particularly upon those of
us who are often push to the blurbs of the gaze, turning us into an other or a background of the
image.
Foster concludes her book with the chapter titled “Other Voices” where she lists the name
of a few African and Asian diasporic female directors, and she briefly situates their work with a
short profile description of their work. With this, she concludes:
Only when their visions are fully appreciated for the revolutionary visions that they truly
are will we be closer to some sort of egalitarian instinct within the boundaries of
cinema/video discourse, a discourse that is increasing in intensity daily and transforming
the ways in which we view ourselves and our shared existence. (Foster 154)
The majority of these filmmakers mentioned by Foster create what are considered independent
films. I would like to challenge our notion of decolonization of the gaze by questioning the
impact of films. Perhaps we should aim to create an impact in mass films screenings since the
more people see these narratives outside of predominant prescriptions of being, the greater
impact of decolonization of the collective psyche we can have. As such, we must allow a wider
variety of filmmakers from the margins to come in and decolonize our gaze and our minds.
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As previously established, motherhood is an institution. Therefore, one of the unspoken
questions one faces as a mother within it is how others’ gaze influences one’s choices? Are we
these instinctive beings who perform caring for others better? Or, are we these beings who are
influenced by the silent panoptic from the institution of motherhood where the disciplinary
extensions can come from other legal institutions—like child services? Or from a disciplinary
extension from within our psyche by losing ourselves and turning into a being in service of the
care for that other? The gaze of the mother by others is a disciplinary gaze; one that is more
grounded on societal judgment than observation, where the underlying mission is keeping
women “in check.” This judgment is rooted in the tradition of religious believes that serve to
construct the social disciplines of western civilization. These colonial practices that are carried
through the gaze of the other that one cannot understand, nor does attempt to understand, rather
judge and decide to “correct” by evangelizing them. If we remove the judgment and move
towards an acceptance gaze, we can perhaps change the economy of the maternal gaze. We
should consider incorporating ideas of indigenous and originary societies as a possible way to
decolonize the gaze. But, let me be clear, I am not proposing appropriating their stories, I
propose we invite people from the margins, from underrepresented communities, to create, and
present their narratives, to showcase the way in which each of them wants others to see them.
The Maternal Gaze and the Gaze of the Mother
A few years ago, neuro-psychologists identified within the particular relationship of
mother-to-infant a gaze that is key to the development of the child. They study the biological
effects of the mother-to-child gaze.45 But, what about the gaze of the mother in general? What
about the gaze of motherhood beyond the mother-to-infant gaze? What about the social gaze of
the mother? In my work, I argue that the maternal gaze comprises some elements from each of
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these prior theories of the gaze and that the maternal gaze is not limited to the mother and child
gaze. The maternal gaze includes the gaze of one mother toward another mother, herself, and the
gaze of the mother by those who support their parenting, from the co-parent to family, friends,
and paid support (depending on the socio-economic status of the mother). The maternal gaze is
not limited to the limits of what psychoanalysis and neurologists have called the mother-child
gaze. I propose that the maternal gaze is beyond the mother-child relationship, and in order to
understand it, one must look at the economy of the gaze.
Therefore, the gaze of the mother is a polyphonic gaze that is constantly shifting based on
the individual who sees and the one who is being seen as performing the maternal. These
exchanges are what I identify as the gaze economy, present in both political and cinematic
market economies. One of these is presented in the television and streamed show Jane the
Virgin. While pregnant, she attends her High School reunion, and as the former valedictorian,
she was expected to address her class during the reunion. During her address, we see an
alternative scenario where she says to the audience:
Jane Villanueva
In fact, none of you cared, because I'm pregnant.
So, when you look at me, that's all you see,
a pregnant lady.
And, look. Stop!
Look!
I get it.
I know that “Mom” is the most important job in the world,
and not just because so many of you have told me that tonight.
The thing is,
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I don't want to be just a mom.
I want a career.
I want a life!
I want to be seen as a person in my own…
Jane the Virgin, S1:E21 min. 23:52, 2015
Here the character of Jane Villanueva presents one of many instances of the polyphony of the
maternal gaze. The maternal gaze includes the gaze of one mother toward another mother,
herself, and the gaze of the mother by the father; it is not limited to the limits of what
psychoanalysis and neurologists have called the mother-child gaze. I propose that the maternal
gaze is beyond the mother-child relationship, and in order to understand these, one must look at
the economy of the gaze.
The next section will introduce the Economy of the Gaze, and chapters seven and eight
will look in detail at the maternal gaze in the top 25 most profitable films in the United States of
America from each year between 2000-2019 as a mode of questioning the narratives that
influence the gaze we place upon mothers and (m)others. I propose that one of the main
challenges lies within the predominant gaze economy: by expanding those who create, produce,
and represent characters and narratives in the film market, one can create an inclusion that may
prompt the decolonization of the gaze, consequently creating a new gaze economy that will
create wider solidarity among everyone. But what is gaze economy or the economy of the gaze?
The Economy of the Gaze
When speaking about the economy of the gaze we cannot ignore that it exists within
political economy and within aesthetic economics. The first one being more subtle and
subconscious at times, while the other is more conscious at least to the producer of the product.
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In the article titled “The Economics of Aesthetics”, Virginia Postrel, a well-known author of
aesthetic economies, writes that:
For businesses, aesthetics is not a matter of esoteric art theory. Itʼs the way we
communicate through the senses, the art of creating reactions without words. Aesthetics
is the way we make the world around us special. Successful businesses understand that
aesthetics is more pervasive than it used to be—not restricted to a social, economic, or
artistic elite, or limited to only a few settings or industries, or designed to communicate
only power, influence, and wealth. (Virginia Postrel 2)
Postrel adds that “aesthetics is critical today not because other factors donʼt matter, but because
competition has pushed quality so high and prices so low that style is often the only way to stand
out” (Postrel 3). Subsequently, in her work, Postrel analyzes how aesthetics change not only
advertising but also production. In the book The Substance of Style: How the Rise of Aesthetic
Value Is Remaking Commerce, Culture, and Consciousness, Postrel states that:
Functionality still matters, of course. But competition has pushed quality so high and
prices so low that many manufacturers can no longer distinguish themselves with price
and performance, as traditionally defined. In a crowded marketplace, aesthetics is often
the only way to make a product stand out. (Postrel 2)
As such, we notice how the gaze of the consumer influences their choices, furthermore how this
influences product production decisions and its marketing. On the other hand, in their analysis of
the gaze, Sturken & Cartwight “examine how modernity was shaped and refracted through visual
culture and visuality specifically emphasizing embodied spectatorship and the gaze as modalities
in the exercise of power” (Sturken & Cartrwight 89). These modalities can be seen in the
exercise of “neuromarketing” and in tourism strategies since both appeals to the political
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economy of the gaze. Neuromarketing is generally understood to be a field of marketing that
uses brain imaging technology to understand consumer’s decision-making. It’s hard to say who
coined the term neuromarketing or who was the first one to use it, but Vlasceanu Sebastian
reminds us in the article “Neuromarketing and Neuroethics” that the term gained usage around
2002 and that there are questions as to how this knowledge is used to manipulate consumer’s
consumption. Eben Harrell says:
“Neuromarketing” loosely refers to the measurement of physiological and neural signals
to gain insight into customers’ motivations, preferences, and decisions, which can help
inform creative advertising, product development, pricing, and other marketing areas.
Brain scanning, which measures neural activity, and physiological tracking, which
measures eye movement and other proxies for that activity, are the most common
methods of measurement. (Harrell 2)
Another market that takes into consideration people’s desires to experience a different reality,
even if temporary and which is feed by the experience and gaze of others, is the tourist economy.
As such, we also have the concept of the tourist gaze, a concept to which John Urry and Jonas
Larsen have dedicated extensive time to study and to present its complexities. Larsen and Urry
remind us that John Berger explained that “the ‘tourist gaze’ is not a matter of individual
psychology but of socially patterned and learnt ‘ways of seeing’” (1). They also reference
Foucault’s observations about the medical gaze as an institutionalized gaze, to it Larsen and Urry
add: “Like the medical gaze, the power of the visual gaze within modern tourism is tied into, and
enabled by, various technologies, including camcorders, film, TV, cameras and digital images”
(Urry 2). But perhaps one of their more relevant points related to the gaze economy is that the
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origins of the tourist gaze are lined to the capitalization of collective travel and photographic
technologies that allow for the reproduction of images, to this they state:
We can date the birth of the tourist gaze in the west to around 1840. This is the moment
when the ‘tourist gaze’, that peculiar combining together of the means of collective
travel, the desire for travel and the techniques of photographic reproduction, becomes a
core component of western modernity. (Urry 14)
Perhaps the tourist gaze is one of the easiest ways to understand the economy of the gaze since
we are used to speaking about tourism as that which is attached to local economies due to its
evident economic exchanges.
While on the other side, and perhaps a less visible impact, we have the cinematic/film
economy, which intersects with all forms of aesthetic economies, and, which at its core, is a
political economic form. Thus, what influences do the multiple cinematic economies have upon
our recognition of an other, particularly our recognition of an other whom we may not have
otherwise encountered, if not through these imaginative/creative experiences?
In my opinion, there is a constant movement among these various cinematic economies,
which are not limited to cinema and film. Hence, I contend that these economic exchanges fall
within the Gaze Economy or the Economy of the Gaze. I will briefly present some highlights
concerning the discourse of the gaze as a foundation for the formulation and definition of the
economy of the gaze:
The gaze can be understood in relation to the amount of time spent “seeing.” In other
words, if the various ways of perceiving visual cues were placed on a spectrum, the gaze
would be positioned on one end, representing the longest and most deliberate of stares.
On the other end of this spectrum would be the most fleeting way of perceiving the
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world—through the glance. (Zulli 2)
The gaze materializes that which is not a material but an inexplicable essence of an other. The
gaze creates an illusion of ownership via the pleasure the act of looking at an other creates. The
gaze allows us to perform an idea that materializes that which cannot be grasped nor owned.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Gaze Economy and Subjectivity
The central question guiding the argument of this project is whether the dearth of
representation of maternal characters affects the subjectivity of mothers in our society by looking
at the US American film culture and representations in recent times. To support the argument
that the dearth of representation affects maternal subjectivity, one must also ask how the industry
itself measures the impact of films? First, it is necessary to acknowledge that this is an industry
that merges aesthetics, fictional, and non-fictional characters and their narratives with other
aesthetic elements within an economic system of production, from the production of professions
to the production of gig based jobs; with the goal of profiting from its product—a film.
In this chapter, I want to suggest we look at the connection between film economics,
cinema aesthetics, and subjectivity, furthermore the political economies it comprises. Moreover,
we must consider the role of the gaze economy as a political economy practice imbedded in
society as one that welcomes mothers into the ideological system of motherhood.
Given the lack of current data on the specifics of maternal characters and representation,
this project embarked on the assignment of cataloging, analyzing, and mapping the data related
to the maternal characters in a leading and supporting role among the top 25 highest-grossing
films in the United States of America from 2000 to 2019.
When looking at the data for the analysis of the possible impact of these films, multiple
things could be considered. As such, I will briefly mention some leading existing projects that
look at issues of characterization and representation in media, with a primary focus on films and
television in the United States of America. Then, I will present the limits of the scope and
methodology for this project, followed by its findings.
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Existing Leading Projects
Before presenting the data, it is important to mention that there has been a series of new
research that studies different aspects within the motion picture industry in recent years. In
addition, it is necessary to point out that there has been increased research that looks at several
aspects of media production and its influence upon viewers during the last decade. Some of the
leading centers in the United States of America are part of the Annenberg Inclusion Initiative at
the School for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California. At the
same time, other projects are supported by other leading institutions like the Norman Lear
Center. Both of these institutions also collaborate in projects like The Media Impact Project. In
addition to these leading institutions, we have the Center for the Study of Women in Television
& Film, and the Representation Project. But we cannot ignore the feminist tradition that preceded
these institutionalized studies for evaluating films critically by creating alternative systems for
these evaluations, including the Bechdel-Wallace Test.
The Bechdel-Wallace Test (widely known as the Bechdel Test) is perhaps one of the
most commonly known measurements of female representation in films. It got its name from the
cartoonist Alison Bechdel who included these standards in her famous cartoon strip Dykes to
Watch Out For (1985). In more recent years, during an NPR’s Fresh Air interview, Bechdel
indicated she would like the test to be renamed Bechdel-Wallace since she included it in her
comic strip after a conversation with her friend Liz Wallace. The test consists of 3 basic
requirements to identify if a film has active female characters:
1. It has to have at least two [named] women in it
2. Who talk to each other
3. About something besides a man
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Fig. 4, excerpt from Dykes to Watch Out For, 1985.
It’s been over 35 years since Bechdel’s comic strip made its appearance. The—now—test
has been utilized by feminist critique to highlight the institutional patterns of passive female
characters in Hollywood. Others have also used the test to highlight other types of discriminatory
institutional practices; for example, Alaya Dawn Johnsons suggests applying this rule of the
Bechdel-Wallace test to People of Color in media:
1. It has to have two POC in it.
2. Who talk to each other.
3. About something other than a white person.
Back in 2009, in her article titled “The Bechdel Test and Race in Popular Fiction” for the
blog “The Angry Black Woman”, Dawn Johnson indicates that if we evaluate popular fiction in
television and films using the rule of the test, it highlights the problem with POC representation
from the beginning of the test, from “number 1”. She states: “Even in stories that feature
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prominent POC characters, it is so rare to find more than one present, let alone who know each
other well enough to talk to each other…” (September 1, 2009).
This test is not exclusive to film, and even though it was coined and attributed to Bechdel
and Wallace, we can trace its roots to the writings of Virginia Wolf in her 1929 essay titled A
Room of One’s Own, when speaking about characters of women in fictional literature:
All these relationships between women, I thought, rapidly recalling the splendid gallery
of fictitious women, are too simple. So much has been left out, unattempted. And I tried
to remember any case in the course of my reading where two women are represented as
friends. There is an attempt at it in Diana of the Crossways. They are confidantes, of
course, in Racine and the Greek tragedies. They are now and then mothers and daughters.
But almost without exception they are shown in their relation to men. It was strange to
think that all the great women of fiction were, until Jane Austen’s day, not only seen by
the other sex, but seen only in relation to the other sex. And how small a part of a
woman’s life is that; and how little can a man know even of that when he observes it
through the black or rosy spectacles which sex puts upon his nose. Hence, perhaps, the
peculiar nature of women in fiction; the astonishing extremes of her beauty and horror;
her alternations between heavenly goodness and hellish depravity—for so a lover would
see her as his love rose or sank, was prosperous or unhappy. (Wolf 237-238)
Although she does not establish “the rules” as precisely as in the Bechdel-Wallace Test,
this excerpt from her essay is commonly recognized as the root of the test to assess the
institutional problem with female representation. But still, these standards for questioning the
bare minimum participation of female characters were not popularized until this past decade. As
presented, even though these questions of representation and the role of female characters in
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fiction has been present for centuries—remember Pizan in chapter one—, these three basic
requirements got popularized in April 2011 after the publication of an article by Tad Friend for
The New Yorker titled “Funny Like a Guy: Anna Faros and Hollywood’s woman problem.”
Therefore, it should be no surprise the progression of institutionalized research centers to
target problems of representation in media, particularly in film and television. In the last decade
and a half, a series of centers emerged to generate detailed studies in which findings can be used
for advocacy and action towards change, some of which are the Annenberg Inclusion Initiative
and the Norman Lear Center.
The Annenberg Inclusion Initiative works with a think tank model. They focus on
conducting multiple studies that look at issues of diversity and inclusion in media entertainment,
with the goal of targeting inequality in the entertainment industry. As such, their reports serve as
an advocacy tool by including possible “simple actions for complex solutions to facilitate social
change at the student, industry, and societal level” (Annenberg website). The Annenberg
Inclusion Initiative collaborates with the Norman Lear Center in several initiatives, including the
Media Impact Project. The mission of this project is:
To understand the social impact of media and effects of media on audiences. We study
projects that serve the social good, and strive to be a thought leader in our field. This
means we assume two distinctly different roles: as evaluator, we offer impartial
judgement on a project’s success towards meeting its desired goals; as research partner,
we develop innovative new ways to study media and illuminate how media has impacted
audiences. (The Media Impact Project website)
Some of their initiatives include projects with the following titles: Africana Narratives,
Poverty Narratives in Pop Culture, Stories Matter: Narratives of Health Equity, Immigration
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Stories Foster Inclusive Attitudes, and Normalizing Injustice. These series of projects identify a
specific issue regarding stereotypical representation in media by further analyzing the data and
frequency in mainstream media. On the other hand, The Annenberg Inclusion Initiative Reports
include other projects that further question who create these; some of their projects include:
Muslims in Popular Movies (a new study from Dr. Stacy L. Smith), Inclusion in the Director’s
Chair, Inequality in 1,300 Popular Films, Mental Health in Popular Storytelling, and Stacy
Smith: The data behind Hollywood’s sexism, among others. All of these projects aim to identify
critical components that contribute to the problems of representation on the screen and behind
the screen with the goal of creating awareness, advocacy, and promoting change in the way these
narratives are constructed and produced these.
So far, these studies have looked at how the media influences how people construct their
ideas about Africa, crime, and pop culture. In addition, they have also conducted studies to track
viewers’ politics and their television preferences. Another group focusing on similar issues is the
Representation Project, which mission focus on fighting “sexism through films, education,
research, and activism” (Representation Project website). The initiative originated after its
founder’s first documentary titled MissRepresentation (2011). At present, two other
documentaries have followed; additionally, the project has developed a film curriculum that has
been used with over 2.5 million students.
Considering these existing projects and their strategies, to measure the level of impact of
the maternal characters in films in the US American media, I will focus on the level of
engagement of the audience, determining such engagement based on the grossing income of the
films. But first, I will briefly mention an ongoing project used to identify one of the underlying
problems of representation lies in who constructs the story in the film and television industry.

214
Then, in the next chapter, I will proceed with the analysis of films by looking at the characters of
mothers in the top-25 most profitable films in the US Market from 2000-2019.
The Celluloid Ceiling Report
How did we go from Virginia Wolf’s observations to the Bechdel-Wallace Test, all the
way to the variety of research about representation in film is still an ongoing project? But
without a doubt, one of the most detailed archives that currently evaluates data from the
productions of films is “The Celluloid Ceiling Reports” from Dr. Martha M. Lauzen, who has
been collecting, representing, and archiving the data of female representation from on-screen and
off-screen since the early 2000s. Recently, Dr. Lauzen published all the findings from each year
in Living Archive: The Celluloid Ceiling, Documenting Two Decades of Women’s Employment
in Film. This one presents the following key data:
Despite the countless panels, repeated calls for voluntary programs, and promises of
change, the percentages of women have remained relatively stable in the majority of the
roles considered. The percentage of women cinematographers remained virtually
unchanged over the 22 years of the study (4% in 1998, 5% in 2019). The percentage of
women working as producers climbed just three percentage points, from 24% in 1998 to
27% in 2019, with similar increases for executive producers (18% in 1998 to 21% in
2019), and editors (20% in 1998 to 23% in 2019). The percentage of women directors
rose a scant four percentage points, from 9% in 1998 to 13% in 2019. Women writers
experienced the most significant gains, with their percentage rising six points from 13%
in 1998 to 19% in 2019. (1)
Furthermore, it indicates that many in the industry expected 2020 to mark a turning point
in the women’s employment in the industry,46 but that it was unclear as to how and that, “the
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long view provided by The Celluloid Ceiling suggests that evolutionary change is more likely
than a revolutionary shift” (Lauzen, 1). Therefore, it is relevant to present this as part of our
project for us to continue to expand our inquiry into how we can create narratives that have more
active female characters whose narratives are independent from a male characters and narratives?
Or let alone, how do we expect to have powerful characters who are mothers but who’s
subjectivity goes beyond their identity as mothers, if the stories continued to be dominated by
our male counterparts?
Scope of Study and Methodology
As established in the introduction, this project limits its scope of analysis to the top 25
grossing films from each year of the Twenty First Century up to 2019, compiling data from 20
years, for a total of 500 films. As such, the analysis will begin by sharing the data of several
categories into the years evaluated since this will allow us to provide a closer evidenced-based
analysis of the possible effects these characters have upon those who watch them.
To answer the meta question of this project, what effect do the characters of mothers in
films in the United States of America has upon the subjectivity of mothers and (m)others?, this
project evaluated a set of data to quantify characters that most likely have an impact on the
mothers and (m)others who see them or to the collective consciousness of those who encounter
those characters. This project managed a smaller set of data as a starting point for this research
while developing a methodology that can be expanded in future research. The scoping of the top
25 grossing films is used as the possible starting reference to answer the central question of this
project. This approach was taken out of the understanding that from all the films that were
released in a given year, the top 25 Grossing Films are the ones who will have a greater impact
upon its audience and society since these are the ones more people watch, and which live in the
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collective consciousness and the popular imaginary. This project does not consider demographic
details of its spectators, like race, gender, socio-economic status, education, or other
differentiation of its audience due to the lack of data on the matter. But, this should be a good
starting point to consider the connections between the usage of data and philosophy to analyze
the Gaze Economy of these characters, from the economic impact these grossing films have in
our economy to the political economic impact these characters have in our interactions with an
Other and the impact on the subjectivity of those who see themselves represented or who do not
see themselves reflected in these characters and its possible implications for the non-fictional
Gaze Economy when encountering others.
In doing so, this chapter proposes to introduce a new reformulation of the economy of the
gaze as it pertains to film production and consumption. Traditionally, philosophical texts are
categorized separately from economic analysis. Here both will be merged to support the
hypothesis of the effect/influence stories represented, misrepresented, or absent from
representation may have on an individual, particularly on (m)others, mothers, and the way in
which others view mothers and (m)others, particularly the imaginary understanding of mothers
as a vessel, a worker of care, and a being.
As such, I will present the data analysis that shows the following: first, the increase in
cinematographic releases and access in the United States of America, the increased tendencies of
film releases from 2000-2019, and the increase in gross earnings. This data analysis will be
followed by two chapters that look at the analysis of the genre of the top 25 grossing films from
each year from 2000 to 2019, and later the analysis of the characters of mothers versus those
characters of maternal qualities, in a leading role versus those in a supporting role.
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The data presented considers the following limitation; we cannot calculate the exact
number of people who watch each film, how many of those watch the film in theaters more than
once, nor the demographics of each spectator. Therefore, it will be impossible to state which
movie has been watched by the majority of individuals. Nor can we calculate how many people
saw all or most movies, nor how many films each watched. But, if we considered the most
grossing income films or the films that were played at the majority of theaters, we can conclude
that regardless of the limits, most likely those are the films that were watched by the greater
number of individuals and consequently the ones which influence the most people. Lastly, film
producers can calculate the grosses of a film monthly, quarterly, by season, or in yearly charts;
this last one can be looked at as “in-[period] releases” or “calendar grosses.” These last ones are
the two main ways in which the film industry calculates domestic box office gross income, one
as calendar grosses, the other, in-year releases.
The calendar grossing chart list the films based on the grossing within the indicated year,
not necessarily since the release date. While the in-year release charts, present the total gross
income of a film during that period and since the release date. The data used in this project is
based on calendar grossing. IMDb defines it as follows:
Calendar grosses shows box office results within a given time period, regardless of when
the movies were released. For example, viewing by calendar grosses for 2019 shows box
office results for all movies that earned money in 2019. A movie released in 2018 may
appear on this chart if it continued to earn money in 2019. (IMDB website)
Furthermore, it established their methods for calculating these incomes, it states that it
includes the daily data of the box office receipts; when they don’t have such details, they create
an estimate based on the data from prior trends. Finally, IMDB specifies that there is more data
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in recent years and that the calendar gross data since 2001 is more comprehensive and accurate.
Therefore, we can expect the following data to be high accuracy due to the years we are
evaluating in our analysis.
General Data about Film Release and Film Productions from 2000-2019
The following graphs illustrate the rapid change in the film industry with a significant
increase in film releases. We see there was an average of 500 film releases per year between the
year 2000 and 2005, by 2007 releases double and between 2007 and 2014 there was a steady
increase that average between 1,000 and 1,500 films per year. These numbers skyrocket and
double by the year 2015 with a total of 3,000 films released, and another steady increase up to
close to 4,000 films released in the year 2019 (fig. 5).
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Fig. 5, Domestic Films Released between 2000-2019 in the United States of America.
Another interesting fact that can be noted by evaluating the number of tickets sold in the
United States of America between the years 2000-2020 is the small decline on tickets sold
throughout the years (fig. 6). The number of tickets sold fluctuates slightly up, and slightly down

219
in a spam of 5 years with no significant increase or decreased. The only significant decrease is
from the year 2020 due to the closure of movie theatres across the nation due to the Covid-19
pandemic. This project have not looked at the details of how this occur, but we can infer this is
the result of the significant increase on streaming platforms. While the total of the box office
income increased (fig. 7), here we must consider the inflation adjustment (fig.8). Although this
project did not include films of the year 2020 in its scope, the data is included to reflect the
effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the box office income, this information can be used in future
research regarding the changes on film economics and film consumption in the household versus
the movie theatre.
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Fig. 6, Tickets Sold in U.S.A. Theatres from 2000-2020.
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Total Box Office U.S.A. Movie Theatres 2000-2020
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Fig. 7, Total Box Office in U.S.A Movie Theatres from 2000-2020.
U.S.A. Movie Theaters Box Office vs. Inflation Adjustment
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Fig. 8, U.S.A. Movie Theatres Box Office vs. Inflation Adjustments from 2000-2020.
Furthermore, these film releases had been also divided among the major studios that released
these films (fig. 9), this graph includes The Big Six—the name given to the six major film
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studios. Although at the moment of this manuscript these are still the major studios, is important
to note that there is a current increase on productions and distribution by new media companies
like Amazon, Hulu, Netflix and Apple Tv, among others. Another comparative graph illustrates
the big six compared to other studios, as noted, we can see a slow increase of other studio
releases (fig 10).
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Fig. 9, The Big Six Movie Theatre Releases in U.S.A between 2000-2020.
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U.S.A. Movie Theater Releases by Studio 2000-2020
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Fig. 10, Combine Totals of Movie Theatre Releases by The Big Six in U.S.A. from 2000-2020.
The next chapter will look at a different set of data which is the result of this
investigation, the mapping of the characters of mothers. The data in the next chapter is not meant
to answer whether there are maternal characters but whether the characters are in a leading or
supporting role for the development of the story. Such analysis looks at the top 25 grossing films
from each year between 2000-2019, particularly at how many of these characters of mothers are
in a leading role and supporting role. Then, it presents these characters be categorized of
maternal types. The classification of these characters will expand our analysis of the films in the
following chapters, as we continue to ask if these characters influence the subjectivity of mothers
and how these characters play a role in the societal prescription of motherhood. It is important to
point out that in the instances where the character is part of an ensemble (where not one
character is lead but a group), each character is classified under leading characters.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Framing Reel Mothers
In the prior chapters we had seen how multiple aspects of our society determine a
prescription for the performance of motherhood. Specifically, we had seen how the patriarchal
western philosophical traditions had delineated standards for the performances of mothers based
on the roles they deemed biologically predetermined. In addition, we had seen some examples of
female voices that challenge such standards, and who present alternative thoughts that illustrate
the complexity of parenting and the constraints male dominated thoughts had placed upon the
female body, particularly upon its possible capacity to bear children. Furthermore, in the
previous chapter we began to see the connection between these male dominated philosophies and
film, by paying attention to the economic trends in the film industry and by scaffolding the gaze
economy.
Now in this chapter we will see the analysis of the data of multiple classifications of
characters of mothers from the top 25 grossing films from each year from 2000-2019. Then, in
chapter eight, we will see the detailed analysis of some of these characters. This analysis will
illustrate how these characters follow a similar developmental path as the philosophical thoughts
presented earlier, while it will also highlight the dearth of representation of (m)others. These
connections between the narratives and performances of these characters will guide the chapter
to conclude that the current gaze economy influences our view of others and one’s subjectivity.
Lastly, I will argue that a possible path to decolonize the gaze economy of mothers can be
achieved by including characters of (m)others and expanding the repertoire of types of maternal
characters.
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Mapping/Graphing recorded characters
In general, every film has a variety of characters, and as such we expect to encounter this
diversity of characters among the ones who are mothers or who perform the maternal. For the
purpose of this project we had identified the characters of mothers who are key for the
development of the story. All the data about the characters was recorded by watching each film
at least once, from the fall of 2017 to the summer of 2021. The majority of the scripts from these
films are not accessible to the public, as such a small number of scripts were accessible and that
was not the main medium for analysis. The data about the grossing income of the films was
accessed through the website of IMDB, a platform used by the industry workers and productions
to collect data from films and television shows. As such, these characters are identified as
characters of mothers in a leading role (fig. 11) and characters of mothers in a supporting role
(fig.12) in the top 25 grossing films in the United States of America in the Twenty-First Century
up to 2019. This data collection also considers that there are instances in which a film may have
more than one character in a leading or supporting role in the same film, as such this project
includes the data of the relationship between the number of characters of mothers in a leading
role and the number of films with mothers in a leading role (fig. 13 and fig. 14). These graphs
illustrate that it is more common to see the character of a mother in a supporting role than a
leading role, as such the relationship between characters of mothers in a leading role and those at
a supporting role and the films that include them has been recorded as well (fig. 15 and fig. 16).
In total we have 82 characters of mothers in a leading role and 254 in a supporting role.
These 82 characters of mothers in a leading role are included in a total of 67 films, and the 254
supporting characters are showcased in 187 films, out of 500 films. In other words, out of 500
films that include the Top 25 Grossing Films from each year from 2000-2019, 13.4% of the films
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have mothers in a leading role. While on the other hand, these same films have 37.4% of
characters of mothers in a supporting role.
Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25 Grossing Films
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Fig.11, Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25 Grossing Films From 2000-2019.
Characters of Mothers in a Supporting Role in the Top 25 Grossing
Films from 2000-2019
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Fig. 12, Characters of Mothers in a Supporting Role in the Top 25 Grossing Films from 20002019.
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Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25 grossing films vs.
the number of Films that include them from 2000 -2019
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Fig. 13, Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role vs. Supporting Role in the Top 25 Grossing
Films between the years 2000-2019.
Characters of Mothers in a Supporting Role in the Top 25 Grossing
Films vs. The Number of Films That Include Them from 2000-2019
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Fig. 14, Characters of Mothers in a Supporting Role vs the number of Films that include them in
the Top 25 Grossing Films between the years 2000-2019.
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Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role vs. Supporting Role in the Top
25 Grossing Films from 2000-2019
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Fig. 15, Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role vs. Supporting Role in the Top 25 Grossing
Films from 2000-2019.
Films with Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role vs. Films with
Characters of Mothers in a Supporting Role in the Top 25 Grossing
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Fig. 16, Films with Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role vs. Films with Characters of
Mothers in a Supporting Role in the Top 25 Grossing Films from 2000-2019.
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The detailed analysis of the sub-division of the categories of these characters will mainly
focus on the data and analysis of the lead characters of mothers. For the analysis of this project,
these characters in a leading role had been classified into multiple categories based on the
predominant categories philosophy and economics had used in the past to divided mothers.47
This categorization intends to highlight its lack of inclusion, and such it aims to visualize and
name categories that further support the argument that film, like philosophy and economics has a
dearth of representation. Philosophers and economists had used these categories to showcase
their ideas about what each of them believe to be the role of a mother within the family structure
and governance of the household. These categories had been used to support both patriarchal and
feminist proposals for the purpose of developing various philosophies and analyzing current and
future markets. Furthermore, these categories are based on ideas of becomings and performances
of motherhood. Although we had seen most of these categories in previous chapters, we intend to
pay close attention to the frequency of these limited characterizations that mostly showcase
patriarchal ideas of the role of the mother, with the intention to showcase some possible
characters which are not included in the popular canon.
First, we have the division of the characters by “type of mother”, which is related to
becoming a mother or the relationship to the child. Here we have the following categories: birth
mother, adoptive mother, surrogate mother, the grieving mother, stepmother, animal mother,
pregnant, abortion, empty nester, fake mother, and godmother (fig. 17). The graph includes the
classification of mother as a leading character to facilitate the visual analysis of the total of
mothers as a leading character and its relation to each category. As we can note, most characters
of mothers at a leading role are birthmothers, to the point that eleven out of 20 years evaluated
only have characters of birth mothers at a leading role. The years 2001-2005, 2009-2011, 2015,
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2016, and 2018 exclusively have biological mothers at a leading role. This is the first and more
obvious category that highlights the dearth of representation. To this, we can add that this data
does not show a trend of improvement in such stereotypical representation through the years, the
most recent year with exclusively biological mothers in a leading role was 2018. In addition, it is
worth mentioning that 2018 is the year with the most characters of mothers in a leading role (fig.
17), also the year with the most films in the top 25 grossing films with the most characters of
mothers in a leading role. In 2018 we had a total of 9 characters of mothers in a total of 8 films,
the highest recorded in a given year from 2000-2019 (fig. 12).
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Figure 17, Types of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25 Grossing Films from
Each Year from 2000-2019.
Animated: Human and Non-Human
Since the medium of film allows for the development of archetypes beyond the narratives
by having the option of animated films and non-human characters, another category mapped in
this project is the human status of these characters, and whether they are shown as live action
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characters or animated characters. In total out of the 500 films evaluated we have 14% nonhuman characters of mothers, and 86% human characters of mothers in a leading role (fig. 18).
Furthermore, out of these, 15% are animated and 85% are non-animated characters of mothers
(fig. 19). This data concluded there are a total of 12 animated characters, and 13 non-human
characters (fig. 20). With a total of 78 human characters and 68 live action characters. Out of
these non-humans we have only 2 animal mothers, one animated via computer-animation, Ellie
from the 2009 animated film Ice Age: Dawn of the Dinosaurs (2009) (fig. 21) and the other using
Weta Digital special effects to create the character of Corlenia from the 2014 film Dawn of the
Planet of the Apes (fig. 22).
Human and Non-Human Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the
Top 25 Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019
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Figure 18, Human and Non-Human Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25
Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019.
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Animated and Non-animated Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in
the Top 25 Grossing Films in USA from 2000 -2019
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Figure 19, Animated and Non-animated Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25
Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019.
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Fig. 20, Human and Non-Human Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25
Grossing Films in USA from Each Year from 2000-201
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Fig. 21, Character Profile Ellie.

Figure 22, Character Profile Cornelia.
As you may have noticed now, in the predominant canon of maternal philosophy, the
economic factor of mothers, and the effect such has on their subjectivity is ignored. If we look at
films as philosophical texts, we can expand the elements that influence maternal subjectivity by
looking at their career choices, marital status, socio-economic status, etc. We can also look at
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their human or non-human condition, particularly questioning if they had been dispossessed of
their human condition, and further ask, what does the representation of animated characters and
non-human characters say about (m)others?
From these animated characters of mothers (fig. 19 and fig. 22) 2 characters repeat
because each appears in a sequel film, this being Helen Parr/Elastigirl (fig. 23) from The
Incredibles (2004) and The Incredibles 2 (2018) and Mavis (fig. 24) from Hotel Transylvania 2
(2015) and Hotel Transylvania 3: Summer Vacation (2018). We see different stages of Helen
Parr and Mavis as mothers, both characters are first seen as stay at home mothers, and in the
latest movie as working mothers, both in the family business. These 12 animated mothers appear
in 11 films, 10 being rated G or PG and 1 rated PG-13, meaning the target audience for this film
is a younger audience and teenagers. In other words, individuals at a developing age. Here, we
can go back to one of our questions earlier about subjectivity and the experiences that influence
it. In this particular case, we can ask ourselves, how the archetypes carried by these characters
(fig. 22) may influence the subjectivity of these children in the future. Furthermore, out of these
animated mothers 9 are biological mothers and 1 an adoptive mother (fig. 25), 9 are married and
1 is a single mother (fig. 26).

Figure 23, Animated Mothers from the Top 25 Grossing Films from 2000-2019.
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Figure 24, Character Profile Helen Parr.

Figure 25, Character Profile Mavis.
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Figure 26, Character Profile Lucy Wilde.

Figure 27, Character Profile Donna Who.
These details about the portrayal of mother in animated films is another example of the
dearth of representation, furthermore igniting the question of what image of motherhood is
promoted via the films for young audiences in U.S. American culture when most of the
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characters of mothers are married and biological mothers? It will be hard not to assert that the
film culture continues to promote the predisposition of women of childrearing age as mothers
and the social prescription of the ideal of a married mother.
Race and Ethnicity
As we continue to evaluate the data and the lack of representation as part of the societal
prescription of motherhood, we now move to a classification that highlights the invisibility of
many groups and how U.S. American films promote mothers and stories from a limited group.
The following data shows the racial and ethnic details of the characters of mothers evaluated in
this study, concluding that 83% of these characters are Caucasian and 17% are other than
Caucasian (fig. 27). More specifically, 71% are White-Americans, 9% Europeans, 2%
Australian, 9% Black, 4% Latinx, 1% Asian, 1% wrongly represented, and 3% unspecified (fig.
28). Some years had exclusively Caucasian mothers in a leading role, this being: 2000-2001,
2004, 2008, 2010-2012, and 2015-2016 (fig. 24). The following figure 36, illustrates the noncaucasian characters of mothers, including black, latinx, non-human and non-caucasian animated
mothers.
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Race of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from the Top 25
Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019
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Figure 28, Race of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from the Top 25 Grossing Films in
USA from 2000-2019.
Racial Details and Ethnicity of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role
from the Top 25 Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019
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Figure 29, Racial Details and Ethnicity of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from the Top
25 Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019.

238

Racial and Ethnic Details of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role
from the Top 25 Grossing Films from each year from 2000-2019 in USA
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Figure 30, Racial and Ethnic Details of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from the Top
25 Grossing Films from each year from 2000-2019 in USA.

Figure 31, Non-Caucasian Mothers from the Top Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019.
Another common categorization of mothers, is based on the number of children they
have, their employment status and their marital status. The following data will identify these
categories in the characters of mothers evaluated here. When looking at the data of how many
characters of mothers have one or more children, only in 2012 we can see all characters of
mothers with the same number of children; all characters of mothers in a leading role that year
had 1 child (fig. 31). When we evaluate the same data as an overall we have the majority of
characters (54%) with 1 child, 28% with 2 children, and 18% with 3 or more children (fig. 32).
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We have seen thus in both philosophy and economics, since many argue there is a connection
between these choices. Although we can argue the employment status of mothers is influenced
by the job market, childcare cost, wage gap between male and female individuals in the
workforce and the lack of public policies that support subsidized child care or flexible work
schedule, instead of a choice.
Here we can begin to see the reflection of the shift of the predominant prescription of
motherhood, with a majority of mothers at a leading role parenting a single child. When
comparing this to maternal philosophy, we can say little has been written about how parenting
more than one child, influences or changes the maternal experience and the subjectivity of a
mother. Framing this into an example of how through film we can shift not only the gaze of
mothers, but also how we conceive their labor, care, and subject/object.
Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role by number of children in the
Top 25 Grossing Films from Each Year in USA from 2000-2019
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Figure 32, Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role by number of children in the Top 25
Grossing Films from Each Year in USA from 2000-2019.
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Percentage of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role by Number of
Children in the Top 25 Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019
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Figure 33, Percentage of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role by Number of Children in the
Top 25 Grossing Films in USA from 2000-2019.
Marital Status
As for the marital status of these characters, we have similar numbers with what is
socially prescribed as “good” or “adequate”, which is marriage (fig. 33). As an overall 55% of
these characters are married, 19% single, 10 % divorced, 4 % remarried, 10% widows and 2%
we do not know because it was never part of the narrative (fig. 34). Out of the unknown
characters we have Rachel from the 2012 horror film The Ring (fig. 35) and Ray Stone from
Gravity (fig. 36). There is not much to say about this category, other than it continues to carry
the social prescription of marriage as part of mothering. In a future study we can go deeper on
this category and see how it compares to the data from the census that comprises those same
years. As for the representation of grieving mothers, is important to mention that even though
both characters are influenced by the loss of a child, both films place such event as a past event
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that influence their present. Ray is also 1 of 2 grieving mothers in the films evaluated (fig. 16),
the other grieving mother is Emma Gaines from San Andreas (2015) (fig. 37).
Marital Status of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25
Grossing Films from Each Year from 2000-2019 in USA
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Figure 34, Marital Status of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25 Grossing
Films from Each Year from 2000-2019 in USA.
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Figure 35, Marital Status of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in the Top 25 Grossing
Films from 2000-2019 in USA.

242

Figure 36, Character Profile Rachel Keller.

Figure 37, Character Profile Dr. Ryan Stone.
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Figure 38, Character Profile Emma Gaines.
Employment Status
Most of the characters recorded are employed professional mothers, with a total of 59%
employed characters, 21% unemployed, and 20% unknown or unspecified (fig. 39 and fig. 40).
These characters can be further seen in a sub-category based on their type of job: 57%
professionals, 16% homemaker, 14% occupation, 5% student (fig. 46-48), and 5% artists (these
can also fall under professionals of occupation) (fig. 49-51). Out of these, 3% of the characters
bring their child to work and this occurs during the 2018 and 2019 (fig. 43 and fig. 44). The
following years have exclusively characters of mothers with a job: 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2017,
the majority of these being professionals (fig. 41 and fig. 42). While in 2010 the employment
status of its only character of a mother, Fiona from Shrek Forever After, is unknown since she is
a former princess (fig. 45), while in 2011 the only character of mother is Bella Cullen The
Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn Part 1 (fig. 48)—was a student and unemployed.
Both of these characters, Fiona and Bella, also fall under the blend of human and nonhuman, the first one a former princess now ogre, the other a human recently converted into a
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vampire. Also, both of these characters follow the fairy tale tradition of a female character who
falls in love with a forever love and completely changes who she is for that loved one. Fiona
transforms from a human princess into an ogre, while Bella changes from human into a vampire.
In the case of Bella this change goes beyond her physical appearance. This change also prevents
her from continuing her relationship with her parents and friends. Furthermore, Bella’s
transformation into a vampire led her to have an unexpected pregnancy, one that was painful and
caused her death. In the film, the choice of an abortion to save Bella’s life was not an option. The
delivery of her child and her imminent death was the only path. Although, as a non-human
narrative, she was able to be resurrected. We must keep in mind how the film portrays her choice
of love as one attached to sacrifice, both, her love for the unborn child, and the love for her
husband. In the last installment of the film series, Bella is portrayed as an overprotective mother.
Due to her vampire status, Bella will always be a teenager and her role as the mother of Renesme
will always be performed in private.
Employment Status of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from
Top 25 Grossing Films from 2000-2019

20%

59%

21%

employed

unemployed
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Figure 39, Employment Status of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from Top 25 Grossing
Films from 2000-2019.
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Employment Details of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from
Top 25 Grossing Films from Each Year from 2000-2019
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Figure 40, Employment Details of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from Top 25
Grossing Films from Each Year from 2000-2019.
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Figure 41, Employment Status of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from Top 25 Grossing
Films from Each Year from 2000-2019.

246

Employment Details of Characters of Mothers from Top 25 Grossing
Films from Each Year from 2000-2019
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Figure 42, Employment Details of Characters of Mothers from Top 25 Grossing Films from Each
Year from 2000-2019.

Figure 43, Character Profile Emma Russell.
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Figure 44, Character Profile Suyin.

Figure 45, Character Profile Fiona.
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Figure 46, Character Profile Juno.

Figure 47, Character Profile Kate Curtis.
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Figure 48, Character Profile Bella Cullen.

Figure 49, Character Profile Claire Spencer.
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Figure 50, Character Profile June Carter.

Figure 51, Character Profile Motormouth Maybelle Stubbs.
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Figure 52, Character Profile Adelaide Wilson.
Age
The last category evaluated for this group of characters is their age range. For the purpose
of this study assumption of age based on their child or children was avoided. The following ages
were gathered from information presented in the script, or whether their age or birthdate is
mentioned at some moment during the film. If their age was not mentioned, those characters
were classified as unspecified. As such, the age of most characters is not mentioned, as an
overall there are 57 % of characters with unspecified age, 15% in their 30s, 11% in their 40s, 5%
teens, 5% in their 20s, 5% in their 60s, and 2% in their 50s (fig. 53 and fig. 54). Since most are
unspecified this is the category with the least clear tendency, that can lead us to conclude that
specifying the age of these characters of mothers is not an important factor, or that filmmakers
already presume we have a universal idea of when someone becomes a mother and can deduced
their age based on the age of their child or children, or by their appearance. Furthermore, this
leave the open question of the social prescription for mothering, and the famous “biological
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clock” pressure many mothers carry—particularly as they approach their 40’s. One film that
touches upon this topic is Baby Mama (2008).
Age of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in Top 25 Grossing
Films from 2000-2019 in USA
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Figure 53, Age of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role in Top 25 Grossing Films from 20002019 in USA.
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Figure 54, Age of Characters of Mothers in a Leading Role from Top 25 Grossing Films from
Each Year from 2000-2019 in USA.
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Reel Mothers
The book Moms in the Movies: The Iconic Screen Mothers You Love (and a few you
love to hate) by Richard Corliss highlights iconic reel mothers. In the forward Debbie Reynolds
reminds us that:
The movie studios, of course, made a point of distinguishing between reel mothers and
real mothers. The Breen Office and the Production Code forced married couples into
separate beds on the set (how did they think these women became mothers?), and films
could rarely depict motherhood in any way that was nearly so messy as it is in real life.
Movie mothers were neat, organized, energetic, and seemed always ready to be a perfect
spouse and parent. They made most of us forget the areas in our life we weren’t so happy
with, for a movie moment. (Reynolds 3)
One of the main arguments carried by Corliss in this book is that through the history of
films we had witness a declined of characters of mothers. He justifies this by saying there are
three main reasons for this to occur: first, movies are about movement and these are manly
quests, second, the role of women has evolved and third, audiences evolved as well. In the book
Corliss presents some iconic characters of mothers from US American films based on characters
type, for example, silent moms, the great American mom, serial moms, malevolent moms and
more. The following chapter will focus on more recent characters, to highlight the complexity of
the disappearance of mothers in film, to continue questioning whether this results originate in the
neglect to accept the existence of some types of mothering, by pushing some of these types into
the margins and turning them into (m)others.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The character’s voice: What did they say?
It is almost impossible to select the perfect starting point to present the voice and
narratives of all the characters previously mapped in the above graphs and data; for that, we will
have to present a catalogue that includes such details. However, to support the argument carried
throughout this project, this section will present some critical dialogues, phrases, or synopsis of a
crucial moment in the narratives of some of these characters. The selection of which characters is
worth highlighting, is based on multiple factors; including their type of character, dialogue,
phrase, or narrative that illustrate some of the issues we had presented in previous chapters. Or,
whether they can illustrate some of the expectations society places on that whom they see as a
mother. For organizational purposes, these will be presented based on the genre of the film, type
of mother, or type of conflict. Moreover, this section aims to illustrate how films do philosophy
and deal with philosophical questions or arguments about childrearing, particularly mothering, to
demonstrate the role of film in the institution of motherhood.
The second scene of The DaVinci Code (2006) shows one of its leading characters,
Robert Langdon, a professor of religious symbology from Harvard University, giving a lecture
titled “The Interpretation of Symbols.” As part of his lecture, he introduces several symbols and
asks the audience to say out loud what comes first to mind when they see it; for the third symbol,
he presents a close up of a sculpture (fig. 54), all we see is a baby facing a breast covered by a
hand, then is zoomed out to the whole image (fig. 55), the following dialogue follows:
Robert Langdon
Now this symbol.
Women 1
Madonna and child.
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Women 2
Faith. Christianity.
Robert Langdon
No. No, it’s the pagan god,
Horus and his mother, Isis...
...centuries before the birth of Christ.
Understanding our past determines actively...
...our ability to understand the present.
So how do we sift truth from belief?
How do we write our own histories, personally or culturally...
...and thereby define ourselves?
How do we penetrate years,
centuries, of historical distortion...
...to find original truth?
Tonight this will be our question.

The DaVinci Code (2006), 4:31.
This moment in his lecture illustrates not only how we can present a philosophical question that
will guide the plot of the film, but more to our interest in the representation of mothers and the
invisibility of (m)others, that these not only occurs in the narratives presented by films but in
general through the tradition of aesthetics and its iconographies. More specifically, the example
of Christianity’s appropriation of images to infiltrate its ideals about the mother to the extent to
which the masses ignore the origins of such icons and idols.
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Figure 55, screenshot 4:34, The DaVinci Code (2006).

Figure 56, screenshot 4:38, from The DaVinci Code (2006).
Horror, Thriller, and Suspense Mothers
Empty Nester, Maternal Filicide, Suicidal Mothers, and Apocalyptic Mothers
As we move toward the analysis of characters of mothers in films, we need to consider
the genre where each narrative takes place. Traditionally most horror films have characters of
mothers in a leading role; as such, we will start by visiting some of these characters, including
characters from thrillers and suspense films. Chronologically, the character at the top of our list
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is Claire Spencer (fig. 49) from horror/thriller What Lies Beneath (2000). Although, the narrative
of the film does not revolve around her mothering, two key moments showcase her mothering or
maternal type. One of these moments is at the beginning of the film when we see Claire packing
things for her daughter, who is moving to the college dorm: as such, this character can be
classified as an empty-nester.48 When Claire is hugging her daughter after placing everything in
the trunk of her car, she tells her daughter:
Claire
I have Norman, and the garden, and a new house, you really don’t
have to worry
What Lies Beneath (2000), 5:45.
This moment showcases multiple problems within motherhood, including the concern of
what would happen to the mother once her child is no longer at home? This response by Claire
highlights one of the problematic assumptions that the child is at the center of the life of mothers.
Another issue is Claire’s reassurance that she will be fine because she has a new house, a
husband, and a garden; she will be fine because she has other domestic responsibilities. In
chapter two, when the review of the predominant discourse of maternal subjectivity was
presented, such discourse did not include empty-nesters in their inquiry. As such, we can see
empty nesters as a possible (m)other. Furthermore, we can ask how maternal subjectivity
changes once the child has become an independent adult? By accepting maternal subjectivity as
rhizomatic, we make room for changes and transitions of being—like the ones manifested by
Claire—to take place.
In a later scene, we see Claire at her daughter’s room at home, folding her clothes; she
picks up a Julliard t-shirt and smells it, then she proceeds to look at some old photographs. This
scene contrasts the initial image presented; we find out Claire is a former cellist through the
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photos. This film is a psychological horror/thriller; as the plot unfolds, we realize Norman
(Claire’s husband) has been lying to her, and he constructed a false reality for Claire to hide the
murder of his mistress. But there is one scene where everything points back at Claire’s maternal
condition:
Mr. Spencer
You were a single mother touring with a baby.
When I came along, you were happy to give it up.
And when you did, you hated me for it,
so you gave it all to her!
Claire
Who?
Mr. Spencer
Caitlyn
Claire
You leave her out of this
What Lies Beneath (2000), 1:14.
At this moment, Norman blames Claire for falling into the life he created for her; he is showing
himself as the savior who came to the rescue of the single mother who was an artist. Again,
multiple stereotypes are presented here, the single mother “happy” to give everything for a man
who will support her and her child because the societal prescription of motherhood does not
expect that a single mother—let alone a musician—is capable of supporting herself and a child.
On the other hand, the following characters of mothers that fall under the horror genre are
placed within narratives and plots that are more easily identified as fictional scenarios: Grace,
Rachel, and Evelyn (fig. 57, fig. 36, and fig. 59). Grace is the leading character of The Others
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(2002), a horror film that revolves around what seems to be a protective mother of two children
who have some photosensitivity condition. If they are exposed to sunlight, it will kill them.
Through the film, a series of inexplicable events occur; these events lead Grace to believe her
house has intruders, later on thinking these are ghosts. At the end of the film, it is revealed that
the intruders are the actual owners of the house, that Grace and her children are the ghosts. We
find out that Grace smothered her kids with a pillow before committing suicide. The film does
not present a direct reason for her actions:
Grace
Yes, of course, but I admit that was not the most pleasant
evening...
At first I couldn’t understand... what the pillow was doing in
my hands... and why you didn’t move.
But then I knew. It had happened. I had killed my children. I
got the rifle... I put it to my forehead...
and I pulled the trigger.
Nothing.
And then I heard your laughter in the bedroom.
You were playing with the pillows, as if nothing had happened.
And I thought... the Lord, in his great mercy... was giving me
another chance... telling me...
“Don’t give up... be strong...
be a good mother...
for them.”
But now... Now... what does all this mean?
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Where are we?
The Others (2002).

Figure 57, character profile, Grace, The Others (2001).
In this horror film, Grace is a mother who committed filicide and suicide; filicide is “the killing
of one’s son or daughter” (Oxford Dictionary). Although maternal filicide and maternal suicide
are also rare—almost un-existent—topics within maternal philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir
briefly mentions the suicidal mother. However, little to none has been said or questioned about
the subjectivity of mothers who kill their children or those who attempt and commit suicide. We
cannot embark on that journey in this project, but it is interesting to see how a film like The
Others presents such inquiries and how it navigates the topic in an attempt to answer it. The
Others framed otherness as live humans versus ghosts. Still, it also unveils another other, a more
real other, an other we avoid mentioning or talking about even within philosophical inquiries, the
(m)otherness of maternal filicide.
Another film in the horror category with a mother in a leading role is The Ring (2002);
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we have three mothers in this film, one at a leading role, one at a minor role, and another as an
absent mother (fig. 58). In this film, the grieving mother is Ruth, her sister Rachel is a mother
trying to figure out a way for her son to survive, and the absent mother key to the story is Anna,
the adoptive mother of Samara. The plot of the film is initiated by Rachel’s investigation of her
niece’s death, but what carries the development through is that Rachel is preventing her son from
dying the same way her niece did; out of fear due to a ghost girl (Samara) that comes out of the
television screen. But, knowing the details of Samara’s death is also key to how we imagine the
role of mothers in horror films. Samara is the adoptive daughter of Anna; she died when Anna
pushed her down a well; here is another example of maternal filicide. Through Rachel’s
investigation, we learn more about Anna’s becoming into motherhood. Anna was infertile and
adopted Samara; through the years, Samara developed supernatural powers that consisted of
burning gruesome images onto people’s minds. After a period of depression, Anna pushed
Samara down a well and eventually committed suicide herself.

Figure 58, Rachel, Ruth, and Anna, screenshots of mothers, The Ring (2002).
The Ring raises more detailed questions about maternal filicide and the mental state of
the mother; contrary to The Others, here the focus is on the soul of the child who was murdered,
to the point where the audience may even empathize with Anna. Samara is not presented as a
normative child, but her supernatural difference before Anna kills her is presented in a scary way
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that may even lead some to justify her murder. This film is one of the few films with a character
of a mother of disabled children. In it, we see how the lack of capacity of Anna to deal with
Samara’s supernatural powers results in her killing Samara, furthermore in not being able to live
with her choice, and killing herself.
A more recent horror film set in a post-apocalyptic world has the mother back at the
center as a heroine rather than an antagonist. This is Evelyn (fig. 59), one of the lead characters
of A Quiet Place (2018). In the film, we see her as a mother of 4 children; she loses her youngest
boy and becomes pregnant again while learning survival skills in a world where the smallest
sound will attract creatures that kill anyone. Even during an apocalyptic scenario, Evelyn is
portrait as a caregiver who carries on with the education of her children; into a quarter of the film
we see her homeschooling her children and teaching math to Marcus. She is also the mother of a
disabled child; her oldest daughter is deaf and mute, the communication skills they develop
before these sound-driven creatures come in handy as they all know how to communicate via
American Sign Language.

Figure 59, character profile, Evelyn Abbott, A Quiet Place (2018).
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One of the most intense scenes of this film is when Evelyn gives birth to the youngest of
her kids while in the bathtub, holding any sound even from her heavy breathing. Contrary to
other horror films, here the mother is not only that who desires to protect her child/ren, but she is
the heroine of their story. She is an imaginary of the futuristic apocalyptic mother, perhaps even
close to the social expectations for the current pandemic mothers. Since in this recent covid-19
pandemic where mothers work from home, learn how to bake bread while also providing an
education for their children.
Action, Crime Mothers
The next character is one of the most iconic female apocalyptic heroes in films who is
also an iconic mother in films, is Sara Connor from the film series Terminator. The first film of
this series was released in 1984 and the last one (so far) in 2019. All the films revolve around a
war between robots/machines and humans, which results in both sending terminators and
protectors—respectively—from the future to the past. In Terminator Salvation (2009)—the
fourth film of this series—Sarah is not a present character, but the plot and story would not be
developed without her absence, and due to a tape recording, she left to her son John. We hear
Sarah Connor’s voice on a tape from the future telling her son to protect his father:
Sarah Connor
This is tape number 28.
It’s Sarah Connor to my son, John.
What’s most difficult for me is trying to decide
what to tell you and what not to.
Should I tell you about your father?
Will it affect your decision to send him
back in time to protect me, knowing that
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he is your father.
And he’ll be younger than you,
only a teenager, when you meet him.
God! A person could go crazy talking about this.
But if you don’t send Kyle you can never be
and Skynet will win the war.
Terminator Salvation (2009), 19:31.
In the film series Terminator, we see the mother who mothers even when absent. This
apocalyptic time-traveling film also speaks about maternal subjectivity when we go back to the
question of when someone becomes a mother? Or when we ask what influences her subjectivity?
In one of the films, Sara learns she will become a mother in the future, a distant future since she
hasn’t met her son’s dad yet, but regardless of this, she fights through the film to save the
promised future. In other films from the series, like Terminator Salvation, it also—like some
other apocalyptic mother—places forward the question, can a mother continue her mothering
even after death? With this series, we see another film-philosophy possibility when it comes to
moving forward the complexity of the maternal rhizomatic subjectivity and how maternal
subjectivity influences the subjectivity of a child even after the passing of their parents.
When it comes to crime films, mothers are not completely out of these films; even in the
sequels of The Godfather, we see the representation of the forever-loving mother. Mothers in
crime films can be seen as the loving mother who has no clear idea of what their child/ren does
for a living, or as a token used by others to manipulate a situation to their convenience. Still, they
can also be seen as the lead criminal of the story. In American Gangster (2007), once Frank
Lucas—the lead criminal of the story—gets to a level of power and wealth, he buys his mother
her dream house:
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Mama Lucas
Oh, my Lord!
I’m so glad to see you, boy.
Oh, I’m telling you.
This is some piece of land you got here.
Some Teenager
I wonder what the Boro people’d say.
Mama Lucas
And whose house is that, Frank?
Frank
That is your house, Mama.
Mama Lucas
Mine?
Frank Lucas
That’s yours.
Mama Lucas
And who else?
Listen!
I wanna tell you how happy I am. Seeing all my children at the
table, and the grand children
at the same time.
American Gangster (2007), 45:08.
While in the film Collateral (2004), Vincent—a hitman—, forces Max—a cab driver—to drive
him around the city, Max receives a phone call asking him about why he is not answering his

266
mother’s phone calls. When Vincent asks about it, he insists Max must continue with his routine
of visiting his mother to avoid any suspicion; between their conversation on the cab and their
arrival at the hospital, we notice how each have different ideas of care and love of a mother:
Max
Yeah?
Lenny
(FILTERED)
Your mother’s calling every ten minutes. Why didn’t he show? Are
you all right? Where are you?
Vincent
(whispers)
Show for what?
Max
(ignoring him)
Tell her I can’t make it tonight, okay?
Lenny
(FILTERED)
What am I, related to you? You tell
her yourself! Lenny CLICKS OFF. Dead air.
Vincent
Show up for what?
Max
She’s in the hospital.
Vincent

267
You visit every night?
Max
Yeah. What difference does it make?
Vincent
Cause if you don’t show it breaks a
routine.
Max
So?
Vincent
So people start looking for you, this
cab. That is not good.
Max
No. I can’t take you to see my
mother...
Vincent
Since when was any of this negotiable?
Flowers?
Max
Waste of money. Won’t mean a thing to
her.
Vincent
(sincere)
She carried you in her womb for nine months.
Collateral (2004).
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In both of these films—which are included in the scope of this study—the mother is a
passive character with a minor role. I include this as an example of how the predominant
portrayal of these mothers in crime films has been for them to be innocents of crime while they
continue the loving and care of their children. A movie that steps outside of these narratives is a
film from 2020, not included in the data presented in the prior chapters, but this is a narrative and
character worth mentioning. This character is Isabel Aretas from Bad Boys for Life (2020).
In Bad Boys for Life, we see multiple characters of mothers in both supporting and
leading roles. The movie begins with a fast-driving scene with Mike and Marcus (the
protagonists of the sequel), which may be interpreted as a car chase scene, but once they stop, we
notice they arrived at a hospital where Megan Burnett (Marcus daughter) has just given birth to
her son Marcus Miles. In this scene, we see her accompanied by her mother, Theresa.
Both Megan and Theresa have minor roles in the film that can be classified as supporting
roles. On the other hand, this film revolves around the escape of Isabel Aretas from prison, a
female inmate seeking revenge from those responsible for her imprisonment and the death of her
former husband. This revenge is carried by her son Armando Aretas. Throughout the film, we
see Isabel gave instructions to her son and constantly scolding him for not following her
instructions. In a later scene (1:26:04), we find out Isabel gave birth to Armando while in prison.
While the film certainly has stereotypes like the Latinx criminal, it breaks from the traditional
crime film by placing a mother and her relationship with her son at the center of the plot. Here
we can see a start towards shifting the predominant narratives.
Caring for Others
Now will move to present a theme that is often neglected regardless of the character’s
employment status, this theme is the childcare component, and when it is acknowledged,
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mentioned, or when is incorporated in part of the narrative, it tends to continue the gender
stereotypes of female individuals as caregivers, unless in a comedy, where men are seeing as
caregivers in “training.” For example, Pacifier (2005) and Are We There Yet? (2005), both of
these comedies have male characters performing the care of children. In Pacifier, Shane Wolfe, a
U.S. Navy Lieutenant, was assigned to protect Zoe Plumer’s children while she traveled after her
husband was killed. In Are We There Yet? Nick Pearson takes care of Suzanne Kingston’s kids
while she is working away from home. Pearson is accompanying the kids on their travel to where
Suzanne is working. These films present men caring for kids as a comic performance of care, as
those who don’t know but try to care for the other. In both of these films, men are portrayed as
“helping” the mother, as “trying their best” but never “as good” as the mother, perhaps because it
continues to carry the ideology that the mother is biologically predisposed to perform the labor
of care better because she is a female-bodied individual.
I would like to highlight two traits that—although they originated in performances of
care—can be seen as a type of (m)othering. Some are paid to provide the labor of care for the
child of others and those who bring their children to work and do not separate their professional
life from their mothering.
The first one is seen in the film based on the novel The Help (2014) and with the same
title. This film has mothers in a leading, as well as mothers in supporting and minor roles. The
film showcases black mothers who work for affluent white families. As such, they sacrifice by
spending more time raising the white kids of their employers than their own children. As a result
of the country’s segregation, constant racist comments, and abusive behaviors from their
employees, some of these women anonymously share their stories through Skeeter Phelan’s
writing platform. Skeeter interviews many of these domestic workers and compiles their stories,
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one of the key scenes to understand the complexity of the life of the black characters of a mother
like Aibileen Clark (fig. 60) and Minny Jackson (fig. 61), and to think about how the subjectivity
of black mothers is different from that of white mothers, is a conversation between Aibileen and
Skeeter:
SKEETER
What does it feel like to raise a white child when your own
child’s at home, being looked after by somebody else?
AIBILEEN
It feel...Uh.
SKEETER
Is that your son?
AIBILEEN
Yes, ma’am. Can we move on to the next question?
SKEETER
You know, Aibileen, you don’t have
to call me “ma’am.” Not here.
SKEETER
Do you want to talk about the bathroom? Or, anything about Miss
Leefolt? How she pays you, or has she ever yelled at you in
front of Mae Mobley?
AIBILEEN
I thought I might write my stories down and read ’em to you. It
no different than writing down my prayers.
SKEETER
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Okay. Sure.
AIBILEEN
And after my prayers last night, I got some stories down too.
SKEETER
Go ahead.
AIBILEEN
My first white baby to ever look after was named Alton
Carrington Speers. It was 1925, and I’d just turned fourteen. I
dropped out of school to help Momma with the bills. Alton’s
momma died a lung disease.
I loved that baby, and he loved me. That’s when I learned I
could make children feel proud of they self. Alton used to
always be asking me how come I’s black. It just ate him up. Then
one time I told him it ’cause I drank too much coffee.
AIBILEEN
You should have seen his face.
The Help (2014).
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Figure 60, character profile, Abileen Clark, The Help (2014).

Figure 61, character profile, Minny Jackson, The Help (2014).
Aibileen (lead character) raised 17 white children in her lifetime. She is the grieving
mother of Treelore, her friend Minny Jackson is the mother of 5 children, her husband Leroy
often beats her. Minny lost her job recently and became the domestic worker of Celia Foote, who
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is not a mother, but whom Minny ends up taking care of. This character will be revisited later on.
In these two characters, we see an example of the rhizomatic maternal subjectivity; Aibileen is a
grieving mother who is still a mother even though her son is dead; her grief and her job as a
caregiver of white, rich kids are part of her subjectivity, through the film we see Aibileen move
through the different emotions of her identity while we also see how her recognition of herself as
a subject that is no longer subject to the abuse of her employer, but instead as a subject who can
reconstruct herself, the way she wants others to see her and the way she sees herself. We also see
the rhizomatic subjectivity in Minny’s character in the way she mothers each of her children,
while yet not being the same for each of them, in the way she cares for her employer Celia, and
in the ways, she reacts to the abuses around her, from her employer to her husband.
Bring Child to Work
In recent years in The Meg (2018) and Godzilla the King of Monsters (2019), we see
characters of professional mothers with unusual professions and who bring their kids to work.
Both of these characters, Suyin (fig. 44) and Dr. Emma Russel (fig. 43), spend a portion of their
time living near the subjects they study, both creatures that do not exist. Suyin is a marine
biologist researching marine activity and a single mother. In the film, we see her daughter
Meiying with her in the submarine. Her daughter is around four years old and has a few
interactions with the other lead character, Jonas; this dialogue exemplifies how important family
is to Meiying:
SUYIN
Do you have children, Jonas?
JONAS
No. When I was in the Navy, my wife and I kept putting it off...
Then after we got divorced, I focused all my energy on...
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SUYIN
Proving you weren’t crazy.
MEIYING
See, I told you she said you were crazy!
Wait. Does that mean you don’t have a family?
The Meg (2018).
Meiying may hold this notion of family because no matter what, she is with her mother.
On the other hand, the character of Dr. Emma Russel has been questioned by popular
media; some have categorized her as an irresponsible mother for taking her teenage daughter to
work. Emma brings her daughter Madison to live with her at the facilities where she studies
sound waves on creatures like Godzilla. In the article titled “Godzilla: King of the Monsters
Introduces the Worst Mom Ever,” Reuben Baron says that his expectation was for the character
of a mother who has been through the grievance of a child to be overprotective, contrary to the
characterization of Dr. Emma Russell: “Having gone through the trauma of losing a child, you’d
think she’d be protective, maybe even overprotective, of her daughter” (Comic book resources
website 2019). This film critic shows his idea regarding the expected grievance of a child and
how such grievance is attached to good mothering as if there was a correct way to grieve and a
proper way to move from it while still mothering. Perhaps he was expecting a similar reaction as
that of the mothers from horror films.
Unexpected Mothering
The opinion about Dr. Emma Russell is an interpretation based on judgment, but what
about the portrayal of “bad” mothering or what I preferred to call unexpected mothering. It is
interesting to note that—as seen earlier in this chapter—horror films often showcase suicidal and
filicide mothers, even though, according to some statistics, more fathers commit filicide than
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mothers in the USA.49 For example, another film which storyline would not exist without
maternal filicide is Shutter Island (2010); we see the character of Dolores, which later on we
learn has been an illusion/memory of Teddy Daniels as a coping mechanism to forget his wife’s
actions. Dolores drowned their three children, and Teddy Daniels (Andrew’s alter ego named
Laendis) kills her after she asks for it:
Andrew
Baby why are you all wet?

Dolores
I missed you. I wanna go home.

Andrew
You home. Where are the kids? Hmmm

Dolores
They’re in school

Andrew
It’s Saturday, honey. School is not in on Saturday

Dolores
My school is.

Andrew
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Oh, my God! Oh, my God!
Shutter Island (2010), 1:58:55.
Andrew swims to the lake and attempts to give them air; he pulls each of his kids out of the lake.
He lays them all on the floor and kisses them. Dolores comes back to him:
Dolores
Let’s put them at the table Andrew. We’ll dry them off. We’ll
chance their clothes. They’ll be our living dolls. Huh. Tomorrow
we can take them on a picnic.
Andrew
If you ever loved me, Dolores, please stop talking.
Dolores
I love you.
Set me free.
Andrew
Oh, baby.
Dolores
We’ll give them baths.
Shutter Island (2010), 2:01:52.
As they exchange a few “I love you”, Andrew shoots her to death (fig. 62).
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Figure 62, screenshot, from Sutter Island (2010).
This film showcases another unsolvable puzzle of cases neglected in the US American society,
serving as another lens of the complexity of the mind, mental health, and neglect. The thriller is
constructed in a way that the spectator can have empathy even for those who committed a crime,
Dolores and Andrew. But still, it showcases the mother as an unstable mental being instead of
highlighting the father’s neglect and alcoholism as the cause for maternal filicide. Do mothers
who commit filicide hold any type of subjectivity, or can we argue that they are able to commit
such crimes as a result of detachment from the self and from others? One can argue that
Andrew’s neglect to recognize Dolores as a subject led her to accept her de-subjectification,
leading to depression and despair and resulting in her maternal filicide.
War Mothers
Other films in which the father’s role is placed at a higher level as the protector while the
mother continues to stay within the confinement of the labor of care within the household are
war-related films. In The Patriot (2000), the mother is absent; without her absence, the figure of
the main character’s ideology would not have the same impact. One of the moments of conflicts
within the film is when Martin expresses his abstinence to cast a vote in favor of proceeding with
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the war:
Martin is silent for a long moment. He softens and grows
unsteady, speaking far more honestly than he ever wanted to.
Martin
I have seven children. My wife is dead. Who’s to care for them
if I go to war?
Lee is stunned by Marin’s honesty and his show of weakness. At
first Lee has no answer, then:
Lee
Wars are not fought only by childless men. A man must weigh his
personal responsibilities against his principles.
Martin
That’s what I’m doing. I will not fight and because I won’t, I
will not cast a vote that will send others to fight in my stead.
Lee
And your principles?
Martin
I’m a parent, I don’t have the luxury of principles.

The Patriot (2000), 19/142.
Script provided for educational purposes by Selling Your Screenplay
On the other hand, in Lincoln (2012), we see the mother as the angry never-ending grieving
parent of war; here, Mary is arguing with Lincoln because he is choosing to allow the war to
continue and his son to fight in it:
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MARY
The war will take our son! A sniper, or a shrapnel shell! Or
typhus, same as took Willie, it takes hundreds of boys a day!
He’ll die, uselessly, and how will I ever forgive you? Most men,
their firstborn is their favorite, but you, you’ve always blamed
Robert for being born, for trapping you in a marriage that’s
only ever given you grief and caused you regret!
While in the dark comedy Inglorious Basterds (2009), the mother is presented as that to whom
young soldiers wish to return to:
LT. ALDO
Now say we let ya go, and say you survive the war? When you get
back home, what’ cha gonna do?
PVT. BUTZ
I will hug my mother like I’ve never hugged her before.
Lincoln (2012).
In this short dialogue, we see the mother as a place of comfort even after one has witness pain,
death, and despair. Although in the case of this particular dialogue of Inglorious Basterd, it
would have been a NAZI mom, and the opportunities of such analysis have other possibilities.
Neither of these films aligns with Sara Ruddick’s proposal of maternal thinking towards peace.
Instead, we see the mother as a place of comfort and in a role of care whose peaceful proposal
only serves her own and not the country or a community.
Films of war are not the only films that present moments of a near-death experience as a
moment to return to the womb and the mother. For example, in the sci-fi/action film Lucy
(2014), the leading character with the same name accidentally gets a chemical component into
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her bloodstream; this component accelerates her mental and sensorial capabilities. When she
learns the consequences will be lethal, she calls her mother for the last conversation; during their
conversation, she shares with her mom the following:
LUCY
I remember the softness of your breast... the taste of your milk
in my mouth... the walls of your vagina on my face.
LUCY’S MOM
Sweetie, what are you talking about?
LUCY
I just want you to know that I love you, mom. You and Dad. And I
want to thank you for the thousand kisses you gave me that I can
still feel on my face. I love you, mom.
Lucy (2014).
In this sci-fi film, the idea of a child forever remembering the experiences in the womb, as well
as every kiss they received from their mother, is another way of presenting the child/mother bond
as one that is impenetrable and will last forever. This is also a fictional way of supporting how
such experiences influence one’s subjectivity. One can only ask why Lucy did not speak with her
dad? Was that a possibility during the screenwriting process? After all, she did mention she also
loves her dad, but there are no details about the affection between them, not to the extend of
being memorable at this near-end experience.
Comedy
While there are characters of mothers who are worth remembering at near-death
experiences, there are also the not-so-great or even bad mothers; there are more commonly
portrait through comedy and drama genres. For example, in The Heat (2013), Mullins visits her
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family, and the following is the conversation we overhear as she is approaching the front door:
Voice
This is the place where
you’re supposed to be civilized!
Peter
Be a mother
for once in your life.
The Heat (2013).
This is followed by a back and forth bickering between Mullins and her brothers, until Mullins
mother returns to the dining table:
Mother
Here are the nuggies!
Mullins
Here we go.
Mother
What kind of an animal throws
her own brother in jail?
Michael
This kind of animal... right here! Shut up.
Mullins
How about keeps him
from killing himself?
The Heat (2013).
At no point do we know why we hear Peter’s voice say “be a mother”, but what follows is a
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funny representation of what could be different ways of interpreting protecting your child or
ways of showing care for loved ones. In an earlier scene from that same day, we learned that
Mullins mother is upset at her because she arrested Jason (one of her siblings); while Mullins and
Ashburn were walking on the sidewalk, someone hunks at them and sticks their middle finger:
Ashburn
Who was that?
Mullins
My mum
The Heat (2013).
Here the mother is not presented as good or bad but as that who will favor the protection of their
kids no matter the cost, even if that means picking sides between her own children.
Bad Mothers
In the drama 8 Miles (2002), one of the supporting roles is an alcoholic mother who is in
an abusive relationship and who shares her intimate relationship problems with her young adult
son:
Stephanie
Me and Greg are having problems
Rabbit
He found our about the eviction?
Stephanie
No
Rabbit
The settlement check ain’t coming?
Stephanie
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No. It’s comin’
Stephanie
No. It’s comin’… It’s our… It’s our sex life.
Rabbit
Mom I don’t want to hear this shit.
Stephanie
I mean, it’s good. It’s real good. But he doesn’t like…
Rabbit
Mom, I don’t want to hear this
Stephanie
Greg won’t go down on me.
8 Miles (2002).
This film, 8 Miles, portraits the mother as a poor, alcoholic, sexual being who is more concerned
about her sex life than caring for her young child as part of the journey for its main character to
become who he is. This portrayal is another example of how maternal beings are portrait in
vilified ways, as if being unemployed or with low income living in a trailer park home was a
choice. The problem is not the portrayal of the characters but what is not included; perhaps if we
have one or two examples of how Stephanie became a mother or how she ended up in this
situation, we can understand the reason for her type of mothering. In a later scene, Rabbit returns
home, and he finds his mom outside crying and his sister by herself inside their trailer home:
STEPHANIE:
Mom. Mom come on. Get up. Come on. Come on. Greg left me.
STEPHANIE
His settlement check came in.
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And now that he’s got money...
he can’t be with
somebody like me no more.
It’s Thursday. I got to go to bingo. Maybe he’ll be there.
JIMMY/RABBIT
You ain’t going nowhere. You’re better off without him.
STEPHANIE
Stop it! It’s your fault he left me! You ruined it!
You fucked it all up for me!
Who’s gonna want me now?
Where are we gonna live?
We don’t have any money!
We don’t have anything!
What am I gonna do?
What am I gonna do?
JIMMY/RABBIT
What are you gonna do? Lily’s out there by herself! Why do you
have to be like this? What’d we ever do to you?
STEPHANIE
Get the fuck out of my house! Get the fuck out of my house!
JIMMY/RABBIT
We’re going next door, okay? We’re getting out of here. His mom
makes fun of him
8 Miles (2002).
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In this dialogue, we hear Jimmy’s mom blame him for her boyfriend leaving her; when
she says, “Who’s gonna want me now?” it makes me wonder how did she become a mother?
What is her subjectivity? How does she see herself?
Although we had often seen these dichotomies of characters of the mother being
represented as ideal good mothers or as vilified ones, it is not until films like Motherhood (2009),
I don’t know how she does it (2011) and more recently, Bad Moms (2016) and A Bad Moms
Christmas (2017), where we not only see the mother at the leading role but their mothering at the
center of the narrative, moreover the ideals of good versus bad mothering as a key component for
the development of the film. To some extent, all of these films question the institution of
motherhood, from its de-sexualization to the hyper labor of mothering, including the loss of
sense of self. While at the same time, all of these films have the same problem, all the narratives
are presented through comedy, and they are all centered around the narrative of an educated
white middle-class female.
Animated Mothers
In the previous chapter, I presented some animated characters of mothers to showcase the
representation of mothers outside of the traditional human canon. Here I would like to focus on a
different aspect of animated films regarding the maternal figure and/or the mother. As we had
seen, the predominant analyses of motherhood and its social prescriptions tend to surround the
desire adults have to bear children, and films are no different. But, when we look at animated
films, we see the other side of such desire, the desire of a child to have a mother. Many animated
films have an absent mother, but not just as an absentee that gears the plot or conflict of a
story—like in superheroes narratives—, but their desire to have a mother or to know who she
was as part of their own becomings is part of the young character’s development.
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We can see an example of this with Agnes and Lucy from Despicable Me 2 (2013); in
this film, we see both the desire of the children to have a mother as well as examples of possible
“becomings” of the future stepmom, Lucy whom acts in a caring way with all three of Gru’s
children throughout the film. Despicable Me 2 ends with Lucy’s and Gru’s wedding. As a result,
she becomes the adoptive mother of Margo, Edith, and Agnes; the following quote exemplifies
another side of motherhood, the child’s side. This is the toast Agnes gave at Gru’s and Lucy’s
wedding:
AGNES
Uh...hi, everybody! I’d like to make some toast. Uh... She
um...she um, kisses my boo-boos. She braids my hair.
We love you mothers, everywhere!
And my new mom Lucy is beyond compare.
Despicable Me 2 (2013).
In other animated films like Kung Fu Panda 2 (2011) and Ice Age Meltdown (2006), we see the
side of adoptive parents, here we have two characters Po and Ellie, respectively, both are animals
raised by a different species, but who don’t realize their differences nor that they were adopted
until later in the film. Po is a panda raised by a goose, and Ellie is a mammoth raised by a
possum. Both Po and Ellie felt so loved and included within their adoptive families that even
though they looked different than their parents and siblings (respectively), they realized they
were adopted later into adulthood. Lastly, we have the strong mother warrior in How to Train
Your Dragon 2 (2014); here, we have the absent mother reappearing. Through the first film, we
learn of her disappearance, and in the second film, her son (with his dragon) find her; she is a
caring mother whose care and love are shown through her fearless fighting against those who
wish to harm her community, maybe we can classify her as an activist mom or a mom in politics,
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she was the leader of in the leader of the tribe.

Figure 63, character profile, Valka Haddock, How to Train Your Dragon (2014).
WiR and Mothers from Films based in Comic Books
One of the most apparent growing trends in film themes is films based on comic books
(see fig. 64) and superheroes themes. Notably, these films have proven to be at the top of the
grossing charts, producing billions in profits. This section will bring forward one of the problems
surrounding female characters within the comic books culture, which is carried through its films’
culture. We can call it an inherited narrative problem.
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Films from the Top 25 Grossing Films Based on Comic Book Characters
from 2000-2019
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Figure 64, Films from the Top 25 Grossing Films from 2000-2019 Based on Comic Book
Characters.
In 1999 Gail Simone, a writer of comic books best known for D.C. Birds of Prey, coined
the term WiR (women in refrigerators). Simone and other comic book fans created the website
Women in Refrigerators after they encounter a scene in Green Lantern #54 (fig. 65) where the
hero’s girlfriend is killed and left inside a refrigerator for him to find. This scene in the comic
book prompted Simone to collaborate with others to create a list of female characters in comics.
In one of the site’s articles, she states that “it’s not healthy to be a female character in comics”
(WiR website 1999). Furthermore, Simone reminds us that “these are super heroines who have
been either depowered, raped, or cut up and stuck in the refrigerator” (WiR website 1999). As
such, WiR has become a term used to refer to the tragic treatment and death of female characters
in comics—which contrary to their male counterpart—do not lead her towards heroism.
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Figure 65, Excerpt from Green Lantern #54.
But the most disturbing refrigeration is that which goes beyond fictional characters, one
that brings everything back to (m)others and the gaze. This is the term refrigerator mothers; the
term was created in 1949 by Leo Kanner, who argued that his study concludes that children with
autism, and schizophrenia, lacked maternal warmth. As such, the term was widely used until
1964. In PBS documentary Refrigerator Mothers (2003), the effects of Kanner’s article is
presented as one that complicated the life of the mothers of disabled children due to the label
placed upon them. This documentary circles back to our initial argument, the effect of the gaze,
and the categorization of mothers to their subjectivity. Furthermore, it also supports the
conclusion that we need characters that challenge the philosophical traditions of the
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commodification of the female body in service of creating, nurturing, and maintaining life,
justified by biological predispositions masqueraded as social prescriptions of motherhood. We
need to continue the labor to include other voices to expand our understanding of the other.
This inclusion is essential for our analysis because the films based on comic books and
films inspired by comic books also show this trend of WiR, mainly by the erasure or invisibility
of the characters. While at the same time, we had seen in more recent years better female
representation in this type of film, even the inclusion of topics related to female reproduction and
mothering. Moreover, to show a comparison of how multiple mediums fail on representation and
how we can work on amending these by welcoming the discourse and making room for others to
imagine their stories.
Most of these films have strong female characters, and films like Wonder Woman (2017),
The Avengers (2012), Ant-Man and the Wasp (2018), and the latest installment of Black Widow
(2021), showcase powerful female characters front and center. But, do we have any mothers at
the center of the narrative where her role goes beyond her mothering? Superhero universes are
full of absent parents to the extent that many heroes will not exist without the event of their
parent’s death, Peter Parker (Spider-Man), Tony Stark (Iron Man), Bruce Wayne (Batman),
Clark Kent (Superman), and many others. In another well-known comic book-based film series,
the majority of the superheroes are orphans, or their parents had agreed to have them in a
boarding school for kids with special abilities; this is the X-Men series. This series also has a
series of films, ten up to date plus the two Deadpool films which are connected.
Out of the films evaluated, we have a total of 58 films based on a comic book saga (fig.
66), and only one mother at a leading role, this is Louis Lane (fig. 67), who is the mother of
Jason White, Clark Kent’s biological son. As for supporting roles, we have a total of twelve
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mothers in a supporting role (fig. 70); out of these twelve mothers, none are superheroes, but one
former employee at S.H.I.E.L.D. and one was the sidekick of a superhero
Characters of Mothers at a Leading and Supporting Role in Comic Book
Inspired Films From the Top 25 Grossing Films 2000-2019
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Films Based on Comic Book Characters

Leading Mothers

Mother at a Supporting Role

Figure 66, Characters of Mothers at a Leading and Supporting Role in Comic Book Inspired
Films from the Top 25 Grossing Films from 2000-2019.

Figure 67, character profile, Louis Lane, Superman Returns (2006).
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The analogy of refrigeration has been used in other instances within comic book culture to
identify the limits of the narrative of female characters to cruel deaths and events. For example,
John Bartol—a CBR contributor—uses the term DMD (dead men defrosting) to identify the
opposite; when men in comics go through a traumatic event that they must overcome, they
become heroes, or their lives are improved. As such, some of the representations of (m)others we
had seen in the films evaluated fall under the WiR. Including women who had abortions,
miscarriages, are sterilized without consent, and whom bodies are commodified.
Non-Mothers
As noted in the prior chapter, economists and feminist philosophers had used women’s
choices to have—or not—children as part of their categorization for mothers. This next section
looks at childfree women, regardless of whether this was their choice or not. Therefore, we will
look at a few characters that fall under the category of abortion, miscarriage, or the social
pressure of the biological clock. In the film Prometheus (2012), Elizabeth Shaw is impregnated
with an alien against her wishes; when she finds out, she asks David—an android that assists
humans in their interstellar expedition—to remove the fetus. David response is not in favor of
Elizabeth’s desires:
David
My, my...
You’re pregnant.
Elizabeth Shaw
What?
David
From the look of it, three months.
Elizabeth Shaw
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Well that’s impossible.
I can’t be pregnant.
David
Did you have intercourse with Dr. Holloway?
Elizabeth Shaw
Yes, but ten hours ago.
There’s no bloody way
I’m three months pregnant.
David
Well doctor, it’s not
exactly a traditional fetus.
Elizabeth Shaw
I want to see
David
Don’t think
Elizabeth Shaw
David, I want
David
Now doctor...
Elizabeth Shaw
I want to see
I want it out of me
David
I’m afraid we don’t have personnel to perform the procedure like
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that. Our best option...
Elizabeth Shaw
I want it out.
David
To put you back into cryostasis...
Elizabeth Shaw
David, get it out of me.
Get it out of me! Please...
Prometheus (2012), 1:18:13.
Shortly after their argument, David sedates her, but Elizabeth’s desire to remove the alien fetus is
greater, and she manages to escape and run towards the Med Pod, a robotic pod designed to
operate and treat. Elizabeth goes to the pod and says:
ELIZABETH SHAW
I need cesarean.
FEMALE COMPUTER VOICE
Error. This Med-Pod is calibrated for male patients only and
does not offer…
ELIZABETH SHAW
Shit
FEMALE COMPUTER VOICE
… the procedure requested
Prometheus (2012), 1:21:30.
Elizabeth proceeds to type commands for emergency abdominal surgery, goes inside the pod,
and self-directs the computer to initiate the procedure and remove the alien (fig. 68). She slides
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out, closes the pod with the moving alien inside, and initiates decontaminated procedure. Since
the alien has been growing at a faster rate than a human fetus, the procedure requested to
terminate this pregnancy was a cesarean section which is traditionally used to deliver infants
surgically by cutting through the abdominal walls of the pregnant individual. But this scene has
also come to be known as a sci-fi abortion; while leaving the hanging question of why the medpod was designed only for male bodies?

Figure 68, screenshots, C-section scene, Prometheus (2012).
An even more neglected theme in films is miscarriages; in The Help (2011), one of the characters
experiences a miscarriage, and her domestic worker assists in her care. Celia shares with Minny
she is pregnant, and she also shares she has had several miscarriages in the past; a few
days/weeks after hiring Minny, Celia has a miscarriage. Soon after the scene where Minny is
caring for her, we see Celia burying the fetus box (fig. 69) and planting a flower over it. We
noticed at least two other flowers/burials (fig. 70).
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Figure 69, screenshot, Celia’s Garden, The Help (2011).

Figure 70, screenshot, Celia’s Garden, The Help (2011).
To this type of character list, we can add the massive involuntary sterilization of women in
service of a cause or government. Such is the case of Natasha Romanoff (Black Widow). She is
in love with Bruce, and in Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015), they argue about their future as a
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couple based on their capabilities to have children:
BRUCE/HULK
Natasha, where can I go?
Where in the world am I not a threat?
NATASHA/BLACK WIDOW
You’re not a threat to me.
BRUCE/HULK
Are you sure? Even if I didn’t just...
There’s no future with me.
I can’t ever... I can’t have this. Kids.
Do the math. I physically can’t.
NATASHA/BLACK WIDOW
Neither can I.
In the Red Room where I was trained... where I was raised, they
have a graduation ceremony. They sterilize you. It’s efficient.
One less thing to worry about. The one thing that might matter
more than a mission. Makes everything easier. Even killing. You
still think you’re the only monster on the team?
Avengers: Age of Ultron (2015), 1:07:50.
In this dialogue, we can unpack multiple ideas that connect to social expectations, the
self, and how others see those who are outside of the social expectations. First, we have Bruce’s
point of having kids, as if that was necessary for their happiness; he thought Natasha wanted a
family with kids. Second, we hear about Natasha’s involuntary sterilization—the details of this
will be given in the most recent film with the character Black Widow (2021). And thirdly, we
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hear about how such sterilization influences the way in which Natasha sees herself because of
how she thinks society sees her as a monster.
In the theory evaluated in prior chapters, in regards to maternal subjectivity and maternal
philosophy, little to none is said about child-free women or mothers who have abortions. When
Elisabeth Badinter speaks about childless women, she only evaluates this choice as it relates to
work choices. More attention has been paid to acknowledge individuals, particularly women,
who are child-free by choice in more recent years.
Female Bodies as Objects
To conclude this chapter, let us briefly look at the many iterations of childrearing and
mothering in the post-apocalyptic film Mad Max: Fury Road (2015). In this post-apocalyptic
patriarchal society, women are treated as commodities justified by their biological capacity to
give life and nurture, while others reminiscence about the space where they used to survive and
create a matriarchal community. As part of the Citadel lead by Immortan Joe, female biological
capabilities are categorized and commodified for the benefit of few. The breeders, also known as
the wives, are young women selected to carry and birth Joe’s children (fig. 71); these are
portrayed as beautiful young women. There are also the milking mothers (fig. 72); these are
women who had already birthed children and whose sole purpose now is to provide breastmilk;
they are portrayed as naked fat ladies with breast pumps attached to their bodies. Lastly, we have
the vuvalini (fig. 73), also known as the many mothers’ tribe, a matriarchal tribe that used to live
in the green place; Furiosa, the lead character of the film, is a descendant of the vuvalini.
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Figure 71, screenshot, The Wives, Mad Max: Fury Road (2015).

Figure 72, screenshot, Milk Mothers, Mad Max: Fury Road (2015).
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Figure 73, screenshot, Vuvalini, Mad Mad: Fury Road (2015).
This film exemplifies how films can do philosophy and showcases the matters presented
through the first section of this project, the predisposition to see the female bodies as a
commodity for patriarchal societies but also as a conduit for liberation by maintaining and
creating life. On the one hand, we have the citadel’s categorization and commodification of the
female body, while on the other, we have Furiosa’s desire to liberate women and return to the
vuvalini way, where women raise children together while they work on maintaining a green land
in a post-apocalyptic scenario, by caring for one another. Eventually, the green space turned into
a swamp due to the toxicity of the land, but the vuvalini’s Seed Keeper continues to safeguard
the seeds, and those who still survived, will continue to look for suitable land to create new life.
These are just a few highlights from some of the existing characters of mothers in films
from 2000-2019. But the hanging question continues to be, from within the films evaluated for
this study, which types of mothers are not included and who have been invisibilized by these
narratives. Also, which narratives, if any, have included them. Just to mention a few, we need
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more characters of mothers that showcase the socio-economic, ethnic, and racial differences of
the United States of America. We need stories that celebrate otherness and diversity outside of
apocalyptic scenarios. We need characters of mothers that share the labor of care with the other
parent. We need narratives that allow us to see the gruesomeness of trying to do it all: putting
food on the table, caring for children physically and emotionally outside of the extremes of being
affluent or poor. We need to defrost our maternal characters in films and in real life.
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CONCLUSION
An Epilogue for (M)others, Welcome Home!
This project, began with the need to answer many questions, and the process, more
questions arise, as the research unfold and the interconnection of modes of thinking and
aesthetics was evident. The initial question that guided the path of this project is: How does
maternal representation and the gaze of mothers and (m)others influence and affect the
subjectivity of all mothers, particularly of those mothers who are positioned as others by societal
prescriptions? Throughout the manuscript I argue that the representation and performances of
fictional characters of mothers in US American media impact maternal subjectivity, maternal
otherness, and the maternal gaze.
To prove my argument the project embarked close to four years research to unpack the
philosophical ideas that turned mothers into an other. Through the research it was evident that
philosophical intertextuality alone would not be enough to support the argument. As a result I
embarked an intertextual approach that connects philosophical traditions, decolonial theories,
film-philosophy and economics to better understand the displacement of mothers into a societal
other and the still prevalent dispossession that many mothers encounter. This project makes
significant contribution to all four areas: philosophy, decolonial theory, film-philosophy, and
economics, while recognizing the projects that are currently being conducted and managed by
academic and media institution including the initiatives from The Media Impact Project and the
Center for the Study of Women in Television & Film. The distinction of this research is that this
is the first project that merges economics and philosophy and its relation to aesthetics, the mother
and subjectivity. In an era where most of the information is consumed through moving images, it
is important we begin to deconstruct the effects this images and narratives have upon our
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becomings. While recognizing film studies has been deconstructing the impact of moving images
on our becomings; is important to highlight this project address areas that have been excluded
from film studies: mothers and (m)others.
The first chapter looked at the history of the philosophical displacement of women as
non-thinking beings who were better fit to birth children and to care for them in the private
sphere. One of the key contributions of this chapter is the unveiling of female philosophers who
challenged the ideas that pushed them to the margins. Among the philosophers included we
encounter the ideas of Christine Pizan, Marie de Gournay, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, and Lady
Damaris Masham, their ideas served as a pivoting point to assert that not only women have
always been thinking beings, but that women have also produced and contributed to the
philosophical canon and that they are swiped under the rug by the predominant philosophical
academic platforms. Pizan, Sor Juana, De Gournay, and Masham defended the women’s rights in
various sectors of their communities, the last three argue in favor of the education of women.
Pizan highlighted the philosophical, theological and political contributions of many women who
preceded her. Sor Juana, highlighted the power structure that led to the oppression of women in
the catholic church, while moving forward a variety of arguments through her sonets. De
Gournay argues in favor of the education of women as the path to achieve equality between men
and women. Lastly, Masham, argues for the education of women, particularly because these are
the potential mothers who will be the first teachers of the future citizens. All of these women
engage in direct discourse with the thinkers of their time and region while contributing
significantly to mapping the road for us to understand female bodied displacement and
dispossessions.
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In chapter one we began with these early philosophers, male and females, we saw the
recurrent displacement of women into motherhood by male thinkers, and the counterargument by
some female thinkers like Masham who responded rethorically that this is why women deserve
education, because they are better at caring for the future citizens and as such need to be
educated themselves, in service of educating others. By the end of the chapter we arrive into the
specific topic of maternal subjectivity and how Sara Ruddick open a door with her ideas of
maternal thinking, here we also began to notice how motherhood has an otherhood, when
Ruddick frames maternal thinking to politics of peace which are limited to warfare. Ruddick also
states that anyone can be maternal, which is problematic because as we saw through the
manuscript that only feeds the maternal myth narrative as one where the female parent is who
better perform care, and their type of care is something males can perform only by acquiring the
female qualities of care. From it, we ask what is maternal subjectivity and which power
structures have prevented females who are mothers to recognize it.
Then, in chapter two we dive into what is subjectivity and how women—particularly
mothers—had been desubjectified by a series of power structures. In the process of
understanding both the subjectification and the desubjectification of mothers, the chapter
presents and evaluates what Michel Foucault, and Simone de Beauvoir say about power
structures. We also consider Marion Young’s decolonial ideas. The chapter makes connections
between legal structures, parenting structures and the loss of recognition. At the same time, it
moves forward an argument that contributes to maternal philosophy, it demonstrates that to
decolonize maternal subjectivity we must acknowledge it as rhizomatic and not limited to a split
of the self. Moreover, it argues that maternal subjectivity is a continuous flux of the evolution of
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the self that can move from itself and the influences of others. Not a before and after being a
mother, but a transition through the rhizome of the mother self.
The argument for maternal subjectivity as rhizomatic paved the way into the third chapter
of this manuscript, one that focus on defining the mother who seems to be absent from the
progression of thoughts presented in chapters one and two, this are the (m)others. This chapter
looks at the meaning of the word mother and its etymology, furthering the analysis into how the
Western predominant canons of mother/father as a binary concept grounded on Judeo-Christian
ideals. To prove this argument, the chapter presents some cosmogony stories and myths from
around the world, to expand the understanding of the ideas of the origin of the universe, care and
being, beyond the binaries of male/female, father/mothers.
From the myths and cosmogonic stories we moved to the mother as an other, including
and not limited to LGBTQ+ parenting which clearly disrupts the contemporary way of seeing
parents as limited to the gender roles of mother/father. This chapter makes a significant
contribution by defining the term (m)other. A term that has been used to refer to several things
from the mother tongue and an other to thinking mothers as an other, but which none of the
theorists mentioned had defined. I define (m)others as the mothers who are grouped outside of
the dominant maternal discourse, but whom are within, as such we must considered them, their
ideas, their aesthetics and their becomings.
To better understand the displacement of (m)others and the decolonial approaches to
assert their existence as subjects and not objects, I dedicated chapter four to evaluating maternal
politics and the dispossession of maternal bodies and their spaces. This chapter looks into the
meaning of maternal politics and the role of the mother as an activist and as a political subject. In
it I argued that the patriarchal western tradition seen in the previous chapters demonstrates how it
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has dispossessed women from their rights to choose what to do with their bodies and what spaces
to navigate—physical and mental.
Chapter four looked at how the mother has been used as an agent for peace and war, for
love and hate. But more importantly, I present that once a mother asserts her selfhood, she can
perform herself as an activist of as a political being. Observing at the dispossession of mothers
provides another entry towards the understanding of maternal subjectivity as rhizomatic and its
connection to politics, personal and publics politics. By recognizing the dispossession of some
mothers one can better understand the displacement towards the margins and the
desubjectification of (m)others. By connecting the dots of the dispossession of mothers, and the
colonial mentality carried through Judeo-Christian ideals, we can better understand the moved
within philosophy, maternal thinking and maternal politics. But then we continue to wonder if
that is something from the past of whether these ideas are still in our present, and we find
ourselves back at the original question, thinking about the effects media has in the way we think
of others and ourselves, and this led us to thinking about the gaze and about the film industry.
In chapter five I go into the analysis of film economics and its connection to the gaze
economy. The concept of the gaze economy is another key contribution of this project, I had seen
the mentioning of gaze economy in titles of articles about performance arts and about the
analysis of the cover of magazines, but none of this define it. I define gaze economy as the
constant flux of exchange between the one who sees and the once who is being seen. The gaze
economy is not limited to aesthetics, we engage in the gaze economy every time we walk down a
street of ride public transportation, we participate in these exchanges of looking constantly,
without realizing it influences us in a variety of ways. The gaze economy influences how we see
ourselves, how we see ourselves in the world and how we see the other.
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But, another significant contribution of this research is the connection between the
political economy of the gaze and economics, from the way in which neuromarketing uses their
findings to influence the products that go into the market, all the way to film economics. This
chapter presents that contrary to other aesthetic mediums, film/cinema has always been
connected to profits, from its early productions till the present. The film industry is one of the
fastest industries in the United States of America, chapter five also presents the data of the
contribution the film industry makes to US American economics. This data is presented in
contrast to the predominant discourse of the gaze, starting with the psychoanalytical tradition and
moving towards the decolonial and sociological approach, to land us into the maternal gaze.
This research concludes that due to the gaze economy, we must expand our definition and
understanding of the maternal gaze. As presented in chapter five, maternal gaze is traditionally
seen as the gaze between mother and child, but the maternal gaze also includes all the other looks
a mother receives and all the other looks a mother gives. The maternal gaze includes the gaze of
one mother toward another mother, herself and the gaze of the mother by those who support her
parenting, from their co-parent to family, friends, paid support and more. The maternal gaze is
polyphonic and in constant shift, as such it influences their maternal subjectivity as rhizomatic.
Chapter six pays close attention to the connection between the gaze economy and
subjectivity. Here we look at the gaze economy as a political economy that influences economics
and vice versa. This chapter recognizes previous forms of analyzing media, particularly film, this
includes the Bechdel-Wallace Test, and The Celluloid Ceiling Report. In this chapter I explain
the method I employed to collect, and record the data presented in chapters six, seven and eight.
By looking at film economics, I was able to identify the trends in the industry: in 2000 an
average of 500 films were released, by the year 2019 that number increased to an average of
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4,000 films per year. As such I decided to limit the scope of my study to the films that have a
higher probability of influencing most number of individuals. I determined that the higher the
sales the higher probability that more people watch those films and were somehow influenced by
it. As such, I determined to look at the top 25 grossing films from each year from 2000 to 2019,
totaling to 500 films. Since the fall of 2017 until summer 2021 I watched all 500 films and
recorded information about the characters of each film. The data from those observations is
presented in chapters seven and eight.
As a result, I classified the data into groups that can help us observe the common
classifications of mothers into types, either for the sake of the story or as a continuum of the
philosophical and economics tradition of classification. In chapter seven I present data related to
the type of characters of mothers as leading or supporting roles. Concluding that out of 500 films
evaluated, a 13.4% of the films had mothers at a leading role and 37.4% had characters of
mothers at a supporting role. In a future study it would be interesting to see how these numbers
compared to the US Census for these years to determine with greater accuracy the
disproportionate representation in film. Other classifications presented in chapter seven is
whether these characters are biological mothers or non-biological mothers, how many of these
characters are human or non-human, their race, marital status, employment status and their age.
These findings illustrate the evident dearth on representation, where the majority of the
characters of mothers have one child, are employed, married, and Caucasian, proving our initial
claim that there is a dearth of representation in the characters and narratives presented. In a
future study we can apply the Bechdel-Wallace test to these films and see how the findings
compare and whether it showcases an even wider gap of representation:
1. It has to have at least two [named] mothers in it
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2. Who talk to each other
3. About something besides their kids
Also, the methodology implemented in this study can be applied to other marginalized
individuals in our society to further study the effects film has on their subjectivity.
These chapters, one through seven led us to the conclusion that there is a dearth of
representation in the top 25 most grossing films in US American media. That invisibility has a
negative impact upon one’s subjectivity by desubjectivizing us. But then we had the hanging
question of what effect of the current representation has upon one’s subjectivity? To answer that
question, chapter eight looked at some of the characters found in the top 25 films and some who
represent a (m)other but are not in the top 25 films, furthering showcasing how in film, like in
philosophy there is a tendency to see the mother as an object and not a subject. As presented in
chapter eight, we cannot say this is a result of film being a reflection of our social reality or
perception, because even in sci-fi, post-apocalyptic and horror films we see the tendency to
follow a patriarchal train of thought and the objectification of the female body into performances
of care. The role of the mother continues to be presented as the one who can best perform the
labor of care and not as a partner in the labor of care. Consequently, it is imperative that mothers
be seen as persons and not solely as objects of labor.
Lastly, I want to conclude that acknowledging the existence of (m)others and the
historicity of the dispossession and displacement of their bodies and ideas from any predominant
discourse, from philosophy to politics and aesthetics is the first step towards its decolonization.
When it comes to the mass media production of film and television in the United States of
America, we are noticing a slow move toward inclusion. Most of these inclusions are in
streaming platforms which only take us into more questions for future research. At the moment
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we will conclude the gaze economy influences maternal subjectivity, particularly those who are
underrepresented, misrepresented or completely invisibilized. There is a need to revolutionize
the film industry, we need more voices of underrepresented communities to sit at the table of
every department, from executive producer, writers, directors, editors, directors of photography,
actors, and the thousands of workers at each department. It is time to make room for other
individuals to represent themselves to the other in the way they see themselves.
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Appendix A
List of women mentioned in The Book of the City of Ladies by Christine Pizan (completed
by 1405)
From the archives of Penguin Press
Thirty-Three Women are mentioned in Part I:
Mary Magdalene
Queen of Sheba
Fredegund
Blanche of Castile
Jeanne d'Évreux
Blanche of France
Marie of Blois
Semiramis
Amazons: Thamiris, Menalippe, Hippolyta, Penthesilea, Synoppe, Lampheto, Marpesia, Orithyia
Zenobia
Artemisia II of Caria
Lilia, mother of Theodoric
Camilla
Laodice of Cappadocia
Cloelia
Cornificia
Faltonia Betitia Proba
Sappho
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Manto
Medea
Circe
Carmenta
Minerva
Ceres
Isis
Arachne
Pamphile
Thamaris
Irene
Iaia
Sempronia
Woman of Valor
Gaia Cirilla
Dido
Ops
Lavinia
Ninety-two Women are mentioned in Part II:
Erythraean Sibyl
Cumaean Sibyl
Deborah
Elizabeth (biblical figure)
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Anna the Prophetess
Queen of Sheba
Cassandra
Basina of Thuringia
Carmenta
Theodora (wife of Justinian I)
Dripetrua
Hypsipyle
the virgin Claudine
Roman Charity
Griselda (folklore)
Hypsicratea
Triaria
Artemisia I of Caria
Argea
Agrippina the Elder
Julia (daughter of Julius Caesar)
Aemilia Tertia
Xanthippe
Pompeia Paulina
Sulpicia (wife of Lentulus Cruscellio)
Lacedaemonian women who saved their husbands from execution
Porcia Catonis
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Curia (wife of Quintus Lucretius)
Cornelia Metella
Andromache
Stateira II
Mary, mother of Jesus
Stateira II
Bithia
Judith of the Book of Judith
Esther
The Rape of the Sabine Women
Veturia
Clotilde
Catulla
Saint Genevieve
Hortensia (orator)
Novella d'Andrea
Susanna (Book of Daniel)
Sarah
Rebecca
Ruth (biblical figure)
Penelope
Mariamne I
Antonia Minor
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Sulpitia
Lucretia
Chiomara
Hippo (Greek woman)
Sicambrian women
Verginia
Claudia Octavia
Claudia Antonia
Athaliah
Jezebel
Brunhilda of Austrasia
Florence of Rome
Wife of Bernabo the Genovan
Leaena
Dido
Medea
Thisbe
Hero of Hero and Leander
Ghismonda of Salerno
Lisabetta of Messina
Dame de Fayel
Dame de Vergi
Iseult
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Deianira
Juno (mythology)
Europa (mythology)
Jocasta
Medusa
Helen of Troy
Polyxena
Claudia Quinta
Blanche of Castile
Busa of Canosa di Puglia
Marguerite, Dame de la Riviere
Isabeau of Bavaria
Joan of Armagnac
Valentina Visconti, Duchess of Orléans
Margaret of Bavaria
Marie, Duchess of Auvergne
Margaret of Burgundy, Duchess of Bavaria
Isabella of Valois
Marie of Savoy, Countess of Saint-Pol
Anne de Bourbon
Thirty-Seven Women are mentioned in Part III:
The Virgin Mary
The Virgin Mary's sisters and Mary Magdalene
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Saint Catherine of Alexandria
Saint Margaret of Antioch
Saint Lucy
Blessed Martina
Saint Lucy (different than the Saint Lucy above)
Saint Benedicta
Saint Fausta
Saints Cyprian and Justina
Blessed Eulalia
Saint Macra
Saint Fida
Blessed Marciana
Saint Euphemia
Blessed Theodosina
Saint Barbara
Saint Dorothy
Saint Cecilia
Saint Agnes of Rome
Saint Agatha of Sicily
Saint Christina of Bolsena
Euphrosyne of Alexandria
Blessed Anastasia
Blessed Theodota
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Saint Natalia of Nicomedia
Saint Afra
Several female saints who were forced to watch their children being martyred:
blessed Felicia
blessed Julitta
Saint Blandina
Several ladies who served the Apostles:
Drusiana
Susanna
Maximilla
Saint Ephigenia
Helena of Adiabene
Saint Plautilla
Saints Julian
Basilissa
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Appendix B
Full quote from The City of Ladies by Pizan
Here is the extended quote which showcase how Pizan presents the role of daughters, a
conversation between Christine and Lady Reason:
My lady, your words make it very clear that the accusations against women are
completely unfounded, and I realize more than ever that they do them an enormous
injustice. Yet I can’t help bringing up a tradition that is quite com- mon among men and
even some women: when women become pregnant and give birth to girls, their husbands
are upset. Many of them complain because their wives have not presented them with a
son. And their foolish wives, instead of being ecstatic that God has granted them a safe
delivery and feel- ing profoundly grateful, are unhappy as well because they see their
husbands upset. Why is it, my lady, that they become so distressed? Are daughters a
greater burden to their parents than sons or less affectionate and more indifferent toward
them than boys?
My dear friend”, replied Lady Reason, “since you ask me the reason why this happens, I
can assure you that it is because those who become distressed by this are extremely
foolish and ignorant. The main reason why they are upset, however, is that they are
thinking about the money they will have to pay from their own pockets to marry their
daughters off. Others are distressed because they fear that a young, ignorant girl could be
led astray by a smooth- talking male. But none of these reasons stands up to close
scrutiny. As regards their fear that their daughters might dishonor themselves, their
parents only need to raise them in a sensible manner and make sure the mothers set a
good example through their own integrity and propriety, because if a mother leads a
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dissolute life, she sets a bad example for her daughter. Also, daughters should be kept
from bad company, raised by strict rules, and taught to fear God, because discipline
prepares children and adolescents to lead exemplary lives. (Pizan 106)
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Appendix C: Full Text and Translation of Sátira Filosófica by Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz
Arguye de inconsecuentes el gusto y la

Queréis, con presunción necia,

censura de los hombres que en las mujeres

hallar a la que buscáis,

acusan lo que causan

para pretendida, Thais,

Hombres necios que acusáis

y en la posesión, Lucrecia.

a la mujer sin razón,
sin ver que sois la ocasión

¿Que humor puede ser más raro

de lo mismo que culpáis:

que el que, falto de consejo,

si con ansia sin igual

él mismo empaña el espejo,

solicitáis su desdén,

y siente que no esté claro?

¿por qué queréis que obren bien
si las incitáis al mal?

Con el favor y el desdén
tenéis condición igual,

Combatís su resistencia

quejándoos, si os tratan mal,

y luego, con gravedad,

burlándoos, si os quieren bien.

decís que fue livianidad
lo que hizo la diligencia.

Opinión, ninguna gana;
pues la que más se recata,

Parecer quiere el denuedo

si no os admite, es ingrata,

de vuestro parecer loco,

y si os admite, es liviana.

al niño que pone el coco
y luego le tiene miedo.

Siempre tan necios andáis
que, con desigual nivel,
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a una culpáis por cruel

¿O cuál es más de culpar,

y a otra por fácil culpáis.

aunque cualquiera mal haga:
la que peca por la paga,

¿Pues cómo ha de estar templada

o el que paga por pecar?

la que vuestro amor pretende,
si la que es ingrata, ofende,

Pues ¿para qué os espantáis

y la que es fácil, enfada?

de la culpa que tenéis?
Queredlas cual las hacéis

Mas, entre el enfado y pena

o hacedlas cual las buscáis.

que vuestro gusto refiere,
bien haya la que no os quiere

Dejad de solicitar,

y quejaos en hora buena.

y después, con más razón,
acusaréis la afición

Dan vuestras amantes penas

de la que os fuere a rogar.

a sus libertades alas,
y después de hacerlas malas

Bien con muchas armas fundo

las queréis hallar muy buenas.

que lidia vuestra arrogancia,
pues en promesa e instancia

¿Cuál mayor culpa ha tenido
en una pasión errada:
la que cae de rogada,
o el que ruega de caído?

juntáis diablo, carne y mundo.
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A Philosophical Satire
She proves the inconsistency of the caprice

Your mad presumption knows no bounds,

and criticism of men who accuse women of

though for a wife you want Lucrece,

what they cause

in lovers you prefer Thais,
thus seeking blessings to compound.

Misguided men, who will chastise
a woman when no blame is due,

If knowingly one clouds a mirror

oblivious that it is you

– was ever humor so absurd

who prompted what you criticize;

or good counsel so obscured? –

if your passions are so strong

can he lament that it’s not clearer?

that you elicit their disdain,
how can you wish that they refrain

From either favor or disdain

when you incite them to their wrong?

the selfsame purpose you achive,
if they love, they are deceived,

You strive to topple their defense,

if they love not, hear you complain.

and then, with utmost gravity,
you credit sensuality

There is no woman suits your taste,

for what was won with diligence.

though circumspection be her virtue:
ungrateful, she who does not love you,

Your daring must be qualified,

yet she who does, you judge unchaste.

your sense is no less senseless than
the child who calls the boogeyman,

You men are such a foolish breed,

then weeps when he is terrified.

appraising with a faulty rule,
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the first you charge with being cruel,

Whose is the greater guilt therein

the second, easy, you decree.

when either’s conduct may dismay:
she who sins and takes the pay,

So how can she temperate,

or he who pays her for the sin?

the one who would her love expend?
if not willing, she offends,

Why, for sins you’re guilty of,

but willing, she infuriates.

do you, amazed, your blame debate?
either love what you create

Amid the anger and torment

or else create what you can love.

your whimsy causes you to bear,
one may be found who does not care:

Were not it better to forebear,

how quickly then is grievance vent.

and thus, with finer motivation,
obtain the unforced admiration

So lovingly you inflict paon

of her you plotted to ensnare?

the inhibitions fly away;
how, after leading them astray,

But no, I dream you still will revel

can you wish them without stain?

in your arms and arrogance,
and in promise and persistence

Who does the greater guilt incur
when a passion is misleading?
she who errs and heeds his pleading,
or he who pleads with her to err?

adjoin flesh and world and devil

325
Appendix D

And so I entered the religious order, knowing that life there entailed certain conditions (I
refer to superficial, and not fundamental, regards) most repugnant to my nature; but given
the total antipathy I felt for marriage, I deemed convent life the least unsuitable and the
most honorable I could elect if I were to insure my salvation. Working against that end,
first (as, finally, the most important) was the matter of all the trivial aspects of my nature
that nourished my pride, such as wishing to live alone, and wishing to have no obligatory
occupation that would inhibit the freedom of my studies, nor the sounds of a community
that would intrude upon the peaceful silence of my books. (Sor Juana 13,15)
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Appendix F
Genesis 2:20-25
The man gave names to all cattle, and to the birds of the air, and to every animal of the field; but
for the man there was not found a helper as his partner. So the LORD God caused a deep sleep to
fall upon the man, and he slept; then he took one of his ribs and closed up its place with flesh.
And the rib that the LORD God had taken from the man he made into a woman and brought her
to the man. Then the man said, ‘This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; this one
shall be called Woman, for out of Man this one was taken.’ Therefore a man leaves his father and
his mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh. And the man and his wife were
both naked, and were not ashamed.
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Appendix G
Genesis 3:1-8
Now the serpent was more crafty than any other wild animal that the LORD God had made. He
said to the woman, ‘Did God say, 'You shall not eat from any tree in the garden'?’ The woman
said to the serpent, "We may eat of the fruit of the trees in the garden; but God said, 'You shall
not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of the garden, nor shall you touch it, or you
shall die. '" But the serpent said to the woman, ‘You will not die; for God knows that when you
eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.’ So when
the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the
tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to
her husband, who was with her, and he ate. Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew
that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made loincloths for themselves.
They heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden at the time of the evening breeze,
and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among the trees of
the garden.
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1

This will be further explored in Chapter 1 in conjunction with how maternal aesthetics has added layers to our
understanding of the gaze by including the recognition of the mother by the infant.
2
The report “is the result of over a year of data collection and analysis by scholars and students at the Media,
Diversity, & Social Change Initiative (MDSC) at the University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for
Communication and Journalism” (CARD 2).
3
A chapter on Visual and Other Pleasures
4
In Chapter 5, this discussion will be expanded from the psychoanalytic lens to the social analysis of the gaze.
5
As per the Oxford dictionary: “an innate mechanism that controls the physiological activities of an organism which
change on a daily, seasonal, yearly, or other regular cycle. Commonly used to make references to the female fertility
affected by age.
6
Including Full Surrogacy Now by Sophie Lewis.
7
A woman whose job is to breastfeed a child that is not her own.
8
More on this when we discuss Ruddick and Irigaray
9
Sex/gender refers to those instances where the author may had indicated sex or gender but which may be limited to
biology, this is done in order to differentiate from the differences that will be stablished later on this Chapter
between gender and sex.
10
In this sentence, mother is being used as a verb.
11
This is based on Marx’s notes on Lewis Henry Morgan, Henry Sumner Maine and Ludwig Lange.
12
Later on, in Chapter 2 we will see at what Karl Marx said about the family and the mother.
13
See Appendix A for the full list of women mentioned in The City of Ladies
14
See Appendix B for full quote
15
Part II and later on is celebrated as queen of the City in Part III
16
Original publication 1620, her revision of 1641, the quotes in this manuscript are from the revision.
17
Is worth noting that she was an avid reader of the stoics and identified herself with many of the Jesuit theology.
18
Look at Appendix C for full text and for English translation.
19
Look at Appendix D for English translation.
20
Juana Inés de Asbaje y Ramírez de Santillana
21
This manuscript will not dive into the patriarchal/matriarchal discourse. Throughout this manuscript patriarchy
and matriarchy will be seem on the same realm as a power structure. On the one hand one indicates the power of the
governance of the family falls upon the father and while the other upon the mother.
22
A chapter from her book Feminist Theories from Margin to Center, 1984
23
This will be examined in Chapter 3
24
Jean Piaget was a psychologist who focused his research on child development, leading him to developed several
theories including his most famous one among psychologists and educators, his theory of genetic epistemology. He
created a series of questions to evaluate how a child’s mind works and how it develops. The reference in the text as a
comparison to Linker is due to the fact that Piaget studied his three children from infancy, his children were also his
subject studies.
25
I need to explain who they are here.
26
The acts of becoming are also key to understand the historical progression of societal genderized prescriptions of
behavior, which lead to certain placements, displacements and dispossessions. Later on, in chapter 3 we will notice
how the ideas and performances of becoming are influencing new categorizations of being that allow for the
visibilities of others. Moving such into the promotion and approval of statues and laws that allow for new
legislations of inclusion, including the New York City’s Intro 954-A which allows non-binary conformed
individuals to change their legal gender to a neutral option.
27
For example, infanticide mothers, we will look at this more in detail on Chapter 3
28
Surrogate parents.
29
Here we can say the becoming a mother starts with the legal power structure that allows for such adoption.
30
Conservative in this manuscript is viewed as that which is “averse to change or innovation and holding traditional
values”(Oxford Dictionary), it is also viewed in its political sense as “favoring free enterprise, private ownership,
and socially traditional ideas” (ibis)

330

31

I state “possible physiological becoming” in order to allow some room of acknowledgement of pregnancies that
for multiple reasons do not come to full term, also to highlight that not all pregnant bodies become mothers, nor do
all identify as such.
32
In the instance of IVF the pregnant body knows when they are pregnant, because the embryo will be implanted.
33
In the kinesthetic sense and not limited to maternity bodily state upon which the embodiment of motherhood shifts
in the multiple spaces it is inhabits when the child is present, but also during its physical absence.
34
According to the American Pregnancy Association, a D&C procedure is “also known as dilation and curettage, is
a surgical procedure often performed after a first-trimester miscarriage. In a D&C, dilation refers to opening the
cervix; curettage refers to removing the contents of the uterus. Curettage may be performed by scraping the uterine
wall with a curette instrument or by a suction curettage (also called vacuum aspiration)” (website).
35
According to the Encyclopedia Britanica, In economics, preference theory is “a theory, introduced by the
American economist Paul Samuelson in 1938, that holds that consumers’ preferences can be revealed by what they
purchase under different circumstances, particularly under different income and price circumstances. The theory
entails that if a consumer purchases a specific bundle of goods, then that bundle is “revealed preferred”, given
constant income and prices, to any other bundle that the consumer could afford. By varying income or prices or
both, an observer can infer a representative model of the consumer’s preferences.
36
Care beyond/outside of parental roles or professions, here we can include the care for an elder, sibling, etc…
37
This would varied based on whether the individual differentiates between sexed and gendered bodies. It should be
noted that popular understanding still sees women and equal to a sexed body, as such, “a woman” or “a female”
within the definition of mother, are used interchangeably by most individuals.
38
Babylonian creation myth.
39
First ancient empire of Mesopotamia
40
This is a quote from Naissance translated by Sauneron and Yoyotte included in History of Religious Ideas Vol. 1
by Marcia Eliade
41 “
Fetomaternal microchimerism (FMc) is a special form of chimerism observed in placental vertebrates in whom a
small number of fetal cells called PAPCs migrate into the mother and integrate into maternal organs during
pregnancy. In humans, PAPCs have been described to persist in mothers almost three decades
postpartum1 suggesting that they have long-term survival and engraftment capabilities.” Definition from the
“Fetomaternal microchimerism: some answers and many new questions” by Kian Hwa Tan, Xiao Xia Zeng, Piriya
Sasajala, Ailing Yeo, and Gerald Udolph
42
More detailed statistics can be found at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
43
I will not discuss Mulvey’s analysis of time and narrative delay as it related to the gaze, but is worth mentioning
that Mulvey’s latest work expands onto the analysis of how the spectator’s experiences have changed in recent times
since the VHS/DVD and now streaming possibilities where the spectator has the ability (if desired or needed) to
control their gaze by controlling the speed of the film or by skipping scenes.
44
Hooks acknowledges that this is no longer the case, but she is presenting this to illustrate the development of
black male spectatorship.
45
This information is presented in “Maternal oxytocin response predicts mother-to-infant gaze” and in “Gaze
Synchrony between Mothers with Mood Disorder and Their Infants: Maternal Emotion Dysregulation Matters”
46
Many of these were paused and delayed due to the impact of COVID-19 on production and viewing of films.
47
Mainly based on the clasifications presented in the work of Elisabeth Badinter, Neil Gilbert, and Katherine
Hakim.
48
Empty nester is defined as a parent whose children have grown up and left home
49
Toward a more holistic understanding of filicide:A multidisciplinary analysis of 32 years of U.S. arrest data by
Timothy Y. Mariano, Heng Choon (Oliver) Chan, Wade C. Myers, 2014.
Filicide in the United States by Philip J. Resnick, December 2016.
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